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EXPLORING	THE	“GREY	ZONE”:	THE	THEORY	AND	
REALITY	 OF	 “HYBRID	 REGIMES”	 IN	 POST-
COMMUNISTIC	COUNTRIES1,2	
	
	
David	PROCHÁZKA	and	Ladislav	CABADA3	……………………………………………………………………….……………………………………		
The	new	multiple-configuration	of	 the	 international	 relations	and	
especially	 the	 break-down	 of	 the	 non-democratic	 regimes	 of	 the	
Soviet-type	 created	 the	 need	 for	 scholars	 to	 address	 new	
classifications	 of	 emerging	 regimes.	 The	 contribution	 of	 the	
presented	 text	 to	 the	 debate	 on	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	 is	 twofold.	 The	
authors	strive	to	wholesomely	introduce	the	debate,	genealogy	and	
intellectual	 background	 of	 this	 line	 of	 research,	 exploring	 if	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 employ	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	 to	 define	 the	
character	 of	 selected	 cases	 and	 simultaneously,	 if	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
change	 the	 paradigm	 of	 classification	 of	 studied	 regimes	 in	 the	
region	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe.	 In	 this	 text,	 the	 authors	
understand	various	conceptualizations	of	“hybrid	regimes”	as	a	unit	
on	 a	 different	 level	 on	 the	 ‘’ladder	 of	 abstraction’.	 Therefore	 the	
authors	emphasize	the	theoretical	employment	of	 ‘hybrid	regimes’	
as	a	‘meta-concept’,	analysing	the	recent	development	in	Hungary.		
	
Key	words:	hybrid	 regimes;	 grey	 zone	 of	 regimes;	 East-Central	Europe;	Hungary.		
	
	
1	INTRODUCTION		 Since	the	one-party	non-democratic	regimes	of	the	Soviet	bloc	fell,	and	the	new	multipolar	world	configuration	has	started	taking	shape,	political	scientists	need	to	 address	 the	 classification	 of	 regimes	 that	 are	 hard	 to	 fit	 into	 traditional	typologies.	The	necessity	to	re-imagine	the	regime	classification	is	reinforced	by	the	 increasing	 number	 of	 democratic	 transitions	 and	 the	 reverberating	 third	wave	of	democratisation.	Due	to	the	significant	change	of	the	research	subjects	–	
 1	This	article	is	the	outcome	of	the	project	 ‘Hybrid	regimes	theory	in	the	East-Central	European	context’	 (E24-66)	 carried	 out	 through	 the	 Internal	 Grant	 Agency	 at	 Metropolitan	 University	Prague.	We	are	grateful	to	the	university	for	the	support.	2	 The	 authors	 would	 like	 to	 express	 their	 gratitude	 to	 Olga	 Brunnerová,	 MA,	 for	 her	 helpful	comments	as	well	as	the	improvement	of	the	language	quality	of	the	article.		3	David	PROCHÁZKA	is	an	internal	Ph.D.	candidate	in	the	Department	of	Humanities	and	Political	Science,	 Metropolitan	 University	 Prague/Czech	 Republic.	 Ladislav	 CABADA	 is	 associate	professor	 of	 Comparative	 Politics	 at	 Metropolitan	 University	 Prague	 and	 University	 of	West	Bohemia	 in	 Pilsen,	 Czech	 Republic,	 permanent	 Visiting	 Scholar	 at	 the	 National	 University	 of	Public	Service	in	Budapest,	Hungary,	and	Co-Editor	of	Politics	in	Central	Europe.	
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i.e.	the	political	regimes	–	in	recent	decades,	political	scientists	have	suggested	alternative	 typologies	 and	 new	 terminologies.	 Or,	 to	 be	 more	 precise,	 they	introduced	 new	 conceptualisations	 of	 political	 regimes.	 The	 change	 of	 the	regime’s	character,	however,	does	not	only	concern	the	large	group	of	actors	of	the	former	post-communistic	bloc,	Pacific	Asia	or	Latin	America.	The	end	of	the	Cold	War	saw	the	emergence	of	new	states,	which	frequently	deviated	from	the	ideal	 types	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 or	 slightly	 different	 types	 of	 non-democratic	regimes.4			As	expected,	 this	situation	has	opened	the	door	 for	more	 than	 two	decades	of	debate	on	so-called	‘hybrid	regimes’,	which	has	become	an	inseparable	part	of	the	 broader	 discussion	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 democracy,	 authoritarianism	 and	 the	examination	of	the	character	of	the	regimes	as	such.	In	the	present	day,	it	seems	entirely	inconceivable	that	the	topic	of	 ‘hybrid	regimes’	could	be	omitted	from	research.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	the	plethora	of	regimes	on	the	political	map	can	be	 categorised	 into	 these	 classifications	 and	 concepts.	 It	 is	 difficult,	 if	 not	impossible,	to	categorise	these	political	systems	and	states	using	classifications	created	in	the	past.		The	exceptionally	turbulent	development	of	political	regimes	in	the	countries	of	the	former	Soviet	bloc	serve	as	the	primary	motivation	for	this	study.	Related	to	the	‘westernisation’	of	a	large	group	of	the	central	European	countries,	which	in	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century	became	part	of	the	vital	integration-oriented	organisations	established	exclusively,	or	besides	other	factors,	on	the	democratic	nature	 of	 its	members	 (as	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 European	 Union	 or	 NATO).	Political	 scientists	 have	 mostly	 agreed	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 countries	 have	successfully	undergone	the	transition	from	non-democratic	regime	of	the	Soviet	type	towards	liberal	democracy	and	have	become	a	part	of	the	group	of	classical,	consolidated	liberal	democracies	(see	Kubát	2005,	163;	Hrdličková	2011,	72–77;	Bureš,	 Charvát,	 Just	 and	 Štefek	 2012;	 Heydemann	 and	 Vodička	 eds.,	 2013).	However,	the	seemingly	firm	democratic	foundations	in	many	newly	established	democracies	quickly	began	to	crumble	as	the	economic	crisis	erupted	in	2008,	followed	by	the	subsequent	period	of	polycrisis	in	the	European	Union	(see	Ágh	2019).	This	period	saw,	among	other	aspects,	the	rise	of	populism	in	numerous	European	countries	and	non-liberal	tendencies,	which	gained	traction	in	some	countries	in	central	and	eastern	European	(see	Kubát,	Mejstřík	and	Kocián	2016).	Adding	 to	 this	 was	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 so-called	 Arab	 spring,	 as	 well	 as	 the	subsequent	migration	crisis	in	the	context	of	the	civil	wars	in	the	Middle	East	and	the	North	African	(MENA)	countries.			The	primary	aim	of	this	text	is	to	clarify	and	refine	the	debate	on	hybrid	regimes	from	a	theoretical	perspective,	as	it	is	not	firmly	anchored	in	scholarly	research.	This	 debate	was	 (and	 still	 is)	 not	 only	 dynamic	 but	 also	 visibly	 linked	 to	 the	tendencies	 to	 prefer,	 at	 least	 partially,	 innovation	 over	 the	 effort	 to	 establish	generalisations	 as	 to	 the	 crucial	 foundations	 of	 a	 theoretical	 framework.	 As	 J.	Bílek	notes	in	his	text	on	hybrid	regimes,	the	research	effort	often	resembles	a	contest	of	who	will	sooner	come	up	with	an	even	more	ground-breaking	concept,	rather	 than	an	effort	 to	 resolve	existing	 research	problems	 (Bílek	2015,	213).	Hence,	 many	 diverse	 conceptualisations	 have	 been	 introduced	 (and	 are	 still	
 4	Nonetheless,	we	do	not	consider	the	third	wave	of	democratisation	the	only	source	of	the	’hybrid’	regime's	debate.	An	important	influence	was	without	doubt	the	evolution	of	the	so-called	Asia	model	of	democracy	with	the	limited	liberal	elements.	After	all,	L.	Diamond,	J.	J.	Linz	and	S.	M.	Lipset	 had	 already	 introduced	 their	 concept	 of	 ‘semi-democracy’	 in	 1988	 (Diamond,	 Linz	and	Lipset	 1988).	 Furthermore,	 the	 influential	 work	 of	 Zakaria	 on	 non-liberal	 democracies	(Zakaria	1997)	also	focuses	predominantly	on	countries	other	than	the	post-communistic	bloc	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.		
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being	 created	 today)	which	 are	 then	 ungainly	 applied	 by	 even	 the	 most	renowned	 scholars,	 leading	 to	 a	 vast	 number	 of	 methodological	 errors	 and	unclarities.		This	paper	has	two	primary	goals.	Firstly,	from	the	theoretical	perspective,	the	aim	 is	 to	 wholesomely	 introduce	 the	 debate,	 genealogy	 of	 research	 and	intellectual	 background	 from	 which	 the	 specific	 concepts	 of	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	emerged,	and	to	present	the	broader	context	of	the	debate	over	the	character	of	political	regimes.	The	second	goal	 is	 to	examine	the	concept	of	a	 ‘grey	zone	of	regimes’	 by	 T.	 Carothers	 (2002)	which	 surpasses	 by	 its	 essence	 all	 the	 other	concepts,	 and	we	 understand	 it	 as	 a	 ‘meta-concept’.	We	 strive	 to	 answer	 the	(twofold)	research	question:			RQ1a:	Is	it	possible	to	reliably	employ	the	‘meta-concept’	of	the	‘hybrid	regimes’	when	attempting	to	define	the	character	of	regimes	that	are	being	analysed?			RQ1b:	And,	simultaneously,	is	it	possible	to	start	thinking	about	these	particular	regimes	 in	 a	 different	 classification	 than	 the	 classical	 category	 of	 liberal	democracy,	under	which	they	were	grouped	for	some	time	after	the	transition	from	a	non-democratic	regime	of	Soviet-type?		The	new	state	of	polycrisis	in	the	EU	and	the	de-democratisation	in	Central	and	Eastern	 Europe,	 or	 to	 be	 more	 precise,	 the	 evident	 transformation	 of	 the	character	 of	 these	 regimes,	 present	 challenges	 when	 analysing	 the	 existing	concepts	 related	 to	 the	 contextually	different	 characters	and	 types	of	 regimes	that	do	not	fall	in	the	liberal	democracy	category.	We	contribute	to	the	academic	debate	 by	 answering	 the	 question	 if	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 unfinished	 or	insufficient	 consolidation	 of	 political	 regimes	 in	 certain	 new	 democracies	 of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	is	a	sufficient	 impulse	to	change	this	paradigm.	In	other	words,	we	aim	to	examine	if	instead	of	the	long-standing	classification,	it	is	beneficial	to	start	thinking	about	these	regimes	primarily	in	the	context	of	‘meta-concept’	 of	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	 and	 to	 perceive	 them	 as	 ‘non-democratic	 non-authoritarian	regimes’	(Gilbert	and	Mohseni	2011,	271).		The	study	is	structured	as	follows.	In	the	introductory,	the	theoretical	part	and	critical	concepts	are	examined.	As	we	will	demonstrate,	these	concepts	form	an	integral	part	of	this	line	of	research.	This	section	aims	to	familiarise	the	reader	with	the	genealogy	of	the	origin	of	the	hybrid	regime	concepts	in	the	context	of	the	 debates	 about	 many	 deviations	 from	 classical	 ideal	 types	 of	 democracy,	authoritarianism	on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 continuum	and	 to	 provide	 a	 critical	reflection	 on	 these	 concepts.	 When	 the	 exploration	 of	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	 is	considered,	 from	 the	 beginning	 we	 encounter	 a	 great	 number	 of	 unclarities,	methodological	errors,	and	,	by	many	existing	conceptualisations,	what	we	could	call	‘conceptual	confusion’	(Gilbert	and	Mohseni	2011).	Precisely	for	that	reason,	it	 is	 imperative	 to	open	 this	analysis	with	a	discussion	on	 the	development	of	these	 concepts	 and	our	perception	of	 its	 content	 as	well	 as	 usefulness.	 In	 the	second,	empirical	part	of	this	article,	we	will	then	test	if	understanding	‘hybrid	regimes’	 as	 a	 ‘meta-concept’	 on	 real-life	 cases	 from	 the	 Central	 and	 Eastern	Europe	 (in	 particular,	 Hungary)	 is	 useful.	 The	 concept	 is	 here	 applied	 in	accordance	 to	 its	 name,	 as	 the	 ‘grey	 area	of	 regimes’	 in	which	we	believe	 the	analysed	countries	can	be	found,	albeit	in	different	measure,	form	and	character,	and	manifestations	of	particular	features	subjected	to	analysis.					
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     7 
 
 
	
2	THE	PHENOMENON	OF	’HYBRID	REGIMES’	AND	ITS	GENEALOGY	IN	
ACADEMICAL	RESEARCH		As	 pointed	 out	 by	 L.	 Diamond,	 before	 the	 disintegration	 of	 the	 bipolar	constellation,	there	were	periods	when	determining	whether	a	given	state	was	a	democracy	or	not	was	relatively	easy.	Alternatively,	at	least,	there	was	more	or	less	a	universal	consensus	about	the	appropriate	answer	(Diamond	2002,	21).	Nevertheless,	 as	 was	 mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 of	 this	 article,	 with	 the	disintegration	of	the	bipolar	world	order	and	the	fading	away	of	the	third	wave	of	democratisation	(Huntington	1991)	a	plethora	of	new	regimes	emerged,	which	are	impossible	to	categorise	under	the	existing	classical	typologies	easily.			Although	the	term	‘hybrid	regimes’	appeared	in	literature	at	the	turn	of	the	80s	and	90s	of	the	20th	century,	predominantly	due	to	the	study	of	T.	L.	Karl	focused	on	El	Salvador	(Karl	1995),	the	discussion	about	regimes	that	stand	somewhere	‘in	 between’	 started	 much	 earlier.	 For	 instance,	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘quasi-democracy’	proposed	by	S.	Finer	or	the	concept	of	the	‘near	polyarchy’	created	by	 classical	 author	 R.	 Dahl	 (Dahl	 1971).	 The	 actual	 term	 ‘hybrid	 regime’	 is	preceded	by	the	concept	of	so-called	‘weakened	authoritarianism’	(dictablanda)	and	 ‘weakened	 democracy’	 (democratura)	 (Schmitter	 and	 O’Donnell	 1986),	which	 originated	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 Latin	 American	 states.	 As	 L.	 Diamond	points	 out,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 multiparty	 configuration	 originating	 from	 the	electoral	 systems	 in	 South	 American	 countries	 shows	 that	 evidence	 of	authoritarianism	was	not	foreign	even	in	the	era	of	the	60s	and	70s	(Diamond	2002,	23).			Before	 we	 launch	 into	 the	 effort	 to	 present	 the	 evolution	 of	 ‘hybrid	 regime’	research,	it	is	necessary	to	focus	on	the	term	‘regime’	itself	and	the	question	of	how	 to	 perceive	 it	 within	 the	 analysis.	 The	 cornerstone	 here	 is	 the	 precise	separation	of	this	unit	of	analysis	from	the	state	itself	which	quite	often	presents	an	arduous	task	for	political	scientists.	As	V.	Dvořáková,	R.	Buben	and	J.	Němec	(2012,	45)	bring	to	attention,	‘in	political	science	we	encounter	moments,	where	the	types	of	states	are	arbitrarily	interchanged,	and	there	is	a	lack	of	agreement	on	 whether	 particular	 characteristics	 belong	 to	 the	 state	 or	 the	 regime’.	 The	development	in	the	perception	of	this	term	hampered	its	application	and	many	authors	brought	into	the	discussion	individually	adapted	concepts,	which	were	to	a	certain	degree	in	contradiction	or	lost	their	usefulness	or	applicability	over	time.	 It	 is	 thus	 necessary	 to	 examine	 the	 current	 situation	 around	 the	term	 ’regime’,	 especially	when	studying	hybrid	 regimes.	From	all	 the	possible	definitions	we	selected	the	one	created	by	L.	Morlino,	who	defines	a	regime	in	a	way	which	is	applicable	for	this	text	also	when	it	comes	to	the	empirical	part:	‘as	regards	 the	 term	 "regime",	 consideration	 will	 be	 given	 here	 to	 "	 "the	 set	 of	government	institutions	and	norms	that	are	either	formalized	or	are	informally	recognized	as	 existing	 in	 a	 given	 territory	and	 respect	 to	 a	 given	population”’	(Morlino	2010,	29).	We	have	to	point	out	though,	that	the	nature	of	the	‘hybrid	regime’	 lies	 particularly	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	functioning	of	a	regime	and	its	institutions	(Karl	1995).		One	 of	 the	 fundamental	 theoretical	 and	 methodological	 problems	 that	 the	current	 analysis	 of	 regimes	 had	 to	 address	 was	 the	 determination	 of	 the	boundaries	where,	so	to	say,	’one	regime’	(or	concept)	ends,	and	where	it	begins.	Considering	 that	 the	 examined	 regimes	 can	 be	 located	 on	 the	 spectrum	 from	‘liberal	 democracy’	 to	 ’authoritarianism’,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 define	 these	 limit	points.	T.	L.	Karl	and	P.	Schmitter	tackled	this	task	in	their	text	‘What	democracy	
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is...	and	is	not’	(1991),	which	not	only	fits	the	given	period	but	can	also	be	directly	applied	to	the	analysis	of	regimes.	The	authors	lay	down	eleven	basic	conditions	which	 must	 be	 present	 in	 order	 to	 consider	 this	 regime	 from	 the	 functional	perspective	as	a	democracy	(Karl	and	Schmitter	1991,	107).	We	regard	this	text	to	be	a	contribution	to	the	academic	debate,	which	is	more	empirically	bearing	than	the	never-ending	discussion	on	which	the	definition	is	fundamental	when	it	comes	to	the	future	research	and	the	debate	itself.5	However,	as	J.	Bílek	reminds	us,	 pointing	 towards	 the	 work	 of	 G.	 Goertz	 (2006),	 in	 order	 to	 present	 a	methodologically	‘untainted’	concept	in	social	sciences,	it	is	necessary	to	define	both	 ends	 of	 the	 spectrum.	 That	 is,	 every	 concept	 should	 dispose	 of	 both	 a	positive	 definition	 (democracy)	 and	 a	 negative	 one	 (authoritarianism)	 (Bílek	2015,	219).			On	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 facts	 mentioned	 earlier,	 there	 are	 two	 possible	approaches	to	grasping	hybrid	regimes	from	a	theoretical	standpoint.	The	first	one	 is	 dichotomous,	 which	 perceives	 a	 hybrid	 regime	 as	 an	 ‘incomplete’	democracy	 or	 ‘incomplete’	 authoritarianism.	 Between	 these	 concepts,	 we	 can	categorise	 for	 example	 the	 text	 of	 Levitsky	 and	 Way	 (2010),	 but	 also	 as	 a	particular	 predecessor	 the	 approach	 of	 P.	 Schmitter	 and	 G.	 O'Donnell	 (1986)	mentioned	 above.	 If	 we	 want	 to	 examine	 hybrid	 regimes	 as	 a	 specific	 and	independent	type	of	regime,	 it	 is	 logically	necessary	to	employ	a	trichotomous	approach,	 in	 which	 we	 introduce	 the	 term	 ‘hybrid	 regime’	 next	 to	 terms	 of	‘democracy’	and	‘authoritarianism’.	Between	these	seminal	works	that	inspired	this	approach,	we	see	as	an	initiative	the	contribution	of	T.	L.	Karl	(1995)	and	(Bílek	2015,	215).				
3	HYBRID	REGIMES	AS	A	’META-CONCEPT’			Due	to	the	methodological	complexity	that	we	mentioned	before,	and	primarily	due	to	the	variability,	we	believe	that	it	is	prudent	to	regard	hybrid	regimes	as	a	‘meta-concept’.	This	is	because,	despite	all	the	doubts	about	its	applicability,	we	can	say	that	the	particular	subtypes	can	be	incorporated	in	this	concept	in	full	length,	no	matter	if	one	or	the	other	approach	is	chosen.	It	is	then	only	up	to	the	researcher	which	of	 the	specific	approaches	 they	will	employ	 in	 the	empirical	research.	They	can	understand	hybrid	regimes	as	weakened	types	of	the	outside	points	of	the	spectrum	democracy,	thus	authoritarianism.	Or	they	may	employ	the	trichotomy	variant	and	perceive	a	‘hybrid	regime’	as	a	distinctive	category	as	does,	for	example,	the	inspiring	text	of	J.	Bílek	(2015).	In	both	cases,	there	are	concepts	we	can	see	as	attempts	to	deal	with	the	‘grey	zone’	(Carothers	2002),	and	we	can	label	them	‘hybrid’,	yet	with	a	higher	degree	of	abstractions	and	a	higher	degree	of	analytical	units.			At	the	turn	of	the	century	the	approach	towards	terms	related	to	‘hybrid	regimes’	started	to	change	and	instead	the	so-called	‘adjective	democracies’	(Merkel	2004;	Zakaria	 1997;	 Collier	 and	 Levitsky	 2007)	 and	 other	 concepts	 based	 on	 the	adjective	 ‘authoritarianism’	 started	 to	 appear	 (Schedler	 2006;	 Schedler	 2013;	Levitsky	 and	 Way	 2010).	 This	 was	 caused	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 political	 science	research	started	to	emphasise	authoritarian	aspects	and	tendencies	rather	than	democratic	ones,	which	were	logically	in	high	demand	after	the	disintegration	of	the	 bipolar	 world	 division	 (Gilbert	 and	 Mohseni	 2011,	 273).	 As	 R.	 Brooker	mentions	 (2014,	 35),	 this	 approach	 is	 based	 on	 a	 disillusion	 of	 sorts	 which	
 5	 A	 great	 explanation	 on	 possible	 interpretations	 of	 democracy,	 various	 definitions	 and	 their	application	are	present	in	the	works	of	Š.	Drahokoupil	(2014)	and	J.	Bílek	(2015).		
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appeared	 in	 the	 relationship	 towards	 the	 reality	 of	 numerous	 unsuccessful	transitions,	starting	with	the	disintegration	of	the	eastern	bloc	and	linked	to	the	ablation	 of	 the	 third	 wave	 of	 democracy.	 To	 a	 certain	 degree,	 this	 approach	influenced	 the	 entire	 subsequent	 discourse	 as	 well	 as	 the	 consideration	 of	regimes	in	‘the	grey	zone’	and	it	shifted	the	debate	into	its	current	shape,	in	which	adjective	authoritarianism	prevails	over	adjective	democracies.			The	next	question	which	needs	to	be	addressed	when	analysing	‘hybrid	regimes’	is	the	matter	of	their	origin.	Due	to	the	fact	that	as	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century	drew	to	an	end,	about	30%	of	the	world’s	states	(containing	about	one	third	of	the	world’s	population	(Morlino	2010,	28))	were	categorized	under	the	‘meta-concept’	of	‘hybrid	regimes’,	it	is	clear	that	the	mere	assumption	of	cultural	and	 geographical	 (or	 regional)	 fragmentation	 brings	 more	 trajectories	 and	feasible	points	of	origins	of	hybrid	regimes.	However,	T.	Carothers	mentions	that	there	 is	 one	 facet	 that	 newly	 emerged	 regimes	 share,	 which	 is	 a	 general	movement	 ‘away	 from	 dictatorial	 rule	 toward	 more	 liberal	 and	 often	 more	democratic	governance’	(Carothers	2002,	6).	This	was	certainly	true	in	the	period	when	T.	Carothers	introduced	his	text	(2002).	However,	that	reality	changed	with	the	 polycrisis,	 as	 will	 be	 delineated	 in	 the	 following	 part	 of	 this	 text.	 These	foundations	and	suppositions	then	contribute	to	the	dispersion	of	research	and	the	lack	of	its	embeddedness	as	E.	Baracani	(2010)	points	out	in	Democratization	
and	Hybrid	Regimes:	International	Anchoring	and	Domestic	Dynamics	in	European	
Post-Soviet	 States.	 While	 the	 last	 four	 decades	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 are	characteristic	 for	 the	number	of	democratic	regimes	rising	across	regions,	 the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century	is	to	a	certain	degree	its	reversal,	which	political	scientists,	 including	 Carothers,	 could	 not	 have	 anticipated.	 The	 increase	 in	democratic	regimes	has	stopped	and,	on	the	contrary,	we	see	certain	indications	of	their	‘erosion’	(Baracani	2010,	1).	This	is	exactly	why	it	is	necessary	to	focus	on	the	situation	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	in	which	this	matter	is	a	direct	concern.			From	the	theoretical	standpoint,	there	are	several	elementary	variations	on	the	emergence	of	a	‘hybrid	regime’.	For	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	which	is	studied	in	 this	 paper,	 the	 most	 important	 variation	 appears	 to	 be	 those	 that	 can	 be	labelled	 ‘weakening’	 of	 the	 limit	 points	 of	 the	 continuum:	 democracy	 and	authoritarianism.	Specifically,	the	weakening	of	democratic	institutions	and	(to	a	certain	degree)	the	demand	for	this	process,	the	character	of	the	given	regimes	necessarily	 changes	 by	 the	 fact	 which	 became	 elected	 representatives.	 The	political	regimes	in	this	instance	go	through	the	process	of	de-democratisation	(see	Nef	and	Reiter	2009;	Szymański	2017;	Bogaards	2018).	The	fact	is	that	the	‘wild’	 transformation	 which	 followed	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 Soviet	 bloc	contributed	very	 little	 to	aid	 the	establishment	of	 a	high	quality	 ‘participative	political	culture’	in	the	sense	of	the	comparative	study	by	G.	Almond	and	S.	Verba	(1989).6	 The	 shift	 from	 liberal	 democracy	 towards	 certain	 ‘hybridity’	 is	 also	addressed	by	L.	Morlino	(2010,	46),	who	points	out	that	this	can	lead	towards	a	type	which	he	calls	 ‘democracy	without	 law’	or	 ‘democracy	without	state’	and	adds	this	category	to	the	typology	of	hybrid	regimes	based	on	three	criteria.			In	the	presented	text	we	thus	understand	hybrid	regimes	as	a	‘meta-concept’	of	sorts,	 which	 includes	 many	 sub-conceptualisations	 which	 manifest	 on	 the	continuum	between	democracy	and	authoritarianism	and	we,	therefore,	employ	a	dichotomous	approach,	albeit	with	a	full	understanding	of	its	methodological	unclarities.	Simultaneously,	we	believe	that	a	trichotomous	approach	would	be	too	 restrictive	 in	 its	 application	 on	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 analysed	 regimes,	
 6	The	study	Civic	Culture	was	originally	published	in	1963.		
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     10 
 
 
especially	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 different	 intensity	 of	 the	 explored	characteristics	and	their	effects	within	the	regimes.				
4	THE	‘GREY	ZONE	OF	REGIMES’:	REFLECTING	ON	THE	CONCEPT	OF	
T.	CAROTHERS		One	of	 the	goals	of	 this	article	 is	 to	 introduce	T.	Carothers’s	concept	of	hybrid	regimes.	The	seminal	work	of	T.	Carothers	will	thus	be	the	focus	of	the	following	section.	We	consider	this	approach	to	be	conductive	especially	in	the	context	of	Central	 and	Eastern	Europe	 and	 the	 large	dynamic	 in	 the	development	of	 the	character	of	regimes	in	this	region.	Simultaneously	it	overlaps	with	the	concept	which	 we	 are	 presenting	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 application	 of	 the	 concept	 of	‘hybrid	regimes’	on	the	empirical	research	of	the	transformation	of	regimes	in	Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe.	 This	 concept	 views	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	 as	 a	 ‘meta-concept’,	 an	 analytical	 unit,	 whose	 subcategories	 are	 the	 partial	conceptualisations	originating	from	seminal	authors,	such	as	L.	Diamond	(2002),	S.	Levitsky	and	L.	Way	(2010),	Gilbert	and	Mohseni	(2011),	Merkel	(2004)	and	A.	Schedler	 (2006,	 2013).	 In	 this	 case,	 we	 believe	 that	 Carothers’s	 view	 and	conceptualisation	 of	 the	 ‘regimes	 of	 the	 grey	 zone’	 is	 (despite	 many	 partial	methodological	shortcomings)	the	best	applicable	concept	in	explaining	‘hybrid	regimes’	as	a	‘meta-concept’.			As	Š.	Drahokoupil	writes	(2014),	the	proliferation	of	different	concepts	at	the	end	of	 the	 last	 millennium	 reached	 a	 state	 where	 an	 actual	 ‘labyrinth	 of	 hybrid	regimes’	emerged.	These	concepts	are	often	built	on	such	a	different	foundation	that	they	become	conflicting	and	contradictory	(Gilbert	and	Mohseni	2011,	272),	even	though	the	debate	is	still	on	the	‘hybrid	regimes’.	That	is	part	of	the	reason	why	we	 decided	 to	 employ	 the	 concept	 of	 T.	 Carothers,	who	 surpasses	 these	‘conceptual	 battles’	 as	 an	 analytical	 unit	 in	 its	 essence.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 goal	 to	delineate	 the	 exact	 ‘borders’	 or	 boundaries	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 or	authoritarianism,	and	for	this	reason	we	do	not	try	to	define	these	ideal	types	on	the	limits	of	the	continuum.	Additionally,	we	do	not	perceive	‘hybrid	regime’	as	a	‘distinctive	 category	 of	 political	 regimes’	 or	 an	 ‘Independent	 Type	 of	 Political	Regime’	 like	Bílek	(2015),	although	we	consider	his	text	to	be	one	of	the	most	crucial	contributions	to	the	methodological	and	theoretical	debates	on	‘hybrids’.		As	we	mentioned	before,	the	concept	of	T.	Carothers	is	one	of	the	most	used	and	quoted.	The	so-called	 ‘grey	zone’	of	 regimes,	a	 term	which	Carothers	came	up	with	(2002)	explains	many	things,	yet	it	cannot	tackle	all	the	challenges	that	the	study	 of	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	 comes	with.	 The	 concept	 is	 built	 on	 a	 comparative-historical	 approach.	 It	 compares	 and	 presents	 the	 transformations	 of	 the	characters	of	political	regimes	between	the	70s	and	90s	of	the	20th	century.	The	author	mentions	 the	 trends	 in	seven	different	regions,	which	 lead	 to	a	critical	redrawing	of	the	political	landscape	(ibid.,	5).	In	this	foundation,	he	tries	to	point	out	 that	 the	 differences	 between	 individual	 cases	 are	 so	 significant	 that	 it	 is	entirely	redundant	to	introduce	the	‘transition	paradigm’	into	the	classification	of	‘hybrid	regimes’.	This	paradigm	is	defined	in	five	points	and,	Carothers	states	originated	 from	 the	 pressure	 from	 government,	 quasi-government	 and	 non-governmental	groups	in	the	US	in	the	80s	when	any	change	of	regime	was	seen,	interpreted	and	presented	as	‘democratic	transition’.	This	paradigm	became	the	main	analytical	framework.	As	Carothers	also	mentions,	‘high-level	officials	were	regularly	referring	to	the	worldwide	democratic	revolution’	(ibid.,	6).				
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	As	 a	 part	 of	 his	 definition	 of	 ‘transition	 paradigm’,	 Carothers	 introduces	 five	fundamental	suppositions,	from	which	he	proceeds.	The	first	one	is	crucial,	as	it	sponsors	 all	 the	 others.	 According	 to	 Carothers,	 every	 state	 which	 is	 on	 the	trajectory	from	dictatorship	to	a	more	liberal	form	of	government	can	be	seen	as	a	 regime	 in	 transition	 ‘toward	 democracy’.	 This	 situation	 can	 be	 observed	especially	 in	 the	 90s	 (ibid.,	 6).	 Carothers	 also	 reflects	 on	what	was	 occurring	during	the	research	of	‘hybrid	regimes’	themselves,	namely	that	the	demand	for	democratic	regimes	also	forms	the	academic	discourse.	The	second	requirement	which	 is	 formed	 by	 the	 whole	 ‘transitional	 paradigm’,	 is	 the	 reality	 that	 the	process	of	democratisation	on	 its	own	 is	created	by	certain	phases,	which	are	defined	 as	 ‘opening’,	 ‘breakthrough’	 and	 ‘consolidation’.	 The	 regimes	 then	linearly	go	through	these	phases.	As	 the	third,	Carothers	sees	the	belief	 in	 the	decisive	power	of	elections	(ibid.,	7).	The	fourth	is	the	specific	environment	in	which	 the	 transition	 takes	place:	 the	 level	 of	 economics,	 own	history,	 form	of	institutions	 and	other	 structures.	However,	 to	 these	he	does	not	 attribute	 too	much	value.	The	fifth	prerequisite	of	the	whole	paradigm	is	the	notion	that	the	process	 of	 democratisation	 takes	 place	 only	 in	 fully	 institutionalised	consolidated	states	(ibid.,	8–9).		Carothers	 then	 calls	 for	 abandoning	 the	 paradigm	 defined	 in	 this	 way	 while	defining	political	regimes	and	their	research.	His	text	functions	as	a	criticism	of	these	suppositions,	where	he	mentions	that	only	20	out	of	100	states	that	were	at	that	time	seen	as	‘"in	transition’	can	today	be	perceived	as	democratic.	In	the	group	of	such	democratised	states	stands	especially	the	region	of	Central	Europe.	On	the	other	hand	are	the	failures	primarily	in	East	Asia	and	Latin	America	(ibid.,	9).	Naturally,	we	must	mention	that	the	text	of	Carothers	was	published	in	2002,	so	his	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	a	regime	in	these	regions,	including	the	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	may	not	be	current.	Nevertheless,	that	does	not	hamper	the	usage	of	his	concept	as	a	‘surpassing’	approach	as	a	‘meta-concept’	as	we	perceive	it,	linked	to	the	theoretical	view	of	hybrids	as	such.	An	interesting	fact	is	that	Carothers	did	not	assume	that	a	different	trajectory	in	the	development	of	specific	regimes	would	take	place.	He	does	not	mention	 in	his	text	that	a	consolidated	democracy	can	be	‘weakened’	to	such	a	degree	that	its	character	would	be	changed	and	the	regime	would	fall	into	the	‘grey	area’.			Carothers,	when	it	comes	to	building	his	conceptualisation,	is	not	dealing	with	an	exact	delineation	of	the	characteristics	of	regimes	in	the	‘grey	zone’,	which	lowers	the	 intensity	of	 this	 concept	on	 the	 ladder	of	 abstraction.	However,	 he	 avoids	many	methodological	problems	when	operationalising	his	 terms.	However,	he	tries	to	describe	what	he	called	‘broad	political	syndromes’	(ibid.,	10)	which	he	finds	specifically	where	regimes	in	the	‘grey	zone’	are	concerned.			Firstly,	 he	 mentions	 so-called	 ‘feckless	 pluralism’,	 which	 manifests	 within	countries	 and	 regimes	 that	 have	 a	 relatively	 high	degree	 of	 political	 freedom,	alternation	of	governmental	structures	between	subjects	with	different	political	opinions	and	uninfluenced	elections.	Simultaneously,	though,	we	can	find	defects	in	 the	basic	democratic	system,	as	 it	 is	a	minimal	degree	of	civic	participation	outside	of	elections	or	perceiving	elites	as	corrupt	or	‘rotten’.	This	is	also	based	on	the	fact	that	the	civil	service	does	not	function	efficiently,	and	it	is	not	capable	of	 supplementing	 the	 function	 of	 primary	 institutions	 related	 to	 healthcare,	education	or	other	services	(ibid.,	10–	11).			The	second	of	the	‘political	syndromes’	is	the	so-called	‘dominant-power	politics’.	The	 regimes	 in	 the	 ‘grey	 zone’	 do	 show	 evidence	 of	 political	 competition;	however,	with	certain	limitations.	Those	appear	in	the	existence	of	a	movement,	
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party,	family	grouping	or	a	specific	leader	who	dominates	over	the	system	to	such	a	degree	 that	 the	probability	 of	 alternation	 reaches	 zero.	 Simultaneously,	 and	distinctively	to	the	regimes	functioning	with	‘feckless	pluralism’,	the	governing	structures	 to	 a	 certain	 degree	 merge	 with	 the	 state.	 Therefore,	 the	 elections	cannot	be	labelled	objective	and	untainted.	However,	governing	structures	are	trying,	especially	for	the	eyes	of	the	international	community,	to	evoke	this	image	to	gain	broader	support,	while	‘bending’	the	whole	electoral	arena	(ibid.,	11–12).	Although	Carothers	attributes	a	certain	degree	of	‘stability’	to	the	regimes	with	both	‘syndromes’,	he	points	out	at	the	same	time	that	it	is	not	easy	to	achieve	a	successful	 transition	 to	 liberal	 democracy.	 In	 the	 first	 case	 mentioned,	 the	political	 structures	 respect	 some	 rules	 not	 in	 direct	 contradiction	 with	 the	essence	of	liberalism.	However,	the	power	is	passed	from	one	to	each	other	and	back,	and	they	are	entirely	separated	from	civil	society.	For	the	second	time,	the	governing	 elites	 allow	 opposition	 only	 to	 the	 degree	 that	 they	 can	 resist	 the	pressures	from	society	(ibid.,	13–14).			Carothers	thus	comes	up	with	an	approach	that	does	not	have	the	goal	within	the	period	we	focus	on	to	create	clear	typologies	of	regimes	and	to	be	categorised	into	a	specific	scheme.	Instead,	he	notices	two	levels	that	manifest	with	the	group	of	regimes	in	the	‘grey	zone’	and	separates	them	with	clear	functional	differences	which	are	the	essence	of	 their	existence.	 In	the	very	end	of	his	text,	Carothers	completely	 rejects	 the	 ‘Transition	 paradigm’	 as	 a	 product	 of	 a	 time	 restricted	period	and	at	that	time	points	out	and	demands	the	necessity	to	employ	different	work	 and	 analytical	 frameworks	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 research	 of	 ‘grey	 zone’	regimes	than	as	was	done	until	then	with	the	‘transition	paradigm’	(ibid.,	200).	In	order	to	put	all	abovementioned	theory	into	practice	in	the	broader	context,	it	is	 necessary	 to	 emphasise	 the	 particularities	 of	 democratisation	 in	 Central-Eastern	Europe	in	the	opening	of	the	empirical	part	of	this	text.				
5	THE	SPECIFICS	OF	DEMOCRATISATION	IN	CENTRAL	AND	EASTERN	
EUROPE		To	 understand	 how	 and	 why	 the	 apparently	 increasingly	 consolidated	democracies	of	Central	Europe	began	to	crumble,	we	 first	need	to	understand	what	 the	 particularities	 of	 their	 democratisation	 were.	 For	 that	 reason,	 we	summarize	the	discussion	on	the	democratisation	of	the	post-communist	states.			The	discussion	on	the	democratisation	of	countries	of	the	post-communist	area	is	 from	 its	beginnings	 linked	 to	 several	 important	questions.	Among	 the	most	significant	is	the	question	of	whether	and	to	what	degree	the	former	communist	states	 present	 specific	 situations	 incomparable	 to	 the	 democratisation	 of	‘standard’	 non-democratic	 or,	 to	 be	 exact,	 authoritarian	 regimes.	 Political	scientists	 relatively	 quickly	 agreed	 that	 communism	 had	 such	 specific	consequences	 that	 the	 democratisation	 of	 these	 states	 would	 be	 completely	different	 compared	 to	 those	 of	 other	 states.	 Noteworthy,	 for	 example,	 is	 the	concept	 of	 ‘triple	 transition’	 introduced	 by	 Clause	 Offe,	 which	 highlights	 the	necessity	 of	 change	 in	 three	 dimensions:	 the	 democracy,	 the	market	 and	 the	stateness	 (Offe	 1991).	 In	 some	 cases,	 this	 has	 been	 extended	 by	 a	 fourth	dimension,	the	nation,	and	therefore	formed	‘the	quadruple	transition’	(see	e.g.,	Kuzio	2001).	From	the	beginning,	scholars	have	simultaneously	strived	to	find	the	key	to	separate	post-communist	countries	into	two	or	more	groups.	This	was	supposed	 to	 show	 evidence	 of	 different	 prerequisites	 when	 the	 anticipated	velocity,	as	well	as	the	intensity	of	democratisation,	is	considered.		
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	In	 the	 first	 analyses	 that	 focused	 predominantly	 on	 Czechoslovakia,	 Poland,	Hungary,	Romania	and	Bulgaria	and	in	some	instances	also	on	the	specific	case	of	the	German	Democratic	Republic,	or	to	be	precise	on	the	area	of	former	eastern	Germany,	 it	 was	 expected	 that	 transforming	 countries	 would	 face	 ‘certain	negative	effects	in	the	short	term.	This	includes	higher	inflation,	unemployment,	social	mobility,	 pressure	 on	workers	 etc.’	 (Di	 Cortona	 1991,	 327).	 It	was	 also	expected	that	differences	among	post-socialist	countries	existed	with	regard	to	the	 prospects	 of	 transition.	 ‘For	 Hungary,	 Czechoslovakia,	 East	 Germany	 and	Poland	it	will	be	easier	to	overcome	these	problems:	because	of	the	role	that	West	will	 assure;	because	certain	 innovative	elements	had	already	been	 introduced	into	the	economic	system	in	the	past	(Hungary,	but	also	Poland);	because	of	the	tradition	of	an	industrial	capitalist	economy	(Czechoslovakia	and	Germany)’	(Di	Cortona	1991,	327).			Di	 Cortona	 used	 the	 economic	 situation	 as	 the	main	 point	 of	 view.	 Samuel	 P.	Huntington,	in	his	seminal	contribution,	used	another	standpoint	which	leads	to	the	 same	 result.	 Huntington	 chose	 the	 countries	 from	 the	 third	 wave	 of	democratisation	based	on	some	democratic	experience	before	World	War	II.	The	same	 group	 of	 countries	 was	 formed	 in	 this	 case	 (Huntington	 1991,	 271).	Huntington	saw	East	Germany	as	extremely	favourable,	Czechoslovakia,	Hungary	and	 Poland	 as	 quite	 favourable	 for	 the	 relatively	 quick	 and	 successful	democratisation.	Romania	and	Bulgaria	were	contrariwise	named	as	indifferent	or	unfavourable	(Huntington	1991,	273).			A	 very	 significant	 contribution	 to	 the	 elaboration	 on	 the	 division	 of	 the	 post-communist	area	was	made	by	Hungarian	political	scientist	Attila	Ágh	in	his	book	
The	Politics	 in	Central	Europe	 (1998).	Ágh	argued	that	 the	development	 in	 the	first	decade	after	the	Iron	Curtain	fell	clearly	shows	that	in	the	post-communistic	area	we	can	distinguish	two	ideal	types	of	countries:	1)	the	countries	of	Central	and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 in	 which	 the	 transition	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 re-democratisation,	and	2)	the	countries	of	the	Balkans,	which	ought	to	undergo	a	‘complete’	democratisation	process	(Ágh	1998,	7).	He	thus	follows	Hungtington’s	idea	of	certain	democratic	experiences	from	the	period	before	the	emergence	of	the	non-democratic	Soviet-type	regime.	The	extraordinarily	bad	performance	of	countries	established	after	the	disintegration	of	Tito’s	Yugoslavia	 lead	without	doubt	 to	 Ágh’s	 relatively	 optimistic	 conclusions	 about	 the	 countries	 of	 the	Visegrad	group.	The	development	after	2008,	however,	constitutes	an	important	turning	point	in	the	sense	of	(de)consolidation,	both	in	the	development	of	post-communistic	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	and	regarding	the	social	science	 analysis.	 This	 development	 is	 very	 often	 called	 the	 backsliding	 of	democracy	interconnected	with	the	growth	of	populism	and	de-Europeanization	(Ágh	2016;	Szymański	2017).	After	two	decades	of	optimism,	interrupted	only	by	‘partial	deviations’7	political	science	had	to	return	to	the	beginning	of	the	debate	on	perspectives	of	democracy	in	post-communistarea.			In	 connection	 to	 this,	 many	 authors	 returned	 to	 older	 sociological	 or	interdisciplinary	 analyses,	 which	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1990s	 had	 already	identified	crucial	structural	differences	between	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	and	countries	of	Western	Europe.	These	were	in	regard	to	either	their	heritage	of	communism,	or	 to	more	 long-term	divergence	or,	 to	be	precise,	an	insufficient	convergence	between	two	European	macro-regions.	Polish	historian	
 7	Ethnical	conflicts	in	post-Yugoslavia	or,	to	be	precise,	the	post-soviet	area,	Meliorism	in	Slovakia,	issues	with	developing	the	rule	of	law	in	Bulgaria	and	Romania,	which	delayed	the	entrance	of	both	states	into	the	EU.		
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Piotr	Wandycz	(2001)	points	towards	the	century-long	closing	of	 the	cultural-civilisation	gap,	which	is	discernible	between	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	and	the	Western	 part	 of	 the	 continent.	 The	 development	 after	 1989	 the	 author	understands	primarily	as	the	‘final’	act	in	this	process	(Wandycz	2001,	21).	Other	authors	suggest	that	the	modernisation	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	took	place	in	 the	 period	 of	 communism,	 but	 also	 in	 previous	 periods,	 only	 partially,	insufficiently	and	in	a	twisted	manner.	Piotr	Sztompka	(1993)	talks	about	false	modernity,	while	the	Slovenian	sociologist	Ivan	Bernik	saw	Central	and	Eastern	European	societies	as	sub-modern,	characterised	by	only	partial	and	insufficient	modernisation	(Bernik	2000).	Besides,	this	false	modernisation	was	conducted	top-down,	 and	 thus	 as	 a	 dictate	 of	modernistic	 intellectual	 and	 partially	 also	political	elites.	This	goes	for	most	of	the	societies	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	perhaps	with	 the	 exception	 of	 regions	where	modernisation	 according	 to	 the	German	model	were	implemented	sooner,	as	in	the	case	of	the	Czech	Republic,	particularly	among	the	elites	of	larger	cities.			Tucker	(2015,	14-74),	regarding	the	discussion	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	stated	that	the	CEE	countries	still	struggle	with	the	legacies	of	the	previous	epoch	(communist,	but	also	older),	such	as	economic	backwardness,	‘rough	justice’	and	the	 backstage	 impact	 of	 the	 post-totalitarian	 elite.8	 Tucker	 and	 other	 authors	emphasise	 the	 pragmatism	 of	 late-communistic	 elites	 as	 one	 of	 the	 key	motivational	 factors	 for	 the	 change	 of	 the	 regimes.	 ‘Democracy	 in	 post-totalitarian	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	was	the	unintended	consequence	of	the	adjustment	of	the	rights	of	the	late-totalitarian	elite	to	its	interests’	(Tucker	2015,	22).	In	the	late-totalitarian	regimes	‘egoism	and	manipulate	opportunism’	were	encouraged.	The	main	interest	of	the	late	totalitarian	elites	became	to	survive,	i.e.	to	maintain	the	control.	Thus,	Tucker	presents	regime	changes	as	‘spontaneous	adjustments	of	the	rights	of	the	late	totalitarian	elite	to	its	interests,	its	liberation,	the	transmutation	of	its	naked	liberties	into	rights,	most	significantly,	property	rights’	 (Tucker	 2015,	 22).	 This	 approach	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 Czech	sociologist	Ivo	Možný.	As	Možný	(1991)	demonstrated	in	his	analysis	focusing	on	the	collapse	of	the	Communist	regime	in	Czechoslovakia	Why	so	easy?	(Proč	tak	snadno?),	the	group	of	unsatisfied	citizens	included	a	significant	majority	of	the	population,	but	that	the	most	important	and	driving	groups	were	economically	motivated	 individuals	 and	 groups,	 both	 from	 the	 official	 and	 semi-official	structures.	In	this	sense,	the	homo	economicus	had	already	dominated	over	homo	
sovieticus	before	the	transition.		Kamiński	 and	 Kurczewska	 (1994)	 recognise	 the	 volatile	 nature	 of	 the	 post-Communist	 political	 elite	 which	 overtakes	 the	 state	 institutions	 in	 order	 to	realise	 their	 own	 goals	 and	 are	 not	 prepared	 to	 serve	 the	whole	 society.	 The	electoral	changes	in	government	then	often	mean	only	the	exchange	between	two	political	or	individual	actors	with	the	same	goals.	This	characteristic	of	political	elites	in	new	democracies	naturally	raises	the	question	of	the	‘rootedness’	of	the	democratic	structure	or,	to	be	precise,	 its	changes.	It	seems	that	with	the	first,	more	 distinct	 crisis,	 which	 came	 after	 2008,	 democratic	 structures	 began	 to	crumble.	The	socioeconomic	crisis	led	to	the	transformation	regression	not	only	in	 the	 economy	 but	 also	 in	 politics	 (weakness	 of	 liberalism	 and	 growth	 of	populism).	Without	welfare,	essential	parts	of	the	societies	in	CCE	do	not	support	the	liberal	democracy	to	the	degree	which	would	be	able	to	maintain	the	quality	
 8	 Of	 course,	 it	 can	 be	 (and	 was	 in	 the	 scholarly	 debate)	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 concepts	 of	‘totalitarianism’	 do	 not	 present	 a	 legitimate	 tool	 for	 the	 study	 of	 regimes.	 It	 needs	 to	 be	acknowledged	at	this	point	that	the	authors	of	this	text	do	not	acquiesce	to	the	use	of	the	term	‘totalitarianism’	 themselves,	however	understand	 the	value	of	 the	works	of	A.	Tucker	 (2015).	Instead,	authors	use	more	neutral	term	‘non-democratic	regime	of	the	Soviet	type’.	
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of	democracy	and	the	democratically	functional	state.	Tucker	argues	with	Ágh,	and	his	beliefs	that	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	had	more	potential	to	build	democracy.	According	to	Tucker,	it	is	presently	more	than	clear	that	the	legacy	of	communism	is	stronger	than	the	legacy	of	democracy.		Ágh,	 the	 prominent	 defender	 of	 the	 basic	 positive	 attitude	 towards	 the	democratisation	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 follows	 Tucker’s	 somewhat	sceptical	 approach.	 In	his	 latest	work(s)	Ágh	 (2018b,	31)	 recognises	 that	CEE	underwent	radical	changes	in	the	last	decade	and	this	matter	of	fact	‘necessitate	a	radical	reconceptualization’.	In	his	opinion,	three	important	phases	or	steps	can	offer	the	explanation	of	the	divergence	of	CEE	states	from	the	EU	mainstreams	development:	 (1)	 the	 absolute	 ‘civilizational’	 (socio-economic	 and	 cultural)	deficit	before	the	accession	and	the	emerging	relative	institutional	deficit	after	the	 accession	 (this	 notion	 brings	 us	 back	 to	 the	 scepticism	 presented	 in	Sztompka’s	 or	 Bernik’s	 work),	 (2)	 the	 growing	 gap	 between	 the	 formal-legal	external	Europeanization	and	the	substantive	internal	Europeanization,	(3)	the	concluding	de-Europeanization	with	de-democratization.			Ágh	believes	that	at	least	some	CEE	countries	reached	the	formally	consolidated	democracy,	but	in	the	last	decade	some	of	them	underwent	the	interconnected	processes	of	democratic	deconstruction	(backsliding)	and	started	opposing	the	liberally	 rooted	 European	 integration	 process.	 Let	 us	 acknowledge	 that	Fukuyama	(1995)	defines	four	areas	where	the	consolidation	of	democracy	must	occur,	namely	ideology	(normative	beliefs),	institutions,	civil	society,	and	culture.	The	cultural	level	labelled	in	his	essay’s	title	as	primary	symbolises	the	‘deepest	level’	 including	 ‘phenomena	 such	 as	 family	 structure,	 religion,	 moral	 values,	ethnic	consciousness,	‘civic-ness’,	and	particularistic	historical	traditions’.	If	we	generally	 evaluate	 the	 development	 in	 CEE	 in	 the	 named	 categories	 or	 areas,	deficiencies	or	paradigmatic	differences	might	be	observed	in	all	four.	Regarding	ideology,	 liberalism	 has	 to	 compete	 with	 nationally	 and	 ethnically	 rooted	populism	and	anti-liberalism,	democratic	 institutions	are	weak,	civil	 society	 is	limited	on	small	parts	of	society,	and	often	we	observe	string	‘bad	civil	societies’	(Chambers	 and	 Kopstein	 2001;	 Fehr	 2016).	 According	 to	 Tucker,	 one	 of	 the	biggest	 problems	 and	 failures	 of	 the	 transition	 in	 the	 given	 region	 was	 the	establishment	 of	 liberal	 institutions.	 The	 ‘small	 illiberalism’	 at	 the	 very	beginning,	 the	 scarcity	 of	 justice	 that	 has	 not	 been	 remedied,	 led	 to	 corrupt	political	democracy	and	to	the	larger	populist	illiberalism	that	emerged	following	the	 economic	 recession.	 The	 aforementioned	 issues	 and	 deficits	 of	 Central-European	and	Eastern-European	regimes	which	underwent	the	transition,	would	suggest	that	these	regimes	showed	or	are	showing	deficiencies	which	could	be	the	reason	to	label	them	differently	than	consolidated	democracies.	For	instance,	in	 his	 book	 Post-communism	 and	 democracy	 (Postkomunismus	 a	 demokracie)	Kubát	 labelled	 new	 democracies	 consolidated,	 semi-consolidated	 and	 not-consolidated	(Kubát	2003,	27).	It	is	possible	of	course	that	specific	countries	can	move	 through	 these	 categories.	 Slovakia,	 for	 example,	 is	 in	 Kubát’s	 book	classified	as	a	semi-consolidated	democracy,	while	Hungary,	on	the	contrary,	is	classified	 as	 consolidated.9	 The	 question,	 however,	 is	 if	 one	 of	 the	 Kubát’s	categories	(most	probably	non-consolidated	democracies)	can	be	perceived	as	an	equivalent	of	the	‘grey	zone	of	regimes’(Carothers	2002)	or,	to	be	precise,	of	‘hybrid	regimes’	as	the	‘meta-concept’	in	the	sense	of	how	authors	of	this	text	see	it.	Kubát’s	approach,	while	similar	to	the	that	of	Heydemann	and	Vodička	in	their	comparative	 analysis	 of	 ten	 years	 earlier,	 suggests	more	 linear	 perception	 in	
 9	We	point	out	that	Kubát	wrote	his	text	basically	in	the	same	time	(2003)	as	Carothers	(2002),	so	the	contemplation	of	a	certain	de-democratisation	in	Central	Europe	and	Eastern	Europe	was	not	current.		
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which	the	countries	can	gradually	move	‘up’.	However,	it	does	not	really	count	on	the	 possibility	 of	 digressing	 to	 ‘lower’	 qualitative	 types	 of	 democracy,	 not	dissimilarly	to	the	above-analysed	text	of	Carothers	(2002).			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Merkel	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 base	 their	 work	 on	 the	 thesis	 that	‘imperfect’	or	in	other	words	‘less-than-fully	democratic	regimes’	can	very	often	develop	from	consolidated	or,	to	be	precise,	liberally-democratic	regimes.	This	approach	would	be	 fully	 in	agreement	with	the	concept	of	de-democratisation	and	with	the	dynamics	and	movement	of	a	higher	degree	of	democracy	towards	the	worsening	of	the	measured	indicators,	specifically,	the	weakening	of	(some)	building	blocks	of	liberal	democracy.	According	to	Carothers,	(2002,	11–12)	we	would	 surely	 discover	 within	 the	 given	 region	 the	 ‘syndrome’	 of	 ‘dominant-power	 politics’	 which	 in	 his	 text	 he	 stated	 as	 one	 of	 the	 symptoms	 of	 non-liberality	of	democracy	and	confirmation	that	these	regimes	belong	in	the	grey	zone	of	regimes.	Let	us	turn	our	attention	now	to	the	case	of	Hungary,	and	how	such	 democratic	 digression	 can	 take	 place	 in	 reality	 and	 to	which	 degree	 the	Hungarian	case	can	be	used	for	the	application	of	hybrid	regimes.				
6	HUNGARY:	THE	ROLE	MODEL	OR	AN	EXEMPLARY	CASE?	
	Hungary	was,	together	with	the	Czech	Republic,	Poland	and,	from	the	second	half	of	the	1990s,	Estonia	and	Slovenia	considered	to	be	one	of	the	most	significant	successes	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 subsequent	 democratisation	 of	 the	 communist	regime	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	In	1997	these	countries	were	placed	in	the	so-called	 Luxembourg	 group,	 through	which	 the	 EU	 gave	 them	 the	 statute	 of	countries	 that	 within	 the	 group	 of	 new	 democracies	 belong	 to	 the	 most	consolidated,	 i.e.	 liberal,	 democracies.	 The	 positive	 assessment	 of	 Hungary	 in	comparison	 to	other	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	was	 in	 this	case	apparent,	even	in	comparison	to	partners	from	the	Visegrad	group.	The	electoral	successes	of	the	League	of	Polish	Families	in	the	elections	for	the	EU	parliament	in	2004	or	the	strongly	Euro-sceptic	tendencies	of	Vaclav	Klaus	as	the	leader	of	the	Civic	Democratic	Party	or	the	president	of	Czech	Republic	(for	comparison	see	Cabada	2016)	raised	in	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century	discussions	about	the	rootedness	of	liberal	democracy.			The	developments	after	2006,	connected	with	the	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	the	ruling	socialist	party,	and	especially	 the	 long-term	economic	populism	of	both	major	parties	led	in	Hungary	to	a	state	of	‘chaotic	democracy	as	labelled	by	Ágh	(2018a,	149).	 Ágh	 also	 stresses	 the	 ‘too	 high	 expectations	 from	 the	 new	 democratic	system’	mentioning	that	 ‘this	over-expectation	could	have	been	higher	than	 in	other	ECE	countries	since	Hungary	was	a	much	more	open	country	in	the	1980s	than	the	others’.	Thus,	the	populist	rhetoric	and	policies	of	both	main	political	camps	(social-liberal	and	national-conservative)	were	rooted	in	social	populism	as	the	general	trend	in	the	Hungarian	development.	‘s	the	general	picture	about	the	Hungarian	developments,	the	economic	and	political	systemic	changes	have	generated	 social	 deconsolidation,	 with	 a	 huge	 contrast	 between	 the	 formal	democratisation	and	the	substantive,	performance	democracy,	as	well	as	with	the	social	exclusion	of	large	masses	from	the	achievements	of	democratisation’	(Ágh	2018a,	143–144).	It	is	important	to	mention	that	the	inner	consolidation	of	the	Hungarian	 regime	was	 only	 illusionary.	 The	 scandal	 with	 falsifying	 statistical	data	 and	 key	 economic	 indicators	 weakened	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Hungarian	Socialist	Party	 (MSzP)	after	2006,	 just	as	 the	mobilisation	of	 the	 insufficiently	developed	 civil	 society	 by	 Fidesz,	 who	 demanded	 new	 pre-term	 elections,	strongly	disrupted	the	democratic	character	of	the	regime	and	opened	the	way	
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for	questioning	the	qualities	of	liberal	democracy.	The	question	remains	to	what	degree	the	quality	of	the	democracy	was	real	or	whether	it	was	only	a	façade	of	the	regime.	Here	we	could	refer	to	the	concept	of	‘hybrid	regimes’	of	T.	L.	Karl	(1995),	who	was	 the	 first	scholar	use	 the	 term	 ‘hybrid	regimes’	 in	 the	 field	of	political	 science	 research,	 and	 whose	 work	 strongly	 emphasises	 relationship	between	 ‘formal	versus	 informal’	 functioning	of	 the	 regime	T.	L.	Karl	 strongly	emphasises.		The	 super-mixed	 electoral	 system,	which	 since	1990	was	 characterised	by	 its	balance	of	power	between	two	strong	political	currents,	worked	in	reverse	in	the	situation	of	strong	dissatisfaction	of	big	social	groups	and	the	fatal	weakening	of	one	 of	 two	 big	 political	 parties,	 as	 it	 even	 strengthened	 its	 effects	 in	 the	majoritarian	 part	 (comp.	 Charvát	 2008).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 based	 on	 the	combination	 of	 two	 essential	 criteria	 (the	 scores	 of	 executives-parties’	dimensions,	 and	 the	 dimension	 of	 the	 federal	 vs.	 the	 unitary	 state)	 by	 2010	Hungary	had	already	become	 the	most	majoritarian	 case	 in	 the	 group	of	new	democracies	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	(Bernauer	and	Vatter	2012,	461).	The	absolute	 victory	 of	 the	 national-conservative	 formation	 Fidesz	 in	 the	 2010	parliamentary	 elections	 thus	 marked	 an	 important	 turning	 point	 in	 the	development,	which	came	at	the	time	of	long-term	inter-	and	intra-	crises	linked	to	 fiscal	 and	 economic	 issues	 as	 well	 as	 institutional	 difficulties	 in	 the	 EU.	According	 to	 Ágh,	 (2018a,	 149)	 with	 this	 ‘began	 the	 transition	 to	 the	authoritarian	rule	and	its	political	system	was	reduced	to	a	defective,	Potemkin	or	 façade	 democracy’.	 Here	 it	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 why	 the	 authors	understand	‘hybrid	regimes’	as	a	‘meta-concept’	and	why	it	is	methodologically	imperative	 when	 employing	 other	 concepts	 to	 analyse	 the	 character	 of	 any	studied	regime,	because	many	authors	work	with	pre-existing	terms	arbitrarily	without	more	specific	conceptualisation	and	 the	understanding	of	 the	original	concepts.	 The	 transformations	 of	 the	 character	 of	 Hungarian	 regimes	 are,	however,	 non-debatable.	 For	 example,	 J.	 Charvát	 (2018,	 81-82)	 labels	 the	development	 in	 Hungary	 after	 the	 2010	 parliamentary	 elections	 ‘absolute	reconstruction	of	the	political	system’.	It	is	necessary,	however,	to	consider	and	acknowledge	the	fact	that	the	complete	change	of	the	political	system	alone	does	not	always	have	to	 include	the	change	of	 the	character	of	 the	political	regime.	Among	the	most	important	changes	he	lists	the	general	centralization	of	power,	state	regulation	of	mass	media,	strengthening	the	competencies	of	the	general	state	attorney,	abolition	of	the	citizens’	competence	to	refer	to	the	Constitutional	Court	 regarding	 the	 inquiry	 of	 new	 legal	 acts,	 the	 general	 weakening	 of	 the	Constitutional	Court	or	the	purposeful	changing	of	the	law	about	the	election	of	members	of	parliament.	Shortly	written,	Fidesz:‘by	far	the	largest	and	the	best	organized	 Eurosceptic	 party	 in	 ECE	 that	 issued	 ambiguous	 declarations	 and	“double	talk”	on	the	EU	at	home	in	order	to	keep	also	the	anti-EU	voters	among	their	supporters’	(Ágh	2018a,	145).	Thus,	they	decomposed	the	system	of	checks	and	balances.	As	important	tools	for	such	decomposition	the	new	Constitution	as	well	as	new	electoral	law	are	labelled,	but	also	the	creation	of	new	institutions	with	 ‘tutelary’	 character.	 The	 new	 Fundamental	 Law	 of	 Hungary	 (‘one-party	constitution’)	took	effect	on	1	January	2012.	Essentially,	it	was	not	discussed	with	the	opposition	nor	within	Fidesz	itself,	where	no	major	debate	took	place.	Landau	(2013),	in	his	assessment	of	the	new	Hungarian	constitution,	compares	both	the	text,	and	the	way	of	its	application	with	such	nations	like	Egypt	or	Venezuela	as	examples	of	‘abusive	constitutionalism’	and	attempt	to	establish	a	‘competitive	authoritarian	regime’	(ibid.).10	
 10	We	have	to	mention	that	the	compared	units	(the	states	in	the	Middle	East	and	in	Latin	America)	have	completely	different	(non)democratic	backgrounds	than	countries	of	Central	Europe,	such	as	Hungary.	
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	From	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 regime’s	 character	 into	 one	showing	evidence	of	‘hybrid’,	we	see	signs	in	the	new	constitution	that	help	the	petrification	of	 the	position	of	Fidesz,	regardless	of	 the	electoral	result.	Fidesz	took	control	of	key	institutions	with	their	people:	
§ New	Media	council	composed	of	five	members,	four	of	whom	were	selected	by	the	parliamentary	commission	exclusively	composed	of	Fidesz,	the	head	of	 the	 Council	 was	 directly	 appointed	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 Orbán.	 All	 five	members	are	appointed	for	a	9-year	term	(Boogards	2018,	1487).	
§ After	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 new	 electoral	 law,	 the	 new	 national	 electoral	committee	was	established	in	2013.	Its	seven	members	were	appointed	for	nine	years	(Charvát	2018,	93).	
§ Another	 example	 is	 the	 Budget	 Council	 composed	 of	 three	members.	 The	head	 was	 appointed	 by	 the	 Prime	 Minister,	 two	members	 elected	 by	 the	qualified	 majority	 in	 the	 parliament;	 i.e.	 all	 of	 them	 are	 Fidesz	representatives.	The	terms	of	Budget	Council	members	are	6,	9	and	12	years,	i.e.	the	first	member	should	be	re-elected	no	sooner	than	6	years.	Significant	is	above	all	the	competence	of	this	new	institution:	‘The	Budget	Council	can	veto	the	national	annual	budget	adopted	by	the	parliament	can	fit	adds	to	the	national	debt.	If	parliament	fails	to	agree	on	the	budget	by	the	end	of	March	of	each	year,	 the	president	can	dissolve	parliament	and	call	new	elections’	(Boogards	2018,	1489).			A	crucial	legislative	element	for	building	the	new	political	regime	in	Hungary	is	also	the	new	electoral	law.	Based	on	Charvát	(2018,	88–95)	there	did	not	exist	any	 objective	 reasons	 for	 the	 electoral	 reform;	 between	 1990	 and	 2010	 the	majoritarian	 government/coalition	was	 created	 easily	 after	 each	 election.	We	must	emphasise,	though,	that	after	the	2002	elections	Fidesz	was	not	able	to	form	a	coalition,	although	they	increased	the	number	of	mandates	compared	to	1998–2002.	 This	 moment	 then	 is	 often	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 reason	 for	 the	radicalisation	of	the	party	(Boskor	2018,	556).	Nevertheless,	the	electoral	reform	was	not	discussed	with	the	opposition;	as	in	all	other	cases	of	legislative	change,	Fidesz	used	the	method	of	 ‘rolling’	against	 the	opposition.	Clear	and	extensive	use	of	gerrymandering	may	be	observed	in	the	process	of	reducing	the	number	of	electoral	districts	for	the	majoritarian	part	of	the	electoral	system	from	176	to	106.	Also,	the	change	from	the	two-round	to	first-past-the-post	system	rewards	the	dominant	actor	–	Fidesz.	Let	us	stress	that	it’s	not	just	the	elections	that	create	a	‘supermajority’	that	is	important,	but	much	more	the	‘subsequent	elections,	in	which	incumbents	made	extensive	use	of	their	advantage.	Hungary’s	particular	super-majoritarianism	 (since	 2010)	 means	 that	 Fidesz	 can	 change	 the	constitution	or	 appoint	 the	people	 to	 the	 judiciary,	 electoral,	 or	media	bodies	without	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 opposition’	 (Szymański	 2018;	 Pozsár-Szentmiklósy	2017).			Again,	 the	 new	 electoral	 law	 was	 introduced	 by	 Fidesz	 ‘without	 meaningful	discussion	 in	 parliament,	 without	 consultation,	 and	 without	 the	 support	 of	opposition’	 (Boogards	2018,	1485)	and	 the	new	electoral	 system	gave	a	 clear	competitive	 advantage	 to	 Fidesz	 (Charvát	 2018).	 Boogards	 (2018,	 1489)	concludes	 that	 ‘Fidesz	 might	 lose	 elections	 but	 can	 hold	 power	 through	 the	counter-majoritarian	institutions	it	created,	the	long-term	appointments	it	made	to	key	positions,	and	 the	policies	 it	enshrined	 in	 the	constitution	and	cardinal	laws.’		As	 presented,	with	 the	 fundamental	 transformation	 of	 the	 legal	 pillars,	 unfair	electoral	law	and	by	taking	over	the	monopoly	of	the	public,	and	dominance	in	private,	 media	 Fidensz	 ensured	 control	 over	 the	 important	 segments	 of	 the	
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systemic	 architecture.	 Also,	 the	 increasing	 pressure	 on	 civil	 society	organisations,	NGOs,	etc.	has	to	be	stressed.	Furthermore,	Fidesz	has	developed	the	system	of	pseudo-	or	quasi-NGOs	and	also	built	 ‘an	extended	system	state	corporatism	through	state-controlled	organisations	for	all	public	employees	with	mandatory	memberships,	 and	 also,	 the	 state-directed	 social	movements	 have	been	 organised	 into	 the	 fake	 civil	 society’	 (Ágh	 2018a,	 150).	 A	 quantitative	analysis	 of	 Bertelsmann’s	 transformation	 index	 following	 the	 development	 in	Hungary	in	the	last	decade	clearly	showed	that	‘all	indicators	except	the	one	for	tutelary	 democracy	 register	 decline	 over	 time”	…	Hungary	 today	 is	 seen	 as	 a	defective	democracy	according	to	the	BTI’	(Bogaards	2018,	1485).			In	the	context	of	our	analysis	we	consider	Hungary	to	be	a	‘hybrid	regime’	in	the	sense	of	abovementioned	theoretical	approach;	that	is,	in	application	of	‘hybrid	regimes’	as	an	umbrella	‘meta-concept’	under	which	we	can	categorize	an	infinite	number	of	conceptualisations,	which	 in	wider	analysis	deal	with	 ‘grey	zone	of	regimes’	 (Carothers	 2002).	 Precisely,	 this	 was	 the	 reason	 why	 the	 text	 of	 T.	Carothers	was	chosen	for	a	deeper	analysis	and	the	subsequent	application	on	the	examination	of	the	specific	region.				
7	CONCLUSIONS	
	All	the	analysed	steps	of	the	ruling	party	Fidesz,	which	show	evidence	of	their	antiliberal	and	populist	character,	together	with	the	monopoly	position	of	Viktor	Orbán,	 logically	 lead	 to	considerations	about	 the	nature	of	Hungarian	political	regime	that	is	to	the	question	about	its	definition	and	character.	Logically	we	can	move	both	in	the	dichotomy	on	the	continuum	democracy	vs.	authoritarianism	as	well	 as	 (reflecting	on	 the	aims	of	our	 text)	primarily	 linked	 to	 the	possible	‘hybrid’	character	of	the	regime	and	concepts,	which	we	perceive	as	an	analytical	unit	under	the	umbrella	‘meta-concept’	of	‘hybrid	regimes’	as	such.			As	Bogaards	(2018,	1482)	emphasises	‘there	is	no	scholarly	consensus	on	how	to	characterize	Hungary’s	contemporary	regime’	The	author	also	points	out	that	the	most	pessimist	scholars	use	labels	such	as	‘onset	of	autocratic,	crypto-dictatorial	trends’,	‘semi-dictatorship’,	‘semi-authoritarianism’	or	‘elected	democracy’,	with	other	authors	using	less	negative	terms	such	as	‘deconsolidation	of	democracy’,	‘democratic	backsliding’,	‘simulated	democracy’,	‘populist	democracy’,	‘selective	democracy’	or	 ‘diminished	 form	of	democracy’;	often	 the	adjective	 ‘illiberal’	 is	used	 (Bogaards	 2018;	 Ádám	 and	 Bozóki	 2016;	 Batory	 2016).	 All	 of	 these	concepts	are	perceived	by	the	authors	of	this	text	as	a	weakening	of	democracy	to	the	degree	where	the	regime	can	be	perceived	as	‘hybrid’.		Bogaards	himself	(2018,	1482)	states	that	‘Hungary	is	a	deviant	and	exemplary	case’.	 “Orbán	 has	 built	 a	 diffusely	 defective	 democracy	weakening	 democracy	across	the	board	but	being	careful,	so	far,	not	to	cross	the	line	with	autocracy	in	any	of	democracy’s	partial	regimes”	(Bogaards	2018,	1492).	Exactly	here	we	see	the	construction	of	a	 ‘phased	autocracy’	for	the	‘international	audience’,	which	presents	 one	 of	 the	 prominent	 features	 of	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’.	 According	 to	Bogaards,	thus	Orbán	pays	careful	attention	so	that	Hungary	does	not	become	‘obvious’	 authoritarian	 but	 maintained	 in	 the	 position	 of	 a	 certain	 ‘illiberal	democracy’.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	author	clearly	points	out	to	the	fact	that	 Hungary	 today	 is	 not	 a	 functioning	 democracy	 and	 he	 does	 not	 see	 a	perspective	in	which	it	could	become	one:	‘Since	many	of	the	democratic	defects	have	been	constitutionally	entrenched,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	an	alternation	in	power	 –	 already	 unlikely	 in	 itself	 –	 can	 restore	 Hungary	 to	 a	 functioning	
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democracy’	(Bogaards	2018,	1491).	On	the	other	hand,	Ágh	(2018a,	138)	clearly	states	that	Hungary	is	on	its	way	to	authoritarianism:	‘The	Hungarian	case	is	an	‘‘ideal	type’’	or	the	worst	scenario	of	the	decline	of	democracy	and	the	transition	to	the	authoritarian	system	in	ECE’.			The	quite	significant	discord	between	the	two	experts,	in	similar	matter	as	the	general	 terminological	 diffusion	 when	 trying	 to	 name	 the	 current	 Hungarian	regime	 thus	 open	 the	 space	 for	 using	 ‘hybrid	 regimes’	 in	 the	widest	 possible	matter,	that	is,	as	a	 ‘meta-concept’,	which	in	our	view	overlaps	with	the	above	analysed	 definition	 from	 the	 works	 of	 T.	 Carothers	 (2002),	 of	 ‘grey	 zone	 of	regimes’.	Here	Hungary	is	joined	by	several	other	regimes	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	 as	well	 as	 outside	 of	 this	macro-region	 (the	most	 often	mentioned	 is	Poland).	Some	analysis,	however,	suggests	that	the	trends	described	in	the	case	of	 Hungary	 (where	 according	 to	 most	 of	 the	 scholars	 they	 reach	 the	 highest	degree)	we	see	in	a	larger	group	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	(see	e.g.	Tucker	2015;	Fehr	2016;	Blokker	2012;	Cabada	2017).			
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THE	BUMPY	ROAD	OF	THE	ECE	REGION	 IN	THE	
EU:	 SUCCESSES	 AND	 FAILURES	 IN	 THE	 FIRST	
FIFTEEN	YEARS	
	
	
Attila	ÁGH1		……………………………………………………………………….……………………………………		
“It	 seems	 as	 if	 Europeans	 are	 almost	 living	 on	 different	 planets”	
(Emmanouilidis	2018)	
	
This	paper	analyses	the	Europeanization	of	the	East-Central	Europe	
in	the	 first	 fifteen	years	of	 the	EU	membership	 in	 its	 three	periods	
that	corresponds	to	the	three	institutional	cycles	of	the	EU:	(1)	2004-
2009	 (Barroso	 I.	 Commission),	 (2)	 2009-2014	 (Barroso	 II.	
Commission)	 and	 (3)	 2014-2019	 (Juncker	 Commission).	 It	 main	
focus	 is	 the	 controversial	 process	 of	 the	 EU	 integration	 with	 its	
positive	 and	 negative	 effects	 in	 the	 contrast	 of	 quantitative	 and	
qualitative	 catching	up,	based	both	on	 the	official	documents	and	
research	 contribution.	 The	 paper	 deals	 first	 of	 all	 with	 the	 latest	
period	of	the	New	World	System	emerging	after	the	global	crisis	and	
triggering	negative	developments	as	the	divergence	of	ECE	from	the	
EU	mainstream	developments	and	its	transition	to	the	authoritarian	
rule.	As	a	conclusion,	in	the	incoming	new	institutional	cycle	(2019-
2024)	the	EU	can	overcome	the	stage	of	Fragmented	Europe	moving	
to	the	stage	of	Cohesive	Europe	with	a	perspective	to	overcome	the	
East-West	Divide.	
	
Key	words:	Europeanization	and	Democratization;	Transition	to	Authoritarian	 System;	 Quantitative	 and	Qualitative	 Catching	 up;	Fragmented	and	Cohesive	Europe.	
		
	
1	 INTRODUCTION:	 A	 CRITICAL	 APPROACH	 TO	 THE	 EUROPEAN	
CHALLENGE		On	1	May	2019	the	East-Central	European	(ECE)	countries	completed	15	years	of	membership	 in	 the	EU	and	after	 this	 long	period	 it	 is	necessary	to	evaluate	their	successes	and	failures	 in	Europeanization	and	Democratization.	The	 first	fifteen	years	of	democratization	between	1989	and	2004	focused	on	the	Euro-
 	1	Attila	ÁGH	 is	 a	 Full	 Professor	 in	 the	 Political	 Science	Department	 at	 the	 Budapest	 Corvinus	University.		
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     24 
 
 
Atlantic	re-integration	as	the	preparatory	phase	of	the	EU	integration.	It	is	a	very	difficult	 task	 to	 outline	 this	 second	 phase	 between	 2004	 and	 2019	 in	 its	complexity,	anyway,	it	will	be	high	on	the	agenda	of	the	European	Studies	and	the	public	discussions	in	the	early	2020s,	since	it	is	an	important	issue	for	the	entire	future	 of	 the	 EU.	 The	 ECE	 answer	 to	 the	 European	 Challenge	 was	 very	contradictory	 and	 volatile	 in	 these	 second	 fifteen	 years.	 It	 is	 even	 more	challenging,	however,	whether	the	EU	with	the	renewed	effort	of	the	ECE	region	can	solve	the	deep	Core-Periphery	Divide	in	the	coming	decades.2		Although	 in	 the	 2010s	 some	 critical	 approach	 has	 been	 felt	 in	 the	 European	Studies	and	Democracy	Research	about	the	ECE	developments	in	general	and	the	emerging	 authoritarian	 trend	 in	 particular,	 still	 so	 far	 the	 dominant	 view	has	been	a	sunny	side	presentation	with	victory	reports	and	diplomatic	niceties	not	only	 in	 the	official	documents	of	both	EU	and	national	authorities,	but	also	by	most	 experts	 analysts.	 In	 fact,	 the	 socio-economic,	 political	 and	 civilizational	crisis	 in	ECE	is	much	deeper	than	it	appears	even	in	the	increasing	number	of	critical	analyses	in	the	last	years.	Therefore	this	paper	tries	to	present	mostly	the	shadowy	side	of	 the	ECE	contemporary	history	 that	has	 to	be	described	 in	 its	complexity	much	beyond	the	political	event	history	of	governments	and	ruling	parties.	 The	 controversial	 effect	 of	 the	 EU	 membership	 has	 been	 more	emphasized	 in	 this	 paper	 because	 while	 the	 deviant	 behaviour	 of	 the	 ECE	countries	 has	 been	 more	 elaborated	 on	 one	 side,	 the	 share	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 the	deepening	of	the	Core-Periphery	Divide	has	much	less	received	a	proper	critical	treatment	in	the	European	Studies	on	the	other.3		No	 wonder	 that	 the	 recent	 systematic	 overview	 of	 Europeanization	 and	Democratization	-	with	the	title	Europeanization	Revisited	-	has	concluded	in	the	
Introduction	 that	 “the	 earlier	 literature	 studied	 Europeanization	 as	 a	 process	with	a	uniquely	positive	direction	and	outcome.	(…)	Negative	Europeanization	or	‘de-Europeanization’	appeared	irrelevant.”,	although	“the	adjustment	to	the	EU	economic	 model	 required	 many	 invisible	 changes	 that	 were	 suboptimal	 for	transition	countries”.	This	impressive	volume	calls	the	alternative	scenario	of	the	analysis	“invisible	Europeanization”	and	notes	its	negative	side-effects	by	adding	that	the	new	member	states	“were	willing	to	adopt	EU	policies	indiscriminately	–	and	remained	relatively	insensitive	to	the	potential	costs.”	(Wozniakowski	et	al.	2018,	10,	15).		In	the	spirit	of	these	recent	evaluations	I	try	to	point	out	the	EU	has	been	moving	between	 the	 two	 poles	 of	 Cohesive	 Europe	 and	 Fragmented	 Europe,	 and	 the	global	crisis	has	pushed	for	the	Fragmented	Europe,	especially	in	the	ECE	region	
 2	 European	 Studies	 has	 been	 a	 well-established	 research	 direction,	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 the	Democracy	 Research	 has	 also	 become	 a	 sub-discipline	 in	 political	 science	 embracing	 many	adjacent	fields	of	other	social	sciences.	In	the	special	case	of	the	ECE	region,	they	overlap	to	a	great	 extent	 and	 have	 four	 research	 directions:	 (1)	 the	 evaluation	 of	 official	 documents,	 (2)	reports	of	ranking	institutes,	(3)	public	opinion	surveys	and	(4)	scientific	research	that	has	been	covered	 by	 the	 references.	 This	 paper	 offers	 some	 further	 reading	 beyond	 the	 references	 of	research	publications	to	have	a	wider	overview	of	ECE	developments	in	these	directions	as	EC	(2018a-e),	 Bertelsmann	 (2018a-e),	 Freedom	 House	 (2018a-e),	 OECD	 (2017a-e);	 and	 V-Dem	Institute	(2019)	in	Annex.	3	For	the	critical	rethinking	of	the	ECE	developments	see	first	of	all	in	Epstein	and	Jacoby	(2014),	Innes	(2014)	and	Rupnik	and	Zielonka	(2013),	and	recently	the	edited	volumes	by	Matlak	et	al.	(2018),	 Moskalewicz	 and	 Przybylski	 (2018)	 and	 Bieber	 et	 al.	 (2019).	 See	 e.g.	 also	 the	publications:	 Bargaoanu	 and	 Volintiru	 (2019),	 Blokker	 (2013),	 Börzel,	 Dimitrova	 and	Schimmelfennig	(2017),	Börzel	and	Schimmelfennig	(2017),	Brusis	(2016),	Coman	and	Tomini	(2014),	 Dawson	 and	Hanley	 (2016),	 Dimitrova	 (2010;	 2018),	 Hanley	 and	Vachudova	 (2018),	Herman	(2015),	Klipcerova-Baker	and	Kostál	(2017),	Krastev	(2016),	Krekó	and	Enyedi	(2018),	Linde	(2012),	Magone	et	al.	(2016),	Schimmelfennig	and	Winzen	(2017),	Schweiger	and	Visvizi	(2018).	
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(Emmanouilidis	2018,	17).	Obviously,	these	fifteen	years	of	the	ECE	membership	have	been	very	important	not	only	for	this	region,	but	also	for	the	entire	EU	as	the	 reunification	 of	 Europe	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 EU	 integration.	 The	 ECE	membership	has	covered	the	three	latest	institutional	cycles	of	the	EU:	Barroso	I.	Commission	 (2004-2009),	Barroso	 II.	Commission	 (2009-2014)	and	 Juncker	Commission	(2014-2019),	which	have	been	very	distinct	periods	not	only	in	the	EU	history,	 but	 contained	 a	 big	 turning	point	 around	2015	 also	 in	 that	 of	 the	world	system	and	its	globalization.	Therefore,	the	analysis	of	the	ECE	history	in	Europeanization	demands	the	elaboration	of	the	conceptual	framework	of	the	EU	history	 in	 the	world	system	changes,	 too.	The	study	of	 the	ECE	recent	history	gives	a	good	starting	point	for	this	general	exercise	because	the	ECE	countries	have	 been	 very	 sensitive	 to	 these	 radical	 changes,	 much	 more	 than	 the	consolidated	old	member	states.4		
	
2	THE	MISSING	EU	CAPACITY	OF	EAST-CENTRAL	EUROPE		The	 conceptual	 starting	point	 of	 this	paper	 is	 that	 both	 “history	matters”	 and	“region	matters”.	 The	 historical	 Central	 Europe	 as	 a	 region	 emerged	 between	East	and	West	and	East-Central	Europe	is	a	result	of	the	Yalta	Agreement	when	this	historical	Central	Europe	after	the	WWII	was	divided	between	its	Eastern	and	Western	parts.	Austria	joined	Western	Europe	and	the	other	Central	Europe	countries	 were	 given	 to	 the	 Soviet	 “external”	 empire.	 As	 to	 the	 historical	background	of	Central	Europe,	it	is	important	to	make	two	strong	statements	for	the	conceptual	foundation	of	the	ECE	analysis.5	
	
First,	 in	the	historical	Central	Europe	there	was	a	controversial	modernization	process	 with	 the	 historically	 recurring	 cycles	 between	 Westernization	 and	Easternization	that	has	produced	a	dual	historical	legacy,	with	dual	economy	and	dual	society.	Hence,	after	 the	WWII	 the	East-Central	European	countries	were	half-modernized	or	half-“Europeanized”	in	the	West-European	meaning,	and	this	mixed	situation	-	with	the	large	heterogeneity	both	in	the	entire	region	and	in	the	individual	countries	–	gives	the	base	of	“path	dependency”,	which	-	not	fatefully,	but	to	a	great	extent	–	determines	the	development	of	the	ECE	countries.	
	
Second,	the	ECE	countries	suffered	the	most	brutal	Easternization	process	of	their	history	 in	 the	 bipolar	 world.	 Despite	 this	 Easternization,	 the	 ECE	 region	preserved	most	of	its	Europeanized	features,	at	the	same	time	the	negative	side	of	its	historical	heritage	was	reinforced	during	these	long	decades	by	this	quasi	complete	 isolation	 from	 the	 Western	 developments	 by	 this	 quasi	 complete	isolation	 from	 the	 Western	 developments.	 Since	 the	 state-socialist	 system	embraced	the	entire	society,	the	negative	effects	of	the	bipolar	world	system,	as	the	missing	participation	in	the	modernization	and	democratization	process	of	the	West	after	the	WWII	were	a	big	burden	for	the	start	of	the	Europeanization	and	Democratization	in	the	systemic	change.6	
 4	This	discussion	paper	has	been	prepared	as	the	introductory	chapter	for	the	book	Fifteen	years	of	East-Central	Europe	in	the	European	Union:	Successes	and	failures	of	Europeanization.	The	conceptual	framework	of	this	paper	has	been	based	on	my	recent	book:	Decline	of	Democracy	in	East-Central	Europe:	The	Core-Periphery	Divide	(2019),	published	by	Edward	Elgar.	5	 East-Central	 Europe	 embraces	 Czechia	 (CZ),	 Hungary	 (HU),	 Poland	 (PL),	 Slovenia	 (SI)	 and	Slovakia	(SK).	It	deals	only	with	ECE	as	a	region	and	not	with	the	all	new	Eastern	member	states.	Croatia	is	a	special	case,	since	it	belongs	to	ECE	but	due	to	the	Yugoslav	war	and	post-Yugoslav	developments	it	became	an	EU	member	state	only	in	2013.	6	 On	 the	 full	 panorama	 of	 Central	 Europe	 see	 recently	 Moskalewicz	 and	 Przybylski	 (2018)	
Understanding	Central	Europe	(rich	in	the	chapters	about	Poland),	first	of	all	the	Introduction	of	the	editors.	Otherwise	see	 the	publications	of	Bozóki	and	Hegedűs	(2018;	2019),	Bugaric	and	
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	The	main	message	of	this	paper	is	the	historical	and	regional	specificity	of	the	ECE	 region,	 giving	 their	 common	 controversial	 historical	 background.	Conversely,	at	the	time	of	the	Euro-Atlantic	 integration	in	the	first	15	years	as	well	as	in	the	EU	integration	in	the	second	15	years	the	ECE	countries	have	had	a	civilizational	gap	that	has	not	been	treated	properly	in	the	European	Studies.	This	regional	specificity	has	also	been	neglected	by	the	EU	in	the	accession	process,	although	this	“benevolent	or	benign	negligence”	has	been	one	of	the	main	reasons	of	 controversial	 performance	 of	 the	 ECE	 region	 within	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 second	fifteen	years.	Since	at	the	start	of	the	EU	membership	the	ECE	region	had	a	huge	civilizational	gap	dividing	it	from	the	old	member	states,	accordingly,	at	all	big	historical	changes	–	and	it	applies	first	of	all	to	the	EU	accession	–	the	ECE	citizens	have	 had	 a	 controversial	 feeling	 of	 “triumph	 and	 trauma”,	 since	 they	 have	welcomed	the	“homecoming”	to	“Europe”	and	at	the	same	time	perceived	their	heavy	civilizational	deficit	(Sztompka	2000).	Indeed,	the	historical	legacy	of	the	dual	society	has	continued	in	the	ECE	contemporary	history,	splitting	the	society	again	in	two	parts:	winners	and	losers,	resulting	in	the	2010s	finally	in	the	dual	structure	of	political	system	based	on	the	separation	into	rulers	and	subjects	and	in	a	society	designed	and	organized	politically	from	above.	Thus,	the	last	thirty	years	has	been	the	re-emergence	of	the	traditional	structure	as	the	dependent	periphery	 of	 Western	 Europe	 with	 all	 contradictions	 between	 successes	 and	failures.	All	in	all,	the	ECE	countries	that	has	not	been	treated	properly	in	the	EU	by	neglecting	its	specificity	and	offering	the	same	general	rules	for	the	strong	and	weak	member	states	to	compete	economically.	This	treatment	will	be	described	in	this	paper	as	the	Copenhagen	learning	process	of	the	EU	that	has	also	been	a	bittersweet	learning	process	for	the	ECE	populations,	too.7		Actually,	the	ECE	countries	began	their	membership	with	a	missing	“EU	capacity”	in	 ECE	 due	 to	 their	 “social	 deficit”	 (Aniol	 2015)	 –	 mentioned	 above	 as	civilizational	 deficit	 -	 not	 just	 in	 their	 relative	 socio-economic	 and	 political	backwardness,	but	in	the	much	deeper	civilizational	“incompetence”	in	the	way	of	life,	skills	and	political	culture.	It	could	have	been	compensated	by	a	special	regional	development	program	by	the	EU	for	the	catching	up	of	the	ECE	countries.	However,	 throughout	 these	 fifteen	 years	 the	 EU	 has	 neglected	 the	 regional	specificity	of	ECE	as	this	civilizational	gap	and	it	has	dealt	with	this	region	in	an	abstract,	 overgeneralized-formalistic	 approach	of	membership.	Moreover,	 it	 is	important	to	distinguish	between	the	absolute	civilizational	deficit	coming	from	the	 historical	 heritage	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 the	 EU	 accession	 and	 the	 relative	civilizational	deficit	 that	has	been	accumulated	within	 the	EU	due	 to	 the	East-West	 divergence	 between	 their	 socio-economic	 developments.	 This	 will	 be	discussed	as	the	contrast	between	the	quantitative	and	qualitative	catching	up	process,	since	the	ECE	states	focusing	on	the	GDP-type	of	economic	growth	have	tried	to	catch	up	with	the	“past”	of	the	old	member	states	and	have	been	unable	to	join	the	new	tendencies	of	the	knowledge-based	economy	as	the	“future”	of	the	EU,	so	their	distance	has	widened	in	many	ways.		All	 in	 all,	 paradoxically,	 although	 the	 ECE	 region	 in	 the	 early	 2000s	 was	 not	prepared	for	the	EU	membership,	still	the	reunification	of	Europe	was	a	political	necessity,	 and	 it	 offered	 a	 long	 term	 opportunity	 for	 the	 ECE	 region	 for	 the	genuine	 Europeanization.	 Again,	 despite	 the	 benign	 neglect	 with	 its	 negative	
 Kuhelj	(2017),	Buzogány	(2017),	Cabada	(2013),	Cabada	et	al.	(2014),	Enyedi	(2016),	Haček	et	al.	(2017),	Havlik	and	Voda	(2016),	Havlik	and	Pinková	(2012),	Hegedűs	(2018;	2019a;	2019b),	Ibenskas	and	Sikk	(2017),	Krašovec	and	Johannsen	(2016)	and	Lisi	(2018).	7	 I	 have	described	 the	democratic	 transition	 in	 the	wider	NMS	region	 in	 two	books	 in	a	 rather	optimistic	approach	(Ágh	1998a,	1998b),	but	I	have	pointed	out	the	decline	of	democracy	is	a	long	series	of	papers	in	the	late	2010s	(Ágh	2016a,	2016b,	2017,	2018a,	2018b	and	2019).	
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externalities,	the	EU	membership	has	been	advantageous	for	the	ECE	region	in	this	 controversial	 Europeanization	 and	 Democratization	 process.	 Similarly,	despite	the	divergence	of	ECE	states	from	the	EU	mainstream	in	the	2010s	the	Eastern	enlargement	has	been	advantageous	for	the	old	member	states,	too,	since	they	have	gained	a	much	larger	market	and	more	political	weight	in	the	global	world	system.	However,	the	successes	and	failures	of	the	Eastern	enlargement	have	 shown	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 EU’s	 transformative	 power	 in	 the	 “internal”	Europeanization,	 therefore	even	the	“external”	Europeanization	process	 in	the	West	Balkan	 and	East	 European	 regions	was	 stopped	 and	 transformed	 in	 the	mid-2010s.	These	regions	have	even	much	less	EU-capacity	than	the	ECE	region	and	the	EU	has	committed	the	same	mistake	in	their	“external”	Europeanization,	applying	 only	 an	 abstract,	 overgeneralized	 approach,	 neglecting	 also	 the	specificity	 of	 these	 regions	 .	 Without	 overcoming	 the	 emerging	 deep	 Core-Periphery	Divide	 in	 the	 EU27	 no	 further	 deepening	 can	 be	 expected,	 and	 the	widening	has	also	reached	its	internal	limits	with	the	deep	decline	of	democracy	and	rule	of	law	in	the	new	member	states.		There	is	no	space	here	to	discuss	the	starting	process	of	Euro-Atlantic	integration	in	Democratization	and	Europeanization.	It	is	true	that	it	would	be	an	interesting	exercise	to	look	back	to	the	last	thirty	years	and	point	out	the	negative	features	already	 in	 the	 first	 fifteen	 years	 leading	 to	 the	 serious	 problems	 later.	 The	accession	prior	2004	that	has	been	analysed	 in	a	 large	 literature	as	a	positive	process,	and	rightly	so.	However,	this	paper	concentrates	on	the	second	fifteen	years	 in	 three	 sub-chapters,	 since	 historically	 the	 fifteen	 years	 of	 ECE	membership	embraces	 three	 institutional	 cycles	 in	 the	EU,	 first	 the	Barroso	 I.	Commission	 (2004-2009)	with	 the	optimistic	 and	evolutionary	developments,	followed	by	 the	 troubled	period	Barroso	 II	Commission	(2009-2014)	with	 the	global	crisis,	and	finally	the	Juncker	Commission	(2014-2019)	with	its	renewal	efforts	that	needs	closer	assessment.	During	these	three	periods	the	ECE	region	has	received	only	a	 formal	and	not	effective	membership.	Actually,	 it	has	only	been	invited	to	Economic	and	Legal	Europe,	not	to	Social,	Political	and	Cultural-Civilizational	Europe.		
	
3	THE	ECE	ACCESSION	AND	THE	COPENHAGEN	LEARNING	PROCESS	
(2004-2009)		In	the	first	period	the	imported	neoliberalism	produced	a	dependent	economic	development	 with	 strong	 multinationals	 and	 weak	 national	 actors.	 This	 new	dependence	was	 formed	with	 a	 neoliberal	 hybrid,	 a	 combination	of	 economic	dependence	from	the	Western	multinationals	with	the	chaotic	democracy	under	a	 comprador	 national	 elite.	 There	 was	 no	 “recognition”	 of	 the	 special	 ECE	situation	leading	to	its	“disempowerment”	in	the	EU.	On	the	ECE	side	the	immune	mechanism	was	not	activated	to	reach	a	proper	balance	between	the	Western	pressure	of	changes	and	the	domestic	demands	for	a	fair	and	specific	treatment	in	 the	Euro-Atlantic	 integration.	All	problems	were	perceived	by	 the	public	as	
transitory	that	would	disappear	automatically	after	some	years	but	they	proved	to	 be	 final	 as	 the	 main	 pillars	 of	 the	 new	 system	 connected	 with	 the	 deep	economic,	social	and	political	polarization	in	ECE.	Altogether,	the	ECE	countries	were	 weak	 in	 the	 early	 systemic	 change,	 and	 economically,	 politically	 and	ideologically	 defenceless	 against	 the	 imported	 neoliberalism.	 Emptying	democracy	 in	 fact	 started	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 hybrid	 as	 combination	 of	multinationals	 with	 the	 native	 crony	 capitalism	 because	 the	 big	 formal	 legal	institutions	 had	 a	 restricted	 power	 in	 their	 own	 field.	 European	 Science	Foundation’s	Report	on	the	Forward	Look	(2012)	research	project	underlined	
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the	 necessity	 of	 shifting	 from	 political	 to	 social	 analysis,	 as	 the	 deep	 socio-economic	polarization.		The	dual	character	of	the	Europeanization	in	ECE	was	pre-programmed	in	the	EU	accession	 process	 by	 the	 Copenhagen	 criteria,	 since	 the	 Eastern	 enlargement	project	neglected	the	heavy	historical	legacy	of	Central	Europe.	The	Copenhagen	criteria	in	June	1993	were	too	general	and	not	region-specific,	conceived	in	the	spirit	of	the	“normal	West”	transferred	to	the	East.	It	considered	the	accession	as	the	return	to	normality,	and	reaching	soon	the	point	of	no	return	in	the	transition	to	 the	democracy	and	market	economy	through	an	evolutionary	development.	This	 document	 has	 been	 based	 in	 its	 general	 features	 on	 the	 functionalist	approach	as	an	automatic	“spill-over”	of	positive	changes	from	one	social	sector	to	 another	on	 the	one	 side,	 and	 the	 “Western	 fallacy”	 as	 the	 general	 image	of	Western	society	with	all	of	its	expectations	for	political	culture	and	civil	society.	Arguing	against	this	Western	fallacy,	Gellner	(1996,	10)	has	noted	that	“In	this	manner,	Civil	Society	is	simply	presupposed	as	some	kind	of	inherent	attribute	of	human	condition.”		The	EU	has	never	realized	that	the	Eastern	enlargement	has	crossed	a	historical	border	and	never	elaborated	a	proper,	tailor-made	regional	catching	up	project	for	ECE	that	would	be	a	real	“differentiated	 integration”	and	would	have	been	vital	for	the	success	of	Europeanization.	Just	to	the	contrary,	the	lack	of	a	special	approach	 to	 ECE	 has	 gone	 through	 the	 entire	 history	 of	 membership,	 not	elaborating	and	providing	a	special	treatment	for	ECE	by	the	EU.	Although	there	has	been	some	kind	of	a	Copenhagen	learning	process	of	deeper	understanding	the	 ECE	 regional	 specifics,	 the	 abstract	 approach	 to	 conditionalities	 with	 the	general	features	of	market	economy	and	democracy	has	still	dominated,	that	is	it	has	 remained	 the	 same	 despite	 the	 often	 changing	 international	 context.	 The	main	obstacle	of	deeper	understanding	of	the	recurring	ECE	crises	has	been	the	narrow	focus	on	the	practical-policy	issues	and	the	formal-legal	issues	directly	regulated	by	the	EU	rules.	The	EU	has	avoided	the	opening	towards	the	general	conceptual	horizon	on	the	deeper	issues	of	polity	–	the	institutional	system	as	a	whole	 -	 and	 politics,	 including	 the	 political	 actors,	 the	 meso-system	 and	 the	performance	 of	 governance.	 As	 Scharpf	 (2015)	 has	 pointed	 out	 the	 EU	 has	followed	the	strategy	of	“judicial	integration”,	i.e.	introducing	and	or	transferring	the	rules	of	the	big	legal	institutions	without	any	regard	of	its	socio-economic	and	cultural	consequences.	As	the	neoliberal	economists	have	believed	in	the	magic	of	trickling	down	of	economic	growth	to	the	entire	population,	the	“functionalist”	lawyers	 believed	 in	 the	 magic	 of	 transformative	 power	 of	 constitutional	regulations	for	the	whole	society.		In	 the	 Eastern	 enlargement	 process	 the	 Economic	 Europe	 has	 defeated	 the	Political	 Europe.	 While	 the	 Political	 Europe	 has	 formulated	 the	 rules	 of	 the	accession	only	 in	 abstract	 legal	 terms,	 the	Economic	Europe	has	exported	 the	tough	version	of	neoliberal	system	and	created	a	dual	economy	and	society	 in	ECE	as	a	neoliberal	hybrid.	This	neoliberal	structure	was	not	that	harmful	in	the	old	member	 states,	 since	 it	 followed	a	period	of	welfare	 society,	 and	 the	 self-defence	of	society	–	to	use	the	term	of	Karl	Polanyi	–	was	very	strong.	But	the	ECE	societies	at	the	time	of	the	entry	were	weak,	defenceless	and	basically	they	had	no	other	alternative	than	accepting	the	Western	rules	of	the	game,	dictated	above	all	by	the	Economic	Europe.	Thus,	the	Euro-Atlantic	integration	has	meant	in	fact	the	 return	 of	 Western	 dependence,	 the	 semi-periphery	 situation,	 by	 the	neoliberal	invasion	since	the	early	nineties.	The	Western	firms	have	exploited	the	specificity	of	the	ECE	region	and	has	restored	its	dependency	status	by	turning	this	 territory	 into	 the	 low	 wage	 periphery	 of	 the	 Western	 multinationals.	 A	neoliberal	hybrid	emerged	as	a	union	of	multinationals	with	the	local-national	
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political	 elite	 that	 has	 mainly	 enjoyed	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 Western	 economic	assistance	 systematically	 and	 the	 political	 acceptance	 for	 the	 emerging	authoritarian	rule	regularly	(Book	2018).	This	situation	has	produced	a	built-in	contradiction,	 externally	 “economic”	 cohesion	 and	 internally	 “social”	polarization.	 The	 neoliberal	 hybrid	 has	 also	 imported	 the	 myth	 of	 an	 over-generalized	trickling-down	effect,	in	which	all	citizens	will	have	their	share	from	economic	growth,	therefore	the	key	issue	in	this	special	new	dependence	can	be	formulated	in	the	social	paradox:	more	political	freedom	with	less	social	security,	and	 consequently	 in	 the	 political	 paradox:	more	 formal	 right	with	 less	 actual	participation	in	politics.8		In	the	first	fifteen	years	between	1989	and	2004	the	ruling	narrative	was	based	on	 the	 Western	 fallacy,	 repeating	 the	 Western	 way	 in	 a	 shorter	 period.	 The	“Sleeping	 Beauty”	 scenario	 meant	 that	 the	 ECE	 region	 had	 been	 basically	Europeanized	 and	 although	 the	 former	 aggressive	 Easternization	 diverted	 it	from	 the	 European	 course,	 after	 the	 collapse	 of	 foreign	 rule	 this	 region	 still	returned	to	its	genuine	European	existence	quickly	and	automatically.	However,	at	the	end	of	the	first	five	years	of	the	EU	membership	the	internal	limitations	of	the	 superficial	 Europeanization	 by	 the	 legal	 transformations	 came	 to	 the	 fore	with	the	“Eternal	East”	scenario	of	the	tough	path	dependence.	The	dream	of	easy	and	quick	Europeanization	of	the	nineties	came	back	to	some	extent	in	the	first	years	 of	 membership	 but	 only	 for	 a	 while,	 and	 finally	 the	 Sleeping	 Beauty	scenario	 evaporated	by	 the	 end	of	 the	2000s.	 In	 this	 period	 there	was	 only	 a	latent	divergence	from	the	mainstream	development	of	the	EU,	nonetheless	the	foundations	for	the	dependent	development	were	laid	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	EU	membership.	Accordingly,	the	increasing	post-accession	crisis	produced	a	credibility	crisis	by	the	late	2000s	owing	to	the	social	frustration	and	general	disappointment,	 and	 afterwards	 the	 global	 crisis	 ruined	 the	 optimistic	perspectives	for	a	long	time.		Due	to	the	insensitiveness	of	the	West,	the	benign	negligence	of	ECE	has	been	a	fatal	misunderstanding	 of	 the	 differentiated	 integration.	 So	 is	 also	 idea	 of	 the	sacrosanct	the	national	sovereignty	in	the	rule	of	law	violations	in	ECE,	even	on	those	issues	that	have	been	the	concerns	of	all	member	states.	Otherwise,	the	old	member	 states	 have	 been	 reformulating	 the	 EU	 priorities	 exclusively	 on	 the	permanently	changing	new	and	new	problems	in	the	Core,	and	avoiding	at	EU	level	even	the	discussions	on	other	priorities.	Therefore,	to	give	a	correct	picture	of	 the	 ECE	 developments,	 the	 differentiated	 integration	 has	 to	 be	 analysed	 at	national	level	in	polity,	politics	and	policy	dimensions	as	well	as	at	the	EU	level	in	the	Core-Periphery	dimensions,	exploring	the	weaknesses	and	failures	on	both	EU	and	ECE	sides	as	the	negative	externalities	in	the	EU	and	the	reform	fatigue	in	ECE.	 The	 reform	 fatigue	 appeared	 already	 by	 the	 late	 nineties	 through	 the	contrast	 of	 external	 and	 internal	 Europeanization	 as	 the	 “judicial	 integration”	from	above	by	 the	establishment	of	 the	big	 formal-legal	 institutions	 that	have	remained	 “Sand	Palaces”	without	 solid	 foundation	 institutionally	 at	 the	meso-government	and	civil	society	levels	as	well	as	without	the	proper	civilizational	structures	in	the	civic	political	culture	and	advanced	human	capital.		After	 many	 deep	 changes	 and	 troubles	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 first	 five	 years	 of	membership	the	reform	fatigue	became	dominant,	just	when	the	global	crisis	put	a	high	pressure	on	the	ECE	region	due	to	its	controversial	transformation	and	EU	
 8	Orenstein	(2013,	379)	has	argued	that	the	neoliberal	approach	was	forced	upon	the	ECE	region	and	Bugaric	(2016,	1)	has	also	emphasized	that	the	ECE	countries	“were	global	 leaders	in	the	adoption	of	neoliberal	ideas	and	policies”	and	added	that	“This	was	particularly	true	during	the	early	transition	period,	when	neoliberalism	emerged	as	a	virtually	unchallenged	ideology”.	
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adaptation.	Finally,	the	reform	fatigue	before	the	global	crisis	in	ECE	producing	a	weak	 crisis	 resilience	 and	 the	poor	 crisis	management.	On	 the	other	 side,	 the	limitation	of	the	EU	transformative	power	and	benign	negligence	turned	to	be	evident	during	the	global	crisis,	still	the	poor	performance	in	ECE	resulted	in	the	enlargement	 fatigue	 in	 the	 West	 with	 the	 accusation	 of	 East	 for	 the	mismanagement	 of	 crisis	 and	 for	 the	 manifest	 divergence	 from	 the	 EU	mainstream	developments.		
	
4	 THE	 ECE	 POLYCRISIS	 AND	 THE	 DEEP	 DECLINE	 OF	 DEMOCRACY	
(2009–2014)		In	the	second	period	it	turned	out	that	the	catching-up	process	lost	its	direction,	since	 the	 main	 trend	 was	 the	 quantitative	 and	 not	 the	 qualitative	 economic	growth,	namely	in	the	outdated	GDP	terms	and	not	in	the	terms	of	the	emerging	knowledge	economy.	Hence,	the	main	aim	of	economic	development	was	–	and	still	is	-	reaching	the	“past”	of	developed	countries	and	not	joining	them	for	them	in	 building	 their	 “future”	 by	 the	 innovation	 driven	 economy	with	 sustainable	development.	 The	 constant	 and	 rather	 chaotic	 transformations	 produced	 an	increasing	 reform	 fatigue	 and	 resistance	 against	 the	 necessary	 changes.	 The	rising	drastic	social	polarization	at	the	end	of	the	2000s	resulted	in	a	credibility	crisis	that	meant	the	end	of	permissive	consent.		The	 global	 crisis	 produced	 a	 special	 ECE	 polycrisis	 as	 a	 cumulated	 crisis,	therefore	the	controversial	EU-ECE	relationship	can	only	be	explained	in	its	full	complexity	by	outlining	briefly	 the	 long	term	changes	 in	 the	polity,	policy	and	policy	dimensions	that	indicates	also	the	specific	situation	in	the	early	2010s.	In	the	polity	the	decline	of	democracy	with	the	transition	to	authoritarian	rule	began	in	 the	 early	2010s	 and	 this	 process	has	 led	 to	 the	 various	 kinds	of	 autocratic	political	systems	in	ECE.	The	initial	crisis	of	the	crisis	management	has	resulted	in	a	marked	divergence	from	the	EU	mainstream	development	not	only	in	macro-political	 terms	 of	 “illiberal	 democracy”	 (Orbán	 2014),	 but	 in	 the	 complete	structure	 of	 polity,	 i.e.	 also	 in	 meso-	 and	 micro-political	 as	 well	 as	 in	 socio-political	 and	 cultural	 dimensions	 (Balcer	 2017),	 generating	 a	 relative	civilizational	backsliding	in	the	well-being	terms.		In	politics	there	was	an	abrupt	change	between	the	first	and	second	generation	of	party	systems	with	the	emerging	hard	populism	and	extreme	right	parties.	It	has	been	accompanied	by	the	dominance	of	the	traditionalist	narrative	with	the	politics	of	historical	memory	and	hard	Euroscepticism.	The	ECE	societies	have	been	 polarized	 between	 winners	 and	 losers	 as	 well	 as	 between	 the	 relative	catching	up	in	the	“West	of	East”	and	the	absolute	impoverishment	in	the	“East	of	 East”.	 The	 “velvet	 dictatorships”	 have	 built	 up	 an	 effective	 socio-political	power	 pyramid	 and	 through	 the	 soft	 power	 of	 their	 mediaworks	 they	 have	successfully	manipulated	the	elections	(Knight	2018;	Buti	and	Pichelman	2017).		In	 policy	 the	 governments	 turned	 to	 austerity	 measures	 with	 the	 radical	disinvestment	into	the	social	and	human	capital,	and	this	relative	backsliding	of	socio-economic	situation	has	produced	an	increasing	credibility	crisis	resulting	in	 low	trust	societies.	Basically,	 there	has	been	a	relative	decline	 in	 the	public	services	–	first	of	all	in	education	and	health	care	–	given	the	needs	of	the	new	innovation	 driven	 economy	 and	 society	 that	 has	 produced	 “the	 social	disinvestment	 state”	 (Lendvai-Bainton	 2018).	 It	 has	 also	 been	 a	 manifest	regression	compared	to	the	Western	way	of	 life	in	social	security	for	the	large	majority,	 and	 even	 more	 in	 the	 life	 perspectives	 for	 youngsters	 that	 has	
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unleashed	a	mass	exodus	of	young	and	talented	people	and	with	this	loss	of	most	valuable	internal	resources	the	ECE	region	has	drastically	diminished	its	catching	up	capacity	in	the	near	future.	The	mass	emigration	of	the	talented	young	people	from	the	less	developed	member	states	will	increase	the	Core-Periphery	Divide:	“The	loss	of	young	highly	educated	people	may	create	yet	other	challenges,	such	as	 impairment	 of	 innovative	 capacities	 needed	 to	 sustain	 economic	 growth.”	(Fernandes	and	Vandenbroucke	2018,	4–5).		In	 the	EU	 there	 is	a	 two	 level	game	 in	all	 respects,	namely	polity,	politics	and	policy	 theoretically	 has	 to	 be	 treated	 both	 at	 the	 EU	 and	membership	 levels.	Actually,	it	is	only	the	policy	dimension	that	has	been	managed	and	discussed	at	the	EU	level,	otherwise	there	is	a	false	myth	of	national	sovereignty	that	has	not	allowed	 for	 the	 discussions	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 polity	 and	 politics	 in	 the	individual	 member	 states.	 The	 democratic	 order	 has	 been	 conceived	automatically	given	at	 the	membership	 level,	 therefore	 the	democratic	system	has	been	exclusively	discussed	in	the	EU	as	the	participation	of	the	EU	citizens	in	the	 EU	 institutional	 system.	 No	 doubt	 that	 the	 elaboration,	 maintenance	 and	development	of	the	“EU	democracy”	with	the	large	citizen	participation	is	a	vital	issue,	nevertheless	the	exclusive	focus	on	this	issue	produced	a	situation	in	which	the	EU	institutions	and	the	public	opinion	has	realized	only	very	belatedly	the	de-democratization	 process	 in	 ECE.	 The	 European	 Parliament	 has	 made	 several	efforts	to	create	a	DFR	mechanism	to	investigate	the	Democracy,	Fundamental	Rights	and	Rule	of	Law	in	the	member	states,	but	it	has	always	failed	because	of	the	resistance	of	 the	most	member	states.	The	Economic	Europe	has	new	and	again	defeated	the	Political	Europe,	therefore	the	authoritarian	challenge	if	ECE	has	come	as	a	surprise	of	the	old	member	states.9		Altogether,	 the	 global	 crisis	 especially	 hit	 hard	 the	 ECE	 region,	 therefore	 the	divergence	 of	 the	 ECE	 from	 the	 EU	 mainstream	 in	 Europeanization	 and	Democratization	 became	 manifest	 already	 in	 the	 second	 period.	 The	 de-democratization	 process	 began	 in	 the	 new	 ruling	 populist	 parties,	 which	introduced	 the	 counterproductive	 austerity	 measures	 cutting	 the	 investment	into	 the	 future.	While	 the	gap	between	 the	quantitative	versus	 the	qualitative	catching	up	had	been	latent	in	the	first	period	because	the	main	task	had	been	the	transition	to	the	market	economy	and	its	minimal	consolidation,	this	gap	was	brutally	widening	in	the	second	period.	The	contrast	was	the	most	evident	in	the	Polish	case,	where	the	GDP	grew	even	in	the	crisis	years,	still	the	disinvestment	into	social	and	human	capital	continued	or	even	increased.	So	under	the	pressure	of	global	crisis	the	ECE	region	did	not	turn	to	the	innovation	driven	development	that	was	the	basic	necessity	for	the	global	competitiveness,	but	it	has	reinforced	the	efforts	of	the	controversial	GDP-based	economic	growth.	In	the	early	2010s	due	to	the	pernicious	effects	of	the	global	crisis	there	was	a	general	backsliding	of	middle	class	-	especially	the	lower	middle	class	-	in	the	ECE	countries,	and	the	increasing	 inequality	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 “precariat”	 strata	 produced	 the	authoritarian	challenge.	Although	after	the	global	crisis	there	was	a	tsunami,	a	master	wave	of	neopopulism	worldwide,	this	authoritarian	challenge	with	hard	populist	parties	appeared	earlier	and	was	stronger	in	ECE	than	elsewhere,	since	the	global	crisis	hit	hard	the	fragile	ECE	economies	and	societies,	even	if	it	was	not	noticed	by	the	EU	institutions	and	experts.	All	in	all,	the	polycrisis	was	deeper	in	 ECE	 than	 in	 the	 old	member	 states	 because	 they	were	more	 vulnerable	 in	socio-economic	and	political	 terms,	being	newcomers	 in	market	economy	and	democracy,	not	yet	reaching	the	early	consolidation	and	not	finding	the	proper	
 9	There	have	been	repeated	attempts	in	EP	from	Tavares	Report	(EP	2013)	through	the	DRF	control	mechanism	(EP	2016)	to	the	Sargentini	Report	(EP	2018)	to	condemn	the	de-democratization	in	ECE.	
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way	 of	 Europeanization	 before	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 global	 crisis.	 The	 socio-economic	crisis	in	the	early	2010s	unleashed	a	vicious	circle	between	low	trust	and	poor	governance	and	resulted	in	a	deep	Core-Periphery	Divide	by	the	second	half	of	the	2010s.		
	
5	 THE	 DEEPENING	 CORE-PERIPHERY	 DIVIDE	 AND	 THE	 JUNCKER	
PARADOX	(2014–2019)		In	the	third	period	there	has	been	in	fact	a	new	systemic	change	as	a	transition	from	 the	 chaotic	 democracy	 to	 the	 authoritarian	 rule.	 The	 global	 crisis	 has	seriously	hit	the	ECE	region,	and	the	negative	socio-economic	effects	have	been	increased	by	 the	emerging	New	World	Order	 in	 the	mid-2010s.	This	 “internal	Easternization”	 has	 led	 to	 a	 marked	 divergence	 from	 the	 mainstream	 EU	development	inside	and	the	new	kinds	of	authoritarian	systems	in	ECE	have	been	facing	the	marginalization	in	the	EU	outside.	Nevertheless,	the	new	institutional	cycle	of	the	EU	(2019-2024)	a	new	perspective	has	been	opened	to	elaborate	the	region-specific	development	 for	ECE	 in	 the	EU.	The	main	 characteristic	of	 the	third	 period	 of	 the	 ECE	 membership	 is	 the	 authoritarian	 challenge	 with	 the	drastic	deepening	of	 the	Core-Periphery	Divide.	Basically,	 in	 the	period	of	 the	Juncker	 Commission	 the	 EU	 has	 tried	 to	 build	 up	 a	 comprehensive	 reform	program	since	2014,	still	the	special	ECE	crisis	management	has	not	yet	been	put	on	 the	 long	 list	 of	 priorities.	 This	 benign	 negligence	 has	 led	 to	 the	 Juncker	Paradox	with	its	counterproductive	effects:	the	more	the	EU	has	neglected	the	ECE	special	treatment	the	more	the	Core-Periphery	Divide	deepened.10		The	 lessons	 of	 the	 global	 crisis	 and	 the	 necessary	 deep	 reforms	 have	 been	summarized	 in	 a	 long	 research	paper	 of	 Eurofound	with	 the	 title	 the	Upward	
convergence	 in	 the	 EU:	 Concepts,	 measurements	 and	 indicators	 (hereafter	Convergence	2018).	This	is	a	very	good	summary	of	the	reform	efforts	during	the	Juncker	Commission,	indeed,	with	both	a	large	collection	of	the	data	about	the	weaknesses	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 excellent	 ideas	 for	 a	 new	 strategy.	 This	comprehensive	 research	 document	 has	 raised	 the	 substantial	 issue	 of	 the	 EU	crisis	under	the	term	of	coherence,	at	the	same	time,	this	conceptual	framework	shows	the	huge	contrast	between	these	 ideas	and	their	 implementation	 in	the	Juncker	Commission.	Although	this	research	report	has	indicated	that	the	regions	and	member	states	have	suffered	from	the	crisis	in	different	ways,	still,	it	has	its	own	limitations,	since	it	has	remained	critical	at	the	general	EU	level	and	has	not	offered	 any	 regional	 remedies.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 excellent	 analysis	 gives	 us	 a	good	theoretical	starting	point	 to	present	 the	ECE	problems,	even	 if	 it	has	not	overstepped	the	Juncker	Paradox	of	benign	negligence	of	ECE.		To	start	with,	“The	founding	fathers	of	the	European	project	were	convinced	that	social	 convergence	 will	 arise	 spontaneously	 through	 economic	 convergence.”	(Convergence	2018,	6).	The	original	idea	of	the	EU	integration	was	based	on	the	simplified	functionalism	exclusively	with	positive	and	automatic	spill-overs	from	the	 economic	 growth	 to	 all	 other	 fields	 of	 society.	 Even	 later,	 realizing	 the	increasing	problems,	supposedly	the	positive	side	effects	were	automatic	and	the	negative	effects	were	deemed	small	and	transitory.	The	Coherence	document	is	in	fact	a	big	effort	to	go	beyond	the	Economic	Europe	–	or	the	“Common	Market”	–	by	elaborating	a	new	conceptual	framework,	in	this	way,	coherence	as	a	central	
 10	The	contrast	between	the	high	expectations	and	low	delivery,	or	between	the	ambitious	reforms	and	 missing	 implementation	 goes	 through	 the	 Juncker	 Commission,	 see	 Blockmans	 (2019),	Botopoulos	(2019),	Ivan	(2017)	and	Russack	(2017).	
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term	is	opposed	economic	growth.	Moreover,	the	simplified	thinking	about	the	economic	 growth	 with	 the	 GDP-based	 philosophy	 is	 presented	 as	 the	 main	reason	for	the	devastating	effects	of	the	global	crisis	for	the	EU.	The	Economic	Europe	captured	the	Social	Europe	and	Political	Europe	on	the	thinking	horizon,	“while	 the	 concept	 of	 economic	 convergence	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 European	treaties	and	has	been	at	the	forefront	of	European	policy	discussions	for	some	time,	the	importance	of	the	upward	social	convergence	has	only	recently	gained	traction.”	As	a	result,	a	downward	convergence	has	taken	place	in	the	EU	“with	an	increase	of	disparities	across	the	Member	States”	resulting	in	social	exclusion,	poor	performance	of	governments	and	low	life	satisfaction	(ibid.,	1–2).		This	research	document	has	confronted	the	taboo	of	the	typical	EU	philosophy	that	the	economic	growth	based	development	of	the	previous	strategy	is	equally	advantageous	for	all	member	states,	given	the	fact	that	“Some	wealthier	Member	States	or	regions	may	benefit	more	than	others	from	the	progress	of	integration	–	 in	 part	 due	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 specialisation	 and	 of	 centre-periphery	dichotomies.”,	although	“If	there	is	a	feeling	that	the	single	market	impedes	the	growth	of	Member	States	and	prevents	low	income	countries	from	developing,	efforts	will	be	made	to	undermine	its	functioning”.	To	overcome	this	“negative	externality”	 or	 controversial	 effect	 of	 the	 EU	 it	 has	 outlined	 “how	 the	 debate	around	convergence	developed	as	the	focus	moved	from	economic	convergence	to	 economic	 and	 social	 convergence”,	 and	 overviewed	 the	 new	 strategy	emphasizing	that	sustained	convergence	is	“a	policy	process	towards	cohesion,	which	 is	 the	 ultimate	 political	 objective”	 (ibid.,	 5–6),	 putting	with	 this	 strong	argument	Cohesive	Europe	at	the	centre	of	the	new	EU	strategy.		The	 Eurofound	 research	 document	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 global	 crisis	 has	meant	a	turning	point	in	this	process	and	concluded	that	“the	2008	financial	crisis	halted	or	even	reversed	some	of	 these	converging	 trends,	 leading	 to	dramatic	social	and	economic	divergence	between	countries.”,	since	“The	consequences	of	divergence	between	Member	States	are	potentially	grave.	Economic	divergence	undermines	the	promise	of	shared	economic	prosperity,	which	was	central	to	the	creation	of	the	EU	in	the	first	place.	(…)	Such	marked	differences	are	unlikely	to	be	sustainable.”	(ibid.,	5,	7).	It	states	that	-	after	the	crisis	management	exercise	of	the	Barroso	Commission	-	the	Juncker	Commission	has	made	serious	efforts	to	elaborate	 a	 new	 strategy	 for	 the	 EU	 developments:	 “The	 debate	 around	socioeconomic	convergence	received	further	input	with	the	election	of	Juncker	Commission	 in	 2014,	 with	 upward	 convergence	 forming	 part	 of	 President	Juncker’s	agenda,	entitled	‘A	new	start	for	Europe’.”	Indeed,	the	White	Paper	on	
the	future	of	Europe	(2017)	was	accompanied	by	the	series	of	“reflection	papers”,	and	the	concept	of	economic	and	social	convergence	was	central	to	these	papers.	It	has	become	clear	that	“The	EU	cannot	afford	to	experience	another	setback	as	drastic	as	that	of	2008,	and	its	leaders	have	recognized	that	it	must	prepare	to	avoid	 such	 an	 event.	This	 is	 the	ultimate	 goal	 of	 the	European	Pillar	 of	 Social	Rights.	(…)	The	Pillar	extends	the	thinking	underlying	the	2013	Social	Investment	Package,	 which	 focused	 on	 social	 investment,	 human	 capital	 and	 equal	opportunities.”	(Convergence	2018,	7–8).		At	the	end	of	the	Juncker	Commission	the	analysis	of	the	prestigious	European	Policy	Center	(EPC)	has	argued	an	even	more	critical	spirit	analysing	the	rising	duality	as	the	Core-Periphery	Divide,	or	as	the	EPC	analysis	terms	it,	Fragmented	Europe.	 It	 points	 out	 that	 “there	 are	 structural	 differences	 among	 the	EU27	–	divergences	 between	 North-South,	 East-West,	 older-younger	 member	 states,	euro	and	non-euro	countries	(…)	These	divisions	do	not	only	affect	political	elites	in	national	capitals,	but	also	societies	as	a	whole”.	The	Fragmented	Europe	has	produced	deep	social	polarization	with	“high	degree	of	economic	divergence	and	
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rising	 inequalities”	 and	 “widening	 economic	 gap	 between	 and	 within	 EU	countries”,	horribile	dictu	“it	seems	as	if	Europeans	are	almost	living	on	different	planets”	 that	 has	 been	 selected	 as	 the	 motto	 of	 this	 paper.	 The	 global	 crisis	management	of	the	EU	has	deepened	the	Core-Periphery	Divide	and	eroded	the	social	solidarity	by	strengthening	the	Core	and	the	prioritizing	the	“market”.	In	this	Core-based	Fragmented	Europe	populists	“are	successful	when	they	can	tap	into	people’s	grievances	and	fears	about	the	future,	when	the	citizens	are	deeply	frustrated	with	those	who	have	been	in	power,	and	when	they	are	dissatisfied	with	 the	 existing	 state	 of	 representative	 democracy.”	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 not	enough	to	have	a	theoretical	discussion	with	the	neopopulism	in	the	EU,	but	it	is	necessary	to	solve	the	basic	problems	leading	to	the	increasing	fragmentation.	This	EPC	document	has	suggested	“cohesion”	and	“social	justice”	as	the	key	terms	for	the	further	federalization,	namely	more	differentiation	without	a	preference	for	 “core	 Europe”	 in	 order	 to	 “counter	 the	 sources	 of	 fragmentation	 and	polarisation”	(Emmanouilidis	2018,	17,	20).		The	 emerging	New	World	Order	 in	 the	 2010s	with	 the	 refugee	 crisis	 and	 the	return	to	geopolitics	after	the	Russian	aggression	against	Ukraine	has	changed	in	the	 international	 scenery	 for	 the	 ECE	 developments	 (see	 e.g.	 Demertzis	 et	 al.	2017).	The	socio-economic	divergence	of	the	ECE	region	was	rather	clear	already	in	the	troubled	years	of	the	global	crisis,	still	the	political	and	cultural	divergence	has	only	become	shockingly	visible	in	the	second	half	of	the	2010s	with	the	quasi	consolidation	of	 the	new	authoritarian	regimes	 in	ECE.	The	 long	authoritarian	transition	 began	 in	 Hungary	 in	 the	 early	 2010s	 that	 was	 documented	 by	 the	Tavares	Report	of	the	European	Parliament	in	2013,	but	the	real	turning	point	to	the	new	authoritarian	systems	came	in	Poland	when	the	PiS	government	entered	in	late	2015,	while	the	other	authoritarian	leaders	like	Babis,	Fico	and	Jansa	have	become	central	figures	in	the	countries	concerned.	Although	the	ECE	divergence	and	 authoritarian	 turn	 was	 exposed	 by	 the	 EP	 and	 continuously	 put	 on	 the	agenda	with	urgency	in	the	second	half	of	2010s,	the	European	Commission	was	not	alerted	and	the	ECE	divergence	was	not	put	on	the	list	of	the	–	even	longer	–	priorities.	 The	 benign	 negligence	 of	 the	 specific	 ECE	 development	 has	contributed	in	three	main	ways	to	the	divergence	of	the	ECE	region	from	the	EU	mainstream:	first	 in	the	rise	and	maintenance	of	the	neoliberal	hybrid,	second	giving	 an	 opportunity	 in	 the	 cohesion	 policy	 for	 the	 systemic	 corruption,	 and	third,	 tolerating	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 violations.	 Conversely,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	characterize	briefly	the	socio-economic,	political	and	identity	issues	as	they	form	a	particular	system	of	the	Eastern	deviation	within	the	EU	in	the	late	2010s.	
	
First	 of	 all,	 in	 the	 socio-economic	 dimension	 the	 divergence	 from	 the	 EU	mainstream	development	began	at	 the	very	 start	of	 systemic	 change	with	 the	creation	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 hybrid	 that	 was	 the	 stepping	 stone	 of	 the	 new	development.	The	starting	divergence	from	the	EU	mainstream	can	be	seen	in	the	contrast	 of	 the	 quantitative	 versus	 qualitative	 catching	 up	 process.	 The	 ECE	region	was	lagging	behind	the	West	in	the	GDP	terms,	therefore	the	quantitative	catching	up	process	was	a	legitimate	aim	–	above	all	in	the	first	period	-,	but	it	has	become	a	blind	alley	more	and	more.	Actually,	the	quantitative	catching-up	with	its	internal	logic	in	the	GDP	and	welfare	terms	has	meant	repeating	the	past	of	the	developed	countries	versus	the	qualitative	catching-up	in	the	knowledge	economy	and	well-being	terms	in	order	to	reach	the	present	of	the	West	in	its	new	internal	logic.	While	the	ECE	region	has	indeed	produced	a	modest	catching	up	effect	in	quantitative	terms,	there	has	still	been	an	increasing	gap	in	qualitative	terms	of	 the	R&D	world.	West	European	firms	have	considered	ECE	as	a	huge	market	and	a	big	labour	reservoir	of	both	the	relatively	low	skilled	workers	and	the	young	high	skilled	workers	and	researchers.	The	biggest	delay	between	East	and	 West	 has	 been	 more	 and	 more	 in	 the	 process	 of	 innovation	 driven	
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development	or	knowledge	economy	that	has	confirmed	the	status	of	ECE	as	the	low	wage	 –	 low	 skilled	periphery	 of	 the	West,	 above	 all	 that	 of	Germany	 and	Austria.	This	controversial	development	has	brought	a	multidimensional	socio-economic	effect	with	very	important	progress	in	some	fields	of	production,	but	–	as	the	edited	volume	of	Europeanization	Revisited:	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	in	
the	European	Union	has	pointed	out	-	basically	has	conserved	the	ECE	historical	delay	 and	 its	 dual	 economic	 and	 social	 structure	 horizontally-territorially	between	the	West	of	East	and	East	of	East	as	well	as	vertically-socially	between	the	winners	and	losers.11		In	the	first	fifteen	years	of	the	EU	membership	it	has	turned	out	that	the	negative	externalities	 in	 the	unfair	 competition	between	 stronger	 and	weaker	member	states	have	not	balanced	by	 the	cohesion	policy.	This	huge	distance	at	macro-level	of	the	member	states	has	come	to	the	surface	vertically-socially	more	and	more,	 since	 it	 has	 brought	 deep	 polarization	 between	 winners	 and	 losers,	educated	 and	 low	 skilled,	 “civilized”	 or	 Europeanized	 and	 “backward”	 or	marginal	strata.	The	positions	and	rules	of	competition	have	been	“misleadingly	positive	 and	 misleadingly	 static”,	 therefore	 the	 “contradiction	 of	 economic	Europeanization	(…)	namely	that	EU	policies	and	regulatory	models	have	been	mostly	created	by	and	for	advanced	capitalist	economies	and	thus	might	lead	to	suboptimal	(or	at	least	unanticipated)	outcomes	for	transition	countries.”	There	are	both	visible	and	invisible	rules	and	effects	in	the	Economic	Europe	and	the	negative	externalities	have	been	particularly	hitting	the	ECE	economies	because	the	EU	“has	exercised	remarkable	control	over	the	economic	transformation	in	ECE”	(Bohle	and	Jacoby	2018,	92,	95).		This	contradiction	between	the	positive	and	negative	socio-economic	effects	of	the	EU	may	appear	even	deeper	horizontally-regionally	as	the	overview	of	the	regional	development	underlines:	“This	paper	shows	that	the	implementation	of	the	 cohesion	policy	 in	 the	Eastern	member	 states	has	benefited	 the	 relatively	more	developed	 regions	 thus	 the	 policy	 has	 failed	 to	 comply	with	 its	 original	objectives.	The	main	reason	for	this	lays	in	the	fund	eligibility	criteria	which	were	established	according	to	an	EU-wide	benchmark.	Relative	to	this	benchmark	the	vast	majority	of	the	Eastern	European	regions	are	backward.	As	a	consequence,	the	 most	 prosperous	 and	 the	 most	 laggard	 Eastern	 regions	 were	 grouped	together	into	the	same	eligibility	category.	The	empirical	evidence	in	this	paper	demonstrates	 that	 this	 ‘level	 playing	 field’	 has	 proved	 advantageous	 for	 the	economically	more	 advanced	 regions	with	 superior	 absorption	 capacity:	 they	competed	more	effectively	for	the	funds	and	secured	more	EU	grants	than	their	weaker	counterparts.”	(Medve-Bálint	2018,	109).		With	 the	 end	 of	 “the	 convergence	 dream”	 (Darvas	 2015;	 Darvas	 2019)	 these	negative	 effects	 have	 generated	 a	 credibility	 crisis,	 in	 which	 “the	 victory	 of	Western	liberalism	would	make	a	swift	convergence	between	east	and	west	of	Europe	the	most	natural	development”	(Rupnik	and	Zielonka	2013,	19)	and	the	social	frustration	has	led	a	nostalgia	for	the	lost	world	of	job	and	life	security	in	ECE.	The	trickling	down	myth	has	evaporated	because	the	economic	growth	has	not	created	a	“social	elevator”	effect	for	all.	Moreover	–	as	the	GDP	gap	has	been	described	by	 Jeffry	Sachs	 (WHR	2012,	3–4)	–	economic	growth	or	bigger	GDP	does	not	generate	necessarily	better	public	services	and	well-being,	just	to	the	contrary,	 it	may	also	unleash	opposite	effects	as	well	with	a	worsening	way	of	
 11	On	socio-economic	transformations	and	the	recurring	crisis	 in	ECE	see	e.g.	Ademmer	(2018),	Tóth	and	Medgyesi	(2018)	and	Závecz	(2017).	In	the	Cohesion	Monitor	Janning	(2018)	has	also	documented	the	widening	gap	between	the	country	and	individual	level,	since	the	catching	up	process	goes	on	much	quicker	at	the	country	level	than	at	the	level	of	the	citizens.	
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life.	 Altogether,	 the	 EU	 document	 of	 Copenhagen	 twenty	 years	 on	 (EC	 2013)	already	 indicated	 the	 profound	 rethinking	 the	 accession	 process	 in	 the	West	Balkan	 due	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 violations	 and	 the	 poor	 performance	 in	 reform	implementation	in	ECE.12	
	
Second,	turning	to	political	issues,	the	cohesion	policy	has	been	supposed	to	be	the	 answer	 of	 Political	 Europe	 to	 the	 disruptive	 effect	 of	 Economic	 Europe.	However,	the	EU	cohesion	policy	as	the	“Convergence	Machine”	has	not	worked	properly	due	the	missing	regional	development	strategy	based	on	the	specificity	of	ECE	as	the	World	Bank	experts	pointed	out	already	in	the	early	2010s	(WB,	Gill	and	Raiser	2011).	Cohesion	policy	has	not	generated	convergence	in	the	proper	meaning	of	this	word	by	producing	the	same	socio-economic	and	political	system	in	the	“quality	of	democracy”	term.	In	some	ways,	it	has	turned	to	the	opposite	effect.	The	huge	amount	of	EU	transfers	has	had	a	controversial	 impact	on	the	ECE	region,	in	an	indirect	way	it	has	supported	the	authoritarian	system,	since	it	has	 resulted	 in	 the	 systemic	 corruption.	 The	 compromise	 between	 the	multinationals	 and	 the	 comprador	national	 elites	 as	 the	neoliberal	hybrid	has	work	in	fact	as	political	security	device	in	both	directions.	The	state	organized	politico-business	 networks	 have	 managed	 channelling	 the	 EU	 transfers	 to	friendly	 oligarchs.	 The	politico-business	 based	 redistribution	has	 been	 a	 legal	facade	for	the	state	mechanism	of	the	money	pump	to	organize	the	local	political	class	in	order	to	serve	the	authoritarian	political	elite	through	the	EU	transfers.	It	means	 the	 full	 state	 capture,	 and	 its	 completion	 in	 the	2010s	provoked	 the	reform	fatigue,	since	the	men	of	the	street	lost	any	interest	in	reform	changes.	Thus,	the	neoliberal	hybrid	based	on	the	undemocratic	compromise	between	the	foreign	multinational	 and	 the	 national	 authoritarian	 political	 elite	 has	 largely	contributed	to	the	decline	of	democracy.	Democracy	has	been	the	mantra	for	the	legitimation	of	the	autocratic	regimes	as	a	simplified	identification	of	democracy	with	“free	and	fair”	elections.	But	actually	this	thin	façade	has	not	been	kept,	since	the	 unfair	 voting	 procedures	 –	 mainly	 through	 clientelism	 –in	 their	 most	sophisticated	 forms	 are	 quite	 widespread	 also	 in	 ECE	 (see	Mares	 and	 Young	2016;	Goat	and	Bazsofy	2019).13		Thus,	 instead	of	 transition	 to	democracy	 reaching	 its	 consolidation	 in	 the	 last	decade	there	has	been	a	transition	to	the	authoritarian	rule.	In	the	first	half	of	the	2010s	 the	ECE	countries	were	still	 seemingly	democratic,	although	due	 to	 the	continuous	degeneration	of	political	system	democracy	was	only	a	thin	façade	provided	by	their	big	formal-legal	institutions.	The	“winner	takes	all”	has	been	taken	to	ad	absurdum	because	the	authoritarian	socio-political	power	pyramids	have	embraced	and	colonized	the	entire	society	from	the	economy	to	civil	society	and	ruled	it	also	through	the	soft	power	of	the	toxic	media.	The	emerging	new	elites	can	be	called	comprador	bourgeoisie,	since	they	have	a	dual,	controversial	position	 by	 serving	 the	multinationals	 economically	while	 confronting	 the	 EU	politically.	Following	 the	worst	Central	European	 traditions	of	parasitic	 ruling	elites	the	ugly	face	of	the	new	political	regimes	has	appeared	for	the	large	public	because	the	new	corrupt	elite	have	presented	conspicuous	–	or	even	provocative	
 12	Outlining	the	EU	scenarios	Emmanouilidis	and	Zuleeg	(2016,	34)	issued	a	warning	already	at	the	mid-time	of	the	2015-2019	institutional	cycle	that	‘[t]he	distinction	between	euro	and	non-euro	countries	undermines	political	cohesion	(…)	the	establishment	of	a	core	Europe	against	the	will	of	those	left	behind	would	lead	to	the	opposite	direction	and	risk	creating	new	dividing	lines	in	Europe.’	13	There	has	been	a	widening	debate	on	the	Unholy	Alliance	between	the	Western	–	mainly	German	–	multinationals	and	the	ECE	comprador	political	elite	in	both	the	old	and	ECE	media,	which	also	deals	with	the	repatriation	of	the	EU	transfers	to	the	West	by	these	firms.	This	issue	would	need	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	political	economy,	therefore	this	paper	does	not	deal	with	its	whole	complexity.	
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-	 consumption	 and	 luxurious	way	 of	 life	 in	 order	 to	 indicate	 their	 high	 social	status.14	
	
Third,	turning	to	the	effects	of	the	New	World	Order	(NWO)	globally	and	the	Core-Periphery	Divide	in	the	EU	as	the	short	presentation	of	the	two-level	game.	The	global	crisis	has	been	at	the	same	time	the	prelude	of	the	world	system	change	that	has	entered	in	the	2010s,	most	evidently	around	2015.	While	in	the	first	two	periods	the	ECE	governments	tried	to	follow	the	EU	rules,	in	the	third	period	of	the	2010s	they	have	turned	more	and	more	against	it	in	both	direct	and	indirect	ways	 in	many	 policy	 fields.	 It	 has	 culminated	 after	 2015	 under	 the	 impact	 of	refugee	crisis	and	with	the	return	of	geopolitics	in	NWO	that	has	completed	the	internal	socio-economic	and	political	desecuritization	with	the	geopolitical	one,	very	 much	 on	 the	 ECE	 borders.	 Parallel	 with	 the	 divergence	 from	 the	 EU	mainstream	 the	 EU	 countries	 have	 produced	 a	 regional	 convergence	 by	 the	common	 policies	 of	 the	 emerging	 neopopulism	 and	 identity	 politics	 inside,	leading	to	rule	of	law	violations.	Despite	the	“family	quarrels”	in	the	V4,	they	had	more	or	less	a	common	stand	in	the	refugee	crisis	open	conflict	with	the	EU,	based	on	 the	mutual	 misunderstanding	 or	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	historical	burden	and	specific	crisis	of	ECE.	At	the	same	time	the	EU	has	tolerated	the	degeneration	of	the	ECE	political	system	with	the	rule	of	law	violations	due	to	 some	 complicity	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 elites	 with	 some	 Western	 economic	forces.	Basically,	the	legal	experts	have	described	the	deep	tension	between	the	“market”	 and	 “constitution”,	 i.e.	 between	 Economic	 and	 Political	 Europe	 as	“perpetuating	the	Union’s	inability”	to	restore	rule	of	law	in	ECE:	“The	EU	thus	emerged	 as	 a	 vehicle	 of	 the	 negative	 market-based	 approach	 to	 the	 ‘values’	question.	Clearly,	creating	a	market	and	questioning	the	state	is	not	sufficient	as	a	basis	for	a	mature	constitutional	system,	potentially	creating	a	justice	nugatory	at	the	supranational	level”	(Kochenov	and	Bárd	2018,	88).15		In	general,	it	applies	to	the	entire	ECE	region	that	“in	recent	years,	however,	the	democratic	 fairy	 tale	has	been	sputtering.”	 (Krašovec	and	 Johannsen	2016,	1).	The	main	 lesson	 from	 the	Eastern	 enlargement	 that	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 argue	against	 the	 neopopulism	 and	 defeat	 it	 in	 the	 theoretical	 discussions,	 but	 its	causes	 has	 to	 be	 dismantled.	 Despite	 the	 reform	 efforts	 of	 the	 Juncker	Commission	 at	 theoretical	 level	 there	 has	 been	 no	 basic	 change	 in	 the	 Core-Periphery	relationships.	There	has	still	been	no	“recognition”,	ECE	has	remained	a	 blind	 spot	 for	 the	West.	 To	 initiate	 a	 basic	 change	 the	 experts	 of	 European	Studies	have	 to	change	 first	 their	vocabulary.	ECE	has	usually	been	compared	with	the	past	of	the	developed	countries	being	hostage	of	the	narrow	horizon	of	GDP	instead	of	the	new,	extended	meaning	of	economic	competitiveness	in	the	unfolding	knowledge	economy,	and	that	of	the	outdated	industrial	world	instead	of	information	society.	The	main	goal	is	of	the	EU	is	not	the	simple	legal	transfer	of	institutions,	but	Cohesive	Europe	with	convergence,	securitization,	social	and	human	 investment,	 social	 and	 human	 capital,	 trust	 and	 socio-political	participation.	Finally,	in	the	recent	situation	the	terminology	of	the	transition	to	authoritarian	 rule	 has	 to	 be	 introduced	 instead	 of	 transition	 to	 democracy,	deconsolidation	 instead	 of	 consolidation,	 neopopulist	 tidal	 wave	 instead	 of	emergence	of	democratic	political	culture.	
 14	From	the	V-Dem	data	(V-Dem	Institute,	2019,	see	Annex)	it	is	clear	that	the	ECE	countries	are	particularly	weak	in	the	DCI	component,	and	to	some	extent	also	in	the	PCI	component	(SI	and	SK	have	only	been	mobilized	by	the	recent	scandals).	Otherwise	the	negative	peaks	in	the	more	detailed	 indices	 are	 freedom	 of	 expression	 (rank	 104	 for	 PL	 and	 128	 for	Hungary)	 and	 civil	society	participation	(rank	111	for	Poland	and	139	for	Hungary).	15	There	has	been	a	large	and	widening	literature	on	the	rule	of	law	violations	in	ECE,	see	Bárd	et	al.	 (2016),	 Bugaric	 and	 Ginsburg	 (2016),	 Bugaric	 and	 Kuhelj	 (2017),	 Hegedűs	 (2019a,b)	 and	Kochenov	and	Bárd	(2018).	
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	All	 in	 all,	 the	 Juncker	 Commission	 entered	with	 a	New	 Start	 by	 elaborating	 a	strategic	renewal	of	the	EU	through	basic	reforms.	This	line	of	strategic	thinking	and	the	radical	reform	of	the	EU	institutions	went	through	the	entire	period	of	Juncker	 Commission,	 starting	 with	 the	 Juncker’	 Ten	 Priorities	 in	 2014	 and	leading	to	the	Sibiu	Declaration	in	May	2019.	Understandably	in	the	global	crisis	management,	 facing	 the	 dilemma	 of	 deepening	 and	 widening,	 the	 Juncker	Commission	 decided	 to	 stop	 and	 postpone	 the	 widening	 in	 the	West	 Balkan	region	and	radically	changed	its	Wider	Europe	strategy	in	the	EaP	region.	At	the	same	 time,	 however,	 it	 narrowed	 its	 deepening	 strategy	 to	 the	 Core.	 In	 fact,	during	 its	 cycle,	 it	 has	 limited	 its	 reform	 efforts	 and	 action	 radius	 to	 the	deepening	of	the	Core,	consequently	the	solution	of	the	specific	ECE	crisis	has	not	appeared	on	the	thinking	and	programming	horizon	of	the	Juncker	Commission	at	all.	Therefore	 the	main	message	of	 this	paper	 is	 the	warning	about	keeping	Juncker	paradox:	the	more	the	EU	neglects	the	special	crisis	management	in	ECE	by	focusing	only	on	the	Core	in	its	priorities,	the	more	the	ECE	countries	diverge	from	the	mainstream	EU	development.	So	the	benign	neglect	has	been	shockingly	counterproductive,	and	it	will	be	even	more	counterproductive	if	continued	in	the	next	institutional	cycle	in	the	early	2020s.		The	 serious	 tension	 between	 the	 cumulated	 and	 not	 implemented	 reform	programs	during	the	Juncker	presidency	has	made	the	2019	EP	elections	crucial	for	 the	 re-organization	of	 the	EU	 institutional	 structure	 in	 the	next	 cycle.	The	2019	EP	elections	clearly	demonstrated	the	danger	of	this	authoritarian	disease	for	the	EU	as	a	whole	and	the	necessity	to	return	to	the	course	of	the	increasing	federalization	of	the	EU	by	the	pushing	back	the	nationalist-nativist	tendencies	across	the	EU	that	would	be	impossible	without	solving	the	ECE	divergence	from	the	EU	mainstream	development.	Since	the	authoritarian	ECE	parties	and	their	leaders	were	 very	 active	 in	 the	 international	 network	 of	 the	 neopopulist	 and	eurosceptic	parties,	and	they	tried	to	change	the	course	of	the	EU	developments	towards	the	decomposition	and	disunion	before	the	EP	elections,	therefore	the	proper	treatment	of	the	special	ECE	crisis	is	one	of	the	important	issues	to	deal	with	in	the	2020s	in	order	to	overcome	the	repeated	crisis	wave	launched	by	the	anti-EU	forces.	
	
	
6	 CONCLUSION:	 THE	 LAST	 DECADE	 AS	 A	 LOST	 DECADE	 AND	 THE	
RENEWAL	OF	DEMOCRACY		The	2010s	years	have	been	a	lost	decade	for	ECE	with	an	increasing	divergence	from	 the	 EU	 mainstream	 in	 both	 Europeanization	 and	 Democratization.	However,	in	the	late	2010s	new	perspectives	have	been	opened	in	both,	thus	this	conclusion	 contains	 not	 only	 the	 summary	 of	 the	 first	 30	 years	 of	Europeanization	–	including	the	15	years	of	the	EU	membership	–	but	also	the	new	perspectives	for	the	next	30	years.	The	first	30	years	has	to	be	described	both	in	its	“objective”	and	“subjective”	history,	i.e.	in	socio-economic	and	political	transformations	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	mental	 history	 as	 the	ECE	populations	have	perceived	this	long	period.	In	the	objective	history	the	monster	waves	of	social	change	have	swept	across	ECE	twice,	namely	the	transformation	recession	with	internal	disintegration	of	socio-economic	desecuritization	in	the	nineties	and	the	global	 crisis	with	external	political	 and	 cultural	desecuritization	 in	 the	2010s.	This	history	in	a	bird’s	eye	view	can	be	summarized	that	there	has	only	been	a	formal	instead	of	an	effective	EU	membership	in	polity,	an	“exclusive”	instead	of	an	“inclusive”	democratic	order	in	politics,	consequently,	a	passive	policy	taker	position	instead	of	an	active	policy	maker	in	policy	within	the	EU.	The	key	word	
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of	describing	ECE	here	is	duality,	since	the	traditional	dual	character	of	the	ECE	developments	has	been	reproduced	in	the	EU	at	a	higher	level.	Thus,	in	the-2010s	the	increasing	Core-Periphery	divide	“refuted	the	kind	of	optimistic	determinism	that	 the	 collapse	 of	 communism	 and	 the	 victory	 of	Western	 liberalism	would	make	a	swift	convergence	between	the	east	and	west	of	Europe	the	most	natural	development”	(Rupnik	and	Zielonka	2013,	19).		This	duality	can	also	be	pointed	out	in	the	ECE	mental	history	where	this	duality	has	come	to	the	surface	as	a	contrast	between	the	adherences	to	Cultural	Europe	versus	Political	Europe.	It	appears	as	a	contradiction	between	cultural	and	civic	identity,	and/or	between	the	diffuse	and	the	specific	support	by	David	Easton.	This	contradictory	situation	has	provoked	a	huge	realm	of	cognitive	dissonance	between	the	long	term	and	short	term	EU	perceptions	of	ECE	population.	This	cognitive	dissonance	can	be	discovered	in	the	Eurobarometer	data	as	well,	but	not	completely,	since	this	public	opinion	survey	has	also	been	based	on	Western	evidences	 where	 this	 cognitive	 dissonance	 does	 not	 exist,	 or	 at	 least	 not	 so	drastically	 than	 in	 ECE.	 Therefore,	 the	 regional	 and	 national	 public	 opinion	surveys	 focusing	 on	 this	 cognitive	 dissonance	 have	 given	much	more	 correct	picture	 about	 the	mental	 history	 of	 the	 ECE	 population	 than	 Eurobarometer,	although	 it	has	 the	advantage	of	 the	 full	scale	EU	comparison.	The	arch	of	 the	public	opinion	during	the	15	years	indicate	the	deep	contrast	between	the	data	of	supporting	of	versus	benefiting	from	the	membership,	since	the	perception	of	the	EU	membership	has	in	ECE	multiple	cognitive	dissonances,	in	which	the	ECE	population	criticizes	or	refuses	the	EU	policies	on	one	side,	but	finally	the	large	majority	 still	 supports	 the	membership	 and	 feels	 as	 being	 a	 proud	 European	citizen	on	the	other.	Moreover,	even	in	the	Fragmented	Europe	this	contrast	has	also	appeared	between	the	EU	and	the	given	country	level	because	the	trust	in	the	EU-level	institutions	has	always	been	higher	in	ECE	than	that	in	the	nation-level	 institutions.	 Nowadays,	 in	 the	 late	 2010s	 the	 EU	 has	 arrived	 at	 the	crossroads,	indeed.	The	very	first	genuine	EU	elections	have	taken	place	at	the	2019	 EP	 elections,	 where	 the	 future	 of	 Europe	 has	 been	 at	 stake.	 The	overwhelming	majority	has	voted	for	the	further	integration,	which	has	proved	that	the	tidal	wave	of	neopopulism	is	over.	As	Pisani-Ferry	argues	after	the	EP	elections,	the	EU	citizens	“want	a	more	political	EU”	(2019),	and	in	the	Bruegel	Institute’s	 Policy	 Contributions	 the	 vital	 issues	 are	 Promoting	 sustainable	 and	
inclusive	growth	and	convergence	in	the	EU	(Demertzis	et	al.	2019)	and	How	to	
improve	European	cohesion	policy	for	the	next	decade	(Darvas	et	al.	2019).		After	the	victory	of	pro-European	forces	at	the	EP	elections	the	EU	can	make	a	progress	 in	 all	 the	 three	main	 fields	 of	 socio-economic,	 political	 and	 cultural	dimensions,	by	taking	marked	steps	in	the	transition	from	the	Fragmented	to	the	Cohesive	Europe.	There	have	recently	been	many	efforts	in	the	European	Studies	to	 design	 a	 Cohesive	 Europe.	 Fernandes	 and	 Vandenbroucke	 (2018,	 1–5)	strongly	argue	for	a	“European	Social	Union”	(ESU)	and	they	point	out	that	“As	heterogeneity	between	Member	States	increased	dramatically	with	enlargement,	a	 social	 dimension	 is	 now	 imperative.”	 because	 “A	 vital	 condition	 across	 the	European	Union	is	upward	convergence	in	the	quality	of	their	human	capital.	(…)	Such	 ‘social	 investment	policies’	are	a	matter	of	common	interest	 for	Europe”.	Finally,	Economic,	Social,	Political	and	Cultural	Europe	are	presented	here	as	a	unity	in	complexity,	more	and	more	also	formulated	in	the	term	of	Green	Europe,	since	they	have	the	common	message	of	completing	“the	half-made	institutions”	like	 the	 Eurozone	 and	 Schengen,	 building	 a	 knowledge	 based	 economy	 with	sustainable	society	and	democracy,	and	reaching	a	new,	active	global	role	for	the	EU	 with	 the	 marked	 appearance	 of	 European	 identity.	 The	 EU	 starts	 a	 new	institutional	cycle	in	2019	with	new	perspectives	to	lessen	the	Core-Periphery	Divide.	The	ECE	population	at	the	2019	EP	elections	has	sent	a	message	about	its	
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warry	because	 of	 the	deepening	Core-Periphery	Divide	due	 to	 the	divergence	from	the	EU	mainstream	in	the	qualitative	catching-up	process	of	the	knowledge-based	economy	and	society,	and	even	more	so	 in	 the	democratization	process	turning	to	the	autocracy.	It	is	high	time	to	overcome,	or	at	least	lessen,	the	East-West	duality,	and	there	is	a	high	expectation	for	a	new	start	on	the	ECE	side	in	the	spirit	of	Dahrendorf	theory.	According	to	his	dictum	(Dahrendorf	1990;	see	also	Offe	1991),	systemic	change	has	three	dimensions:	legal-political	transition	needs	six	months,	economic	transition	six	years	and	finally	social	transition	60	years.	 The	 first	 thirty	 years	 are	 over,	 the	 first	 generation,	 which	 has	 been	socialized	after	the	systemic	changed	has	entered,	with	their	new	perspectives.	Thus	in	the	next	thirty	years	social	systemic	change	may	take	place	completing	the	triple	transition	in	democratization	and	Europeanization.			
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ANNEX	
	 TABLE	1:	RANKINGS	LIBERAL	DEMOCRACY	INDEX	AND	ITS	COMPONENT	INDICES	
	LDI	–	Liberal	Democracy	Index,	EDI	–	Electoral	Democracy	Index,	LCI	–	Liberal	Component	Index,	ECI	 –	 Egalitarian	 Component	 Index,	 PCI	 –	 Participatory	 Component	 Index,	 DCI	 –	 Deliberative	Component	 Index.	 V-Dem	 Institute	 (2019),	 Democracy	 Report	 2019,	 https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf	
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NATURA	 2000	 EXPERIENCES	 IN	 SOUTHEAST	
EUROPE:	 COMPARISONS	 FROM	 SLOVENIA,	
CROATIA	AND	BOSNIA	AND	HERZEGOVINA			
Aleksandar	ŠOBOT	and	Andrej	LUKŠIČ1		…………………………………………………………………....……….................................………	
	 	 	 	
The	 main	 research	 objective	 is	 to	 determine	 the	 impact	 of	
Europeanisation	on	the	nature	protection	system	in	the	countries	of	
Southeast	 Europe.	 Europeanisation	 is	 presented	 in	 the	 research	
through	legislative	and	institutional	changes	due	to	the	adoption	of	
the	 European	 ecological	 network	 –	 Natura	 2000.	 Comparative	
analyses	 were	 made	 in	 Slovenia,	 Croatia	 and	 Bosnia	 and	
Herzegovina.	 Data	 collection	 was	 primarily	 done	 through	
participant	 interviews	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 Natura	 2000	 and	
secondary	 through	 all	 available	 relevant	 literature.	 After	 that,	 a	
policy	analysis	was	carried	out	through	a	thesis	and	subthesis	based	
on	the	main	goal.	The	conclusion	was	presented	as	a	confirmation	of	
the	main	thesis	that	Europeanisation	led	to	changes	in	Southeastern	
Europe’s	nature	protection	system.	
	
Key	 words:	 The	 Europeanisation;	 Nature	 Protection	 System;	Southeast	Europe;	Natura	2000.	
	
	
	
1	INTRODUCTION	AND	METHODOLOGY	
	Natura	 2000	 (N2000)	 is	 a	 sustainable	 development	 strategy	 at	 the	 European	Union	(EU)	level.	It	requires	the	introduction	of	sustainable	goals	and	principles	into	a	national	legislation	through	the	process	of	Europeanisation	in	Southeast	Europe	(SEE)	(Fernández	et	al.	2010;	Kapaciauskaite	2011;	Gioti	Papadaki	2012;	Niedziałkowski	et	al.	2012;	Cent	et	al.	2014;	Denti	2014;	Kay	2014;	Krenova	and	Kindlmann	2015).	 Sustainable	goals	are	based	on	 the	Bird	Directive	 (BD)	and	Habitat	Directive	 (HD)	 (Rosa	 and	Da	 Silva	 2005;	Wurzel	 2008;	 Ferranti	 et	 al.	2010;	 Louette	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Winter	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Winkel	 et	 al.	 2015)	 and	 the	principles	 of	 the	 Aarhus	 Convention	 (AC)	 (Stringer	 and	 Paavola	 2013;	Niedziałkowski	et	al.	2014).	In	order	to	implement	these	goals	and	principles	in	practice,	 it	 is	a	necessary	institutional	transformation	at	the	national	and	local	level.	Institutional	transformation	leads	to	the	involvement	of	non-governmental	
 1	Aleksandar	ŠOBOT,	Ph.D.,	and	Assistant	Professor	Andrej	LUKŠIČ,	Ph.D.	are	members	of	 the	Centre	for	Political	Theory,	Faculty	of	Social	Sciences,	University	of	Ljubljana,	Slovenia.	Contact:	ecosobot@gmail.com	
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organisations	(NGO)	(Weber	and	Christophersen	2002;	Newig	and	Fritsch	2009;	Ferranti	et	al.	2010;	Cent	et	al.	2013;	Stringer	and	Paavola	2013)	and	EU	actors	(Giljum	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Stubbs	 2005;	 Jordan	 2008;	 Brulle	 2010)	 in	 the	 system	of	nature	protection	and	the	changing	of	the	roles	of	national	and	local	institutions.	All	this	leads	to	a	change	of	the	nature	protection	concept	at	a	local	and	national	level	according	to	the	goals	of	sustainable	development	(SD)	on	the	global	level	(Šobot	 and	 Lukšič	 2016;	 2017;	 2019).	 Global	 environmental	 changes	 are	influenced	 by	 the	 internationalisation	 of	 national	 and	 local	 policies	 in	 global	movement	for	sustainable	development.			The	research	was	carried	out	within	the	framework	of	the	individual	research	project	Multi-Level	 Governance	 of	 Natural	 Resources	 in	 Slovenia,	 Croatia	 and	
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	 from	2013	to	2016	and	 the	applied	methodology	was	used	from	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016;	2017;	2019).	Primarily,	67	interviews	were	conducted	via	snowball	sampling,	using	over	1000	pages	of	secondary	literature	text.	 Secondary,	 all	 relevant	 and	available	 literature	 (legislative	acts,	 scientific	literature	etc.)	was	collected	and	a	policy	analysis	was	conducted	according	to	the	main	objective	of	the	research.	The	main	research	objective	was	to	determine	the	impact	of	Europeanisation	(legislative	and	institutional	level)	on	the	nature	protection	system	in	the	counties	of	SEE.	A	comparative	discussion	is	conducted	according	to	the	research	thesis	divided	into	5	sub-theses.	The	research	thesis	 is	drawn	from	the	main	objective	of	the	research.	The	five	sub-theses	are	drawn	from	five	research	questions,	which	are	included	in	the	research.2	The	discussion	according	to	the	thesis	and	sub-theses	is	presented	through	similarities	and	differences	between	the	influences	of	the	process	of	establishing	the	N2000	multi-level	governance	(MLG)	system	on	the	nature	protection	system	of	the	countries	included	in	the	study.				
2	DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSION	
	
Research	thesis:	The	Europeanisation	of	SEE	led	to	the	adoption	of	SD	objectives	in	 the	nature	protection	 systems	due	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	N2000	MLG	system	and	the	legal	as	well	as	institutional	development	is	required	in	order	to	have	the	objectives	of	SD	implemented	in	practice.		
	
The	first	sub-thesis:	The	process	of	establishing	the	MLG	system	of	N2000	or	the	integration	of	the	objectives	of	SD	in	selected	SEE	countries	following	the	process	of	Europeanisation.		
	
Confirmation:	The	Republic	of	Slovenia	(RS)	and	The	Republic	of	Croatia	(RC)	are,	according	 to	 the	 constitution,	 unique	 and	 indivisible	 states,	while	 Bosnia	 and	Herzegovina	(BiH)	is	composed	of	two	entities.	In	the	RS	and	RC,	the	main	role	has	the	government	at	the	country	level,	while	the	Council	of	Ministers	has	the	main	 role	 in	 BiH.	 Their	 roles	 are	 primarily	 legislative.	 According	 to	 the	constitution	 of	 all	 three	 countries,	 the	 international	 objectives	 must	 be	
 2	 The	 first	 research	 question	 is	 to	 determine	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 the	MLG	 of	 N2000	 in	countries	 of	 SEE	 that	 followed	 during	 the	 pre-accession	 and	 accession	 process;	 The	 second	research	 question	 is	 to	 determine	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 national	 legislation	 during	 the	implementation	of	N2000	international	agreements;	The	third	research	question	is	to	determine	the	roles	of	the	main	actors	in	the	process	of	establishing	MLG	of	N2000;	The	fourth	research	question	 is	 to	determine	 the	contribution	of	 the	process	of	establishing	MLG	of	N2000	 in	 the	nature	 protection	 system;	 The	 fifth	 research	 question	 is	 to	 identify	 future	 challenges	 for	 the	nature	protection	system.	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     48 
 
 
 
implemented	 in	 their	 national	 legislation	 during	 the	 process	 of	 the	Europeanisation.	In	1999,	the	RS	submitted	its	application	for	EU	membership	and	in	2004,	became	a	member	of	the	EU.3	The	RC	submitted	a	formal	candidacy	to	join	the	EU	in	2003	and	joined	the	EU	in	2013.4	BiH	entered	the	pre-accession	process	to	join	the	EU	in	1999	and	in	2016,	BiH	submitted	its	official	candidacy	to	join	the	EU.5	All	three	countries	had	an	obligation	to	establish	the	N2000	MLG	system	 in	 this	 period.	 In	 the	 RS	 and	 RC,	 this	 process	 began	 with	 the	 official	candidacy	to	join	the	EU	(the	accession	period)	while	in	BiH,	it	began	before	the	official	 candidacy	 to	 join	 the	EU	 (the	 pre-accession	period).	 The	 first	 steps	 to	establishing	the	N2000	MLG	system	in	all	three	countries	were	in	changing	the	national	legislation	of	nature	protection	with	the	implementation	of	international	objectives.	 In	 1999,	 the	 RS	 adopted	 a	 new	 law	 on	 nature	 protection,	 which	integrated	nature	protection	objectives	according	to	BD	and	HD,	and	the	RC	along	with	BiH	integrated	these	objectives	into	their	national	law	in	2003.	The	next	step	was	 to	 include	 work	 on	 information	 gathering	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	 non-governmental	actors	in	decision-making.	In	the	RS,	this	process	was	guided	by	the	 competent	Ministry	of	nature	protection	 that	 included	national	 experts	 in	information	gathering	and	decision-making	(Šobot	and	Lukšič	2017).	In	the	RC	and	BiH,	these	processes	were	guided	through	projects	without	a	clear	plan	and	strategy	of	the	work	on	the	establishment	of	N2000	areas.	The	work	was	such	mostly	due	to	the	politics	in	these	countries	and	the	lack	of	financial	resources.	Having	major	 EU	 funding,	 there	 had	 been	 intensive	work	 on	 establishing	 the	N2000	 MLG	 system.	 As	 an	 example,	 in	 the	 RC,	 the	 first	 project	 "National	Ecological	Network	–	important	bird	areas	in	Croatia"	was	funded	and	led	by	the	competent	Ministry	of	nature	protection.	However,	after	this	project	there	was	a	break	of	2	years	to	obtain	the	EU	funds.	With	obtaining	the	funds	from	the	EU,	the	 following	 three	 projects	 were	 organised,	 "Institutional	 strengthening	 and	implementation	 of	 the	NATURA	2000	network	 in	 Croatia",	 "The	 identification	and	establishment	of	the	marine	part	of	the	NATURA	2000	network	in	Croatia",	"Capacity	building	for	the	preparation	of	management	plans	and	strengthening	of	 nature	 protection	 inspection	 on	 the	 proposed	 NATURA	 2000	 areas",	 with	which	the	process	of	establishing	the	N2000	MLG	system	was	completed	(Šobot	and	Lukšič	2016).	The	competent	ministry	of	nature	protection	was	included	in	all	projects	and	the	organisers	of	projects	along	with	participants	were	mostly	composed	 of	 international,	 governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 actors.	 All	projects	 contributed	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 BD	 and	HD	 objectives	 into	 the	national	legislation.	In	this	period	a	lot	of	experience	was	adopted	from	the	RS.	In	BiH,	the	process	of	establishing	the	N2000	MLG	system	was	performed	through	5	 projects:	 "Emerald	 Network",	 "Living	 Heart	 of	 Europe",	 "Protection	 of	Biodiversity	of	the	Sava	River	Basin	floodplains",	"Wise	use	of	common	natural	resources",	 "Cooperation	 for	NATURA	2000"	(Šobot	and	Lukšič	2019).	The	EU	funded	 the	 first	 4	 projects	 and	 the	 main	 project	 managers	 were	 national	 or	international	NGOs.	There	were	no	representatives	of	competent	ministries	from	BiH	in	these	projects.	The	EU	also	funded	the	last	project,	however,	the	project	coordinator	was	the	competent	Ministry	of	nature	protection	in	BiH.	This	project	was	also	 the	 final	proposal	of	N2000	areas	 in	BiH.	 In	 this	project,	 a	 lot	of	 the	experience	 was	 adopted	 from	 the	 RC	 and	 RS.	 All	 projects,	 in	 the	 process	 of	establishing	 the	N2000	MLG	system	demanded	 information	gathering	and	 the	involvement	of	stakeholders	in	decision-making,	which	make	up	the	parts	of	the	Aarhus	 Convention.	 Therefore,	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 the	 N2000	 MLG	system	 in	 all	 three	 countries	 led	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 principles	 and	
 3	See	more	in	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2017).	4	See	more	in	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016).	5	See	more	in	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2019).	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     49 
 
 
 
ratification	 of	 the	 Aarhus	 Convention.	 The	RS	 ratified	 the	 AC	 in	 2002,	 the	 RC	completed	it	in	2006	and	BiH	did	it	in	2008.			
The	Second	sub-thesis:	The	objectives	of	BD,	HD	and	AC	are	implemented	into	the	national	legislation	that	led	to	the	definition	of	the	main	actors	and	their	roles	in	achieving	the	objectives	of	sustainable	development.			
Confirmation:	The	implementation	of	the	BD	and	HD	objectives	and	the	principles	of	AC	 into	the	national	nature	protection	systems,	which	 led	to	the	changes	of	national	 legislation.6	 Changes	 led	 to	 the	 inclusion	 of	 new	actors	 in	 the	 nature	protection	 system.	 The	 main	 actors	 in	 all	 three	 countries,	 in	 addition	 to	governmental	 institutions	 (competent	 ministries	 and	 managers	 of	 protected	areas),	 became	 international	 actors	 (such	 as	 the	 EU)	 and	 non-governmental	actors	 (such	 as	 NGOs	 in	 the	 field	 of	 nature	 protection).	 The	 EU	 became	 an	important	actor	in	nature	protection	at	the	national	level	in	all	three	countries.	In	the	RS	and	RC,	it	is	a	platform	of	information	transfer	under	the	national	law.	In	 BiH,	 RC	 and	 RS,	 the	 EU	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 financing	 the	 implementation	 of	international	 agreements	 into	 national	 legislation.	 In	 addition,	 the	 EU	 is	responsible	for	coordinating	the	implementation	of	international	commitments	into	national	legislation	in	these	countries.	In	the	RS	and	RC,	the	EU	is	a	controller	of	international	agreements	in	order	to	remain	unchanged	under	the	influence	of	national	legislation.	The	EU	is	a	consultant	in	BiH	for	all	the	important	issues	on	its	way	towards	the	EU.	Competent	ministries	of	nature	protection	are	in	charge	of	communicating	with	the	EU	at	the	national	level	in	terms	of	implementation	and	 enforcement	 of	 international	 obligations	 to	 protect	 nature.	 They	 have	 an	administrative	role	in	the	transposition	of	BD,	HD	and	the	directives	of	AC	into	national	 legislation.	 They	 are	 the	 leaders	 of	 a	 formal	 process	 of	 establishing	N2000.	It	 is	defined	that	the	government	with	the	assistance	of	the	competent	ministry	submits	a	N2000	areas	final	proposal	to	the	competent	EU	institution	in	RS.			During	the	process	of	establishing	the	N2000	MLG	system,	competent	ministries	of	 nature	 protection	 have	 a	 role	 in	 information-gathering	 and	 involvement	 of	stakeholders	 in	decision-making	in	all	 three	countries.	The	governments	of	RS	and	 RC	 have	 to	 establish	 new	 institutions	 that	 should	 operate	 within	 the	competent	ministry	 in	 order	 to	 gather	 information.	 Competent	ministries	 are	also	 in	 charge	 of	 inter-sectoral	 cooperation	 during	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	N2000	 MLG	 system.	 In	 BiH,	 an	 inter-entity	 cooperation	 and	 coordination	mechanism	 are	 established	 for	 all-important	 issues	 towards	 the	 EU.	 The	competent	 state	 ministry	 has	 the	 role	 of	 co-ordinating	 the	 competent	 entity	ministries	(in	 the	Federation	of	BiH	(FBiH)	cantonal	ministries).	Furthermore,	these	ministries	have	a	role	in	information-gathering	and	involving	stakeholders	in	decision-making.	In	RS	and	RC,	competent	ministries	keep	records	of	N2000	areas	after	adopting	N2000.			The	 cooperation	 with	 managers	 of	 protected	 areas	 is	 defined,	 which	 are	becoming	an	important	actor	in	implementing	BD	and	HD	at	the	local	level	in	all	three	 countries.	 The	 National	 Parks,	 in	 all	 three	 countries,	 have	 the	 role	 of	managing	the	national	eco-network	and	after	the	adoption	of	N2000	-	of	also	the	N2000	network.	Their	 role	 in	 the	N2000	 is	 to	gather	 information	and	 involve	local	people	in	decision-making.	Working	with	local	people	is	defined	in	raising	
 6	A	literature	review	on	the	implementation	of	the	objectives	of	BD	and	HD	and	the	principles	of	AC	into	national	systems	of	nature	protection	countries	of	 the	EU	can	be	 found	 in	 the	articles	by	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016;	2017;	2019).	
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public	 awareness	 (work	 on	 opinions)	 to	 achieve	 the	 objectives	 of	 nature	protection.	It	is	defined	that	National	Parks	(NP)	participate	in	the	development	of	documents	on	the	national	level	in	RS.	It	is	defined	that	NPs	participate	in	the	transfer	 of	 experience	 from	 other	 protected	 areas	 and	 cooperate	 with	 non-governmental	organisations	in	all	three	countries.			The	 NGOs	 in	 the	 field	 of	 nature	 protection	 are	 defined	 as	 major	 actors	 in	achieving	 the	 principles	 and	 objectives	 of	 sustainable	 development	 at	 the	national	 level	 in	 all	 three	 countries.	 Their	 role	 is	 based	 on	 the	 help	 to	governmental	actors	 in	 implementing	the	principles	of	 the	Aarhus	Convention	and	the	objectives	of	BD	and	HD.	They	also	have	a	role	in	collecting	information,	involving	 the	 public	 in	 decision-making	 and	 promoting	 the	 rights	 of	 nature	protection.	 They	 are	 legitimate	 participants	 in	 the	 Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	(EIA)	process	at	the	national	level	and	have	a	role	in	representing	public	environmental	rights.			
The	 third	 sub-thesis:	 The	 main	 actors	 of	 nature	 protection	 had	 a	 role	 in	implementing	the	principles	of	AC	for	achieving	the	objectives	of	BD	and	HD	in	accordance	with	the	concept	of	SD.			
Confirmation	 1.	 The	 role	 of	 the	 EU.7	 The	 EU	 funded	 and	 coordinated,	 in	 an	advisory	manner,	all	projects	to	establish	the	N2000	MLG	system	in	RS,	RC	and	BiH.	These	projects	led	to	the	implementation	of	the	objectives	of	BD	and	HD,	as	well	as	the	principles	of	AC	in	the	national	legislation,	that	represent	the	basic	change	in	the	nature	protection	system	of	these	areas.	The	objectives	of	BD	and	HD	were	implemented	in	the	law	on	nature	protection	and	the	objectives	of	AC	into	 the	 law	 on	 environmental	 protection.	 Financing	 the	 implementation	 of	international	obligations	by	the	EU	enabled	the	implementation	of	the	objectives	of	sustainable	development	in	nature	protection	systems	of	the	SEE	and	policy	development	 in	 these	 areas.	 The	 EU	 is	 recognised	 as	 the	 guardian	 of	 the	objectives	of	international	agreements	in	order	to	remain	unchanged	under	the	influence	of	domestic	legislation	in	RS	and	RC.	In	this	manner,	supranational	rules	with	a	transnational	participant	enabled	the	transparency	and	unchangeability	of	nature	protection	rules	at	the	national	level.	The	unchangeability	of	AC	rules	led	to	altering	public	awareness	and	old	practices.	The	new	practice	demanded	change	in	the	concept	of	nature	protection,	a	system	access	through	planning	and	inter-sectoral	cooperation,	which	was	not	the	case	before.	That	is	why	the	NGO	sector	gained,	for	the	first	time,	equality	in	decision-making	in	the	field	of	nature	protection.	It	is	the	biggest	change	regarding	the	attitude	of	governmental	and	non-governmental	actors	in	the	RS,	RC	and	BiH	nature	protection	system.	In	the	RS	and	RC,	this	led	to	altering	the	practice,	increasing	the	number	of	participants	in	nature	protection,	the	respect	for	all	stakeholders	in	decision-making,	as	well	as	a	higher	degree	of	respect	for	legislation.	The	EU	is	the	guardian	of	the	rights	and	 all	 disputable	 situations	 that	 came	 between	 governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 actors	 in	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 N2000,	 which	 led	 to	 the	freezing	of	funds	for	the	RS	and	the	RC.	This	is	the	mechanism	by	which	the	EU	does	 not	 participate	 directly	 in	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 stakeholders	(governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 actors)	 but	 instead,	 it	 protects	supranational	 interest	 and	 compels	 participants	 to	 work	 together	 to	 find	 a	solution.	In	the	RS,	RC	and	BiH,	the	EU	became	a	national	consultant	for	all	future	plans	of	nature	protection	which	must	comply	with	the	legislative	of	the	EU,	i.e.	other	 member	 states.	 In	 this	 manner,	 a	 new	 practice	 was	 introduced	 in	 the	
 7	 A	 literature	 review	 on	 the	 EU	 role	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 international	 obligations	 at	 the	national	level	can	be	found	in	the	articles	by	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016;	2017;	2019).	
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transfer	 of	 information	 that	 was	 recognised	 as	 important	 in	 all	 processes	 of	nature	protection.			
Confirmation	2:	The	 role	of	 the	 competent	Ministry	of	nature	protection.8	The	competent	Ministry	of	nature	protection	in	the	RS	had	a	formal	role	of	organising	the	 whole	 process	 of	 establishing	 the	 N2000	 MLG	 system.	 The	 ministry	established	the	Management	board	that	coordinated	the	entire	process	from	the	beginning	 to	 the	 end.	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	N2000	MLG	 system	was	done	through	projects	 in	 the	RC	and	BiH.	A	competent	ministry	had	a	major	role	 in	establishing	 N2000	 in	 RC.	 They	 were	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 first	 project	 of	establishing	 N2000	 and	 the	 main	 actors	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 all	 other	projects	 funded	by	the	EU.	The	process	of	establishing	N2000	 in	BiH	was	also	done	through	projects.	However,	in	BiH,	the	competent	ministry	at	the	state	level	did	not	participate	in	all	the	projects	but	it	did	participate	and	coordinate	the	last	project	of	establishing	the	N2000	MLG	system.	Other	projects	were	coordinated	by	domestic	or	international	NGOs.	The	role	of	the	competent	Ministry	in	nature	protection	of	BiH,	in	the	process	of	establishing	the	N2000	MLG	system,	is	defined	quite	well	by	a	constitutional	structure	that	differs	from	the	RS	and	RC	(mostly	due	 to	 the	entity	governments).	The	 competent	 state	ministry	established	 the	Management	 Board	 in	 which	 all	 the	 entities	 and	 cantonal	 ministries	 were	included.	 The	 Management	 Board	 had	 a	 group	 for	 the	 harmonisation	 of	legislative,	information	gathering,	to	involve	the	public	in	decision-making	and	creating	a	proposal	of	N2000	areas.	This	Board	was	established	on	the	practice	of	the	RS.	In	the	RS,	the	Board	had	a	role	to	harmonise	national	legislative	with	the	EU	legislative,	to	gather	information,	to	involve	the	public	in	decision-making	and	to	prepare	the	final	draft	of	N2000	areas.	In	the	RC,	there	were	no	boards	and	activities	were	done	from	project	to	project.	The	competent	ministry,	as	in	the	RS,	had	the	role	of	transposing	international	obligations	into	national	legislation,	of	information	gathering	and	of	involving	the	public	in	decision-making.	In	the	RS	and	the	RC,	there	was	an	increase	in	the	number	of	employees	due	to	the	needs	for	 the	 work	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 N2000.	 Statutory	 legislation	 led	 to	 the	changes	 of	 inter-sectoral	 organisations	 of	 the	 competent	 ministry	 on	 several	occasions	 (the	 transformation	 of	 institutions)	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	institutions	 for	 the	purpose	of	N2000	areas,	 such	as	 the	Republic	 Institute	 for	Nature	 Protection	 (RINP).	 The	 Institute	 for	 Nature	 Protection	 included	many	independent	 researchers	 in	 the	 data	 collection	 process.	 In	 BiH,	 due	 to	 the	constitutional	order,	there	was	neither	the	capacity	building	and	transformation	of	existing	institutions,	nor	the	establishment	of	new	institutions	at	the	national	level,	however,	the	coordination	mechanism	was	established.	The	coordination	mechanism	plays	a	role	of	increasing	inter-entity	cooperation,	i.e.	intersectoral	cooperation.	Collecting	data	in	the	Entity	Republic	of	Srpska	(ERS)	went	through	RINP	 and	 independent	 experts.	 In	 EFBiH,	 collecting	 data	 went	 through	independent	experts	and	NGOs	because	there	was	no	Entity	Institute	of	Nature	Protection	(EINP).	Inter-sectoral	cooperation	in	RC	was	developed	mostly	during	the	EIA	process,	which	has	been	going	on	since	2007.	This	led	to	the	involvement	of	other	sectors	in	nature	protection	(potential	N2000	areas)	on	a	planned	basis.	In	 RS	 and	 BiH,	 there	 was	 the	 inclusion	 of	 other	 sectors	 in	 the	 process	 of	establishing	N2000	through	the	board	for	N2000.	Primarily,	there	were	included	representatives	of	the	forestry	and	agriculture	in	all	three	areas	since	a	large	part	of	forest	and	agricultural	land	represents	a	potential	N2000	area.	The	sector	of	forestry	 cooperated	 quite	 well,	 while	 the	 sector	 of	 agriculture	 had	 very	 little	
 8	A	literature	review	on	the	roles	of	the	ministry	on	implementation	of	international	obligations	can	be	found	in	published	articles	by	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016;	2017;	2019).	
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cooperation	 in	 all	 three	 areas.	 In	 all	 three	 countries,	 all	 other	 sectors	 were	marginally	involved.			
Confirmation	3:	The	role	of	the	National	parks.9	The	role	of	NPs	in	all	three	areas	was	not	defined	by	the	organisers	of	the	process	of	establishing	the	N2000	MLG	system.	The	competent	ministry	communicated	with	NPs	in	all	three	areas	during	the	 establishment	 of	 the	 N2000	 MLG	 system	 in	 the	 course	 of	 their	 regular	activities	of	inter-sectoral	cooperation.	In	all	three	areas,	the	research	was	done	by	 the	 RINP	 and	 NGOs.	 In	 this	 manner,	 there	 was	 cooperation	 between	governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 actors	 in	 all	 three	 parks.	 Also,	 all	 three	parks	are	members	of	the	Dinaric	Arc	parks	and	in	such	a	manner,	there	was	an	international	 communication	 in	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 the	 N2000	 MLG	system.	 The	 Triglav	 National	 Park	 (TNP)	 underwent	 legal	 changes	 after	 the	establishment	of	 the	N2000	MLG	 system,	whereby	 a	new	management	model	was	 established	 that	 included	 non-governmental	 actors	 in	 decision-making.	There	was	no	new	management	model	and	non-governmental	actors	were	not	involved	in	decision-making	in	Plitvice	Lake	National	Park	(PLNP)	and	Sutjeska	National	Park	(SNP).			
Confirmation	 4:	 The	 role	 of	 Non-governmental	 organisations.10	 The	 need	 for	information	gathering	according	to	BD	and	HD	led	to	the	establishment	of	new	NGOs	 by	 the	 experts	 and	 the	 development	 of	 existing	NGOs	 in	 the	 process	 of	establishing	 the	 N2000	 MLG	 system	 in	 all	 three	 countries.	 The	 work	 on	information-gathering	led	to	the	professionalisation	of	the	NGO	sector	in	all	three	countries.	The	professionalised	NGO	sector	began	to	control	the	implementation	of	national	legislation,	mostly	on	the	examples	of	EIA.	This	led	to	increasing	the	public	involvement	in	NGO	in	the	field	of	nature	protection	in	all	three	countries.	Public	involvement	in	NGOs	led	to	increased	public	involvement	in	the	national	nature	protection	politics	and	policy.	The	increased	NGO	participation	in	politics	at	the	national	level	of	nature	protection	system	led	to	more	conflicts	between	governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 actors.	 The	 NGOs	 in	 many	 cases	represented	 the	 rights	of	 the	public	and	prevented	many	harmful	projects	 for	potential	N2000	areas.	In	this	manner,	many	NGOs	received	media	attention.	In	addition,	in	all	three	countries,	NGOs	had	the	role	of	transferring	the	experiences	from	countries,	which	had	already	adopted	N2000.	The	NGOs	 that	were	more	internationally	linked	(like	NGOs	in	RC)	began	to	participate	in	lobbying	at	the	international	 level.	 In	BiH,	 the	 international	NGO	World	Wildlife	Fund	 (WWF)	was	 the	 first	 proponent	 of	 N2000,	 while	 in	 the	 RS,	 it	 was	 the	 national	 NGO	DOPPS.11	 In	 the	 RC,	 the	 NGO	 sector	 corrected	 the	 final	 proposal	 of	 the	government	 for	 the	 proposed	 N2000	 areas.	 Also,	 in	 the	 RC,	 the	 NGO	 sector	underwent	 an	 evolution	 in	 public	 involvement	 while	 in	 BiH,	 it	 was	 more	"symbolic"	 in	 nature.	 This	 influenced	 that,	 in	 BiH,	 the	 NGO	 sector	 was	 less	developed	than	the	NGO	sector	of	the	RC	and	RS.	In	the	RS,	after	the	adoption	of	N2000,	NGO	DOPPS	was	given	the	role	of	management	and	monitoring	of	N2000	areas,	while	in	the	RC	it	had	only	the	role	of	monitoring	the	proposed	areas.			
The	fourth	sub-thesis:	The	implementation	of	BD,	HD	and	AC	contributed	to	the	introduction	of	the	concept	of	sustainable	development	in	the	nature	protection	
 9	A	literature	review	on	the	roles	of	national	parks	in	an	implementation	of	international	obligations	can	be	found	in	the	articles	by	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016;	2017;	2019).	10A	literature	review	on	the	roles	of	NGOs	in	the	implementation	and	execution	of	international	objectives	at	 the	national	 level	can	be	 found	 in	 the	articles	by	Šobot	and	Lukšič	 (2016;	2017;	2019).		11	National	name	is	Društvo	za	opazovanje	in	proučevanje	ptic	Slovenije	(Society	for	the	observation	
and	study	of	birds	of	Slovenia).	
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system	at	the	national	level.	The	AC	became	a	central	component	in	achieving	the	objectives	of	BD	and	HD,	and	introducing	the	concept	of	SD.			
Confirmation	1:	The	contribution	of	the	first	pillar	of	the	AC	according	to	BD	and	HD.12	There	was	an	increase	of	information	on	the	number	and	status	of	species	and	habitats	according	to	BD	and	HD	in	all	 three	countries.	 In	this	manner,	all	three	countries	established	the	new	protected	areas.	The	RS	and	RC	protected	one	third	of	the	country	according	to	BD	and	HD.	In	BiH,	1/5	of	the	areas	of	the	state	was	submitted	for	protection	according	to	BD	and	HD	and	new	protected	areas	were	set	up,	such	as	the	Una	NP,	which	has	the	role	of	managing	species	and	habitats	 that	 are	protected	by	BD	and	HD.	The	processes	 of	 information-gathering	in	the	RS	and	RC	led	to	an	increase	in	communication	and	cooperation	of	all	sectors,	while	in	BiH,	they	led	to	an	increased	inter-entity	cooperation.	In	the	RS	and	RC,	this	led	to	an	institutional	transformation	and	capacity-building	in	 the	nature-protection	sector	 through	 the	establishment	of	new	 institutions,	while	BiH	adopted	the	coordination	mechanism.	The	processes	of	establishing	N2000,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 RS	 and	 RC,	 enabled	 the	 public	 access	 to	information	 on	 nature	 protection	 in	 one	 place,	 while	 the	 process	 in	 BiH	contributed	 a	 greater	 amount	 of	 information	 to	 be	 publicly	 available	 in	more	places.			
Confirmation	2:	The	contribution	of	the	second	pillar	of	the	AC	according	to	BD	and	HD.	In	all	three	countries,	there	was	a	public	involvement	in	the	NGO	sector.	The	 public	 was	 primarily	 involved	 in	 the	 NGO	 sector	 to	 influence	 decision-making	because	the	public	realised	that	non-governmental	actors	had	equality	in	decision-making	as	governmental	actors.	 In	the	RS	and	RC,	this	 led	to	the	first	great	public	participation	in	decision-making	within	a	nature	protection	system.	The	public	found	that	public	participation	was	a	way	of	protecting	nature.	In	BiH,	there	was	no	raising	of	public	awareness	about	the	need	for	public	participation	in	a	nature-protection	system	and	the	public	were	mostly	involved	in	the	process	of	EIA.	In	BiH,	there	was	no	great	NGO	sector	development	as	was	the	case	in	the	RS	and	RC.	However,	non-governmental	actors	from	BiH,	for	the	first	time,	began	to	get	involved	in	creating	nature	protection	politics	and	policy	at	the	national	level	together	with	governmental	actors.			
Confirmation	3:	The	contribution	of	the	third	pillar	of	the	AC	according	to	BD	and	HD.	In	all	three	countries,	the	public	recognised	the	possibility	for	action	upon	the	problem	in	nature	protection	through	NGOs	that	received	a	similar	impact	as	governmental	organisations	and	partly	therefore	included	them	in	the	process	of	EIA.	That	is	why	the	NGO	sector	initiated	many	lawsuits	against	harmful	projects	in	the	proposed	N2000	areas	in	all	three	countries.	This	contributed	to	the	raising	of	public	awareness	about	the	importance	of	BD	and	HD	in	all	three	countries.		
	
The	fifth	sub-thesis:	Future	challenges	of	nature	protection	(and	SD)	are	based	on	the	application	of	the	principles	of	AC	for	achieving	the	objectives	of	BD	and	HD.			
Confirmation	1:	The	challenge	of	 the	 first	pillar	of	 the	AC	according	 to	BD	and	HD.13	All	three	countries	are	faced	with	the	challenges	of	developing	a	system	of	information-gathering	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 nature	 protection.	 In	 the	 RS	 and	 RC,	 the	
 12	A	literature	review	on	the	contributions	of	all	pillars	of	the	AC	according	to	BD	and	HD	can	be	found	in	the	articles	by	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016;	2017;	2019).	13	A	literature	review	on	the	challenges	of	all	pillars	of	the	AC	according	to	BD	and	HD	can	be	found	in	the	articles	by	Šobot	and	Lukšič	(2016;	2017;	2019).	
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problem	is	a	lack	of	connection	or	incompleteness	of	all	information	according	to	BD	 and	 HD.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 transparency	 of	 information	 for	 nature	protection.	In	BiH,	the	biggest	challenge	is	creating	a	unified	database	according	to	BD	and	HD.	The	data	have	been	available	 so	 far	 in	multiple	 sources,	which	significantly	 causes	 the	 lack	 of	 connection	 of	 all	 data.	 In	 addition,	 all	 three	countries	experienced	a	lack	of	data	on	the	opinions	of	population	of	protected	areas	for	nature	protection	and	N2000.	It	is	necessary	to	collect	the	views	of	the	population	with	the	aim	of	improving	management	control	of	protected	areas	in	all	 three	countries.	On	a	national	 level,	 it	 is	also	very	 important	 to	 include	the	whole	 of	 society	 in	 order	 to	 gather	 information	 in	 all	 three	 countries.	 It	 is	therefore	 necessary	 to	 create	 a	 communication	 strategy	 of	 governmental	 and	non-governmental	actors	in	all	three	countries	as	a	basic	document	for	gathering	information	and	nature	protection	in	these	areas.	In	addition,	on	an	international	level,	in	the	future,	it	is	necessary	to	gather	information	on	the	impact	of	climate	change	on	species	and	habitats	according	to	BD	and	HD,	which	has	not	been	done	by	 the	managers	 of	 protected	 areas	 in	 all	 three	 areas.	 Based	 on	 the	 gathered	information	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 develop	 policies	 of	 adaptation	 and	 of	 climate	change	management.			
Confirmation	2:	The	challenge	of	the	second	pillar	of	the	AC	according	to	BD	and	HD.	 All	 three	 countries	 have	 a	 lot	 of	 problems	 with	 public	 participation	 in	decision-making.	In	the	RS	and	RC,	there	is	a	problem	of	uneven	development	of	the	NGO	sector	across	the	country,	which	leads	to	the	disengagement	of	public	from	 peripheral	 areas	 in	 decision-making.	 In	 BiH,	 there	 is	 a	 problem	 of	 the	underdeveloped	NGO	sector	in	general.	In	the	future,	it	is	necessary	to	create	a	clear	plan	 for	 the	development	of	 the	NGO	sector	on	 the	 territory	of	 all	 three	countries,	 which	 should	 be	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 a	 communication	 strategy.	 In	addition,	 the	 RC	 and	 BiH	 have	 big	 problems	with	 non-compliance	 in	 national	legislation	 while	 involving	 the	 public	 in	 decision-making	 across	 the	 country.	Following,	 the	 law	 is	 carried	 out	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.	 In	 the	 future,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 raise	 public	 awareness	 on	 the	 respect	 for	 the	 legislation	 on	 the	whole	territory	of	the	country.	In	BiH,	public	participation	in	decision-making	is	also	at	a	low	level,	mostly	due	to	the	small	development	of	the	NGO	sector.	It	is	necessary	to	develop	public	participation	in	NGO	of	nature	protection	in	BiH	in	the	future.	BiH	and	the	RC	expressed	the	problems	of	insufficient	involvement	of	local	people	in	the	management	of	protected	areas.	In	the	future,	it	is	necessary	to	organise	new	models	of	governance	and	management	in	which	governmental	and	 non-governmental	 actors	 should	 have	 equal	 participation	 in	 decision-making.	In	the	RS,	there	is	a	problem	of	the	population’s	uneven	involvement	in	decision-making	 in	 the	 entire	 territory	 of	 protected	 areas.	 In	 addition,	 the	problem	 is	 also	 the	 unequal	 powers	 of	 non-governmental	 actors	 in	 decision-making	with	governmental	actors.	A	 future	challenge	for	the	RS	represents	an	upgrade	of	managers	of	protected	areas	that	should	contribute	to	the	balanced	involvement	of	non-governmental	actors	in	the	entire	territory	of	the	protected	area	and	should	distribute	equal	powers	to	non-governmental	and	governmental	actors	in	decision-making.			
Confirmation	3:	The	challenge	of	the	third	pillar	of	the	AC	according	to	BD	and	HD.	In	all	three	countries,	the	judiciary	is	seen	as	not	sufficiently	developed	to	deal	with	questions	on	nature	protection.	The	main	problem	is	a	complete	access	to	information	in	all	three	countries.	Another	problem	is	the	non-compliance	of	legislation	(as	in	RC	and	BiH)	for	public	participation	in	all	processes	of	nature	protection.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 major	 problem	 is	 the	 low	 level	 of	 public	awareness	in	BiH,	i.e.	the	lack	of	education	of	the	population	on	nature	protection	
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in	all	three	countries.	It	is	necessary	to	integrate	education	on	nature	protection	and	sustainable	development	in	all	regular	school	systems.		
	
	
3	CONFIRMATION	OF	THE	MAIN	THESIS	AS	A	CONCLUSION		The	Europeanisation	has	contributed	to	the	introduction	of	the	concept	of	SD	in	the	system	of	nature	protection	of	SEE	countries	and	it	is	necessary	for	the	future	legislative	and	institutional	development	to	agree	to	the	AC	principles	in	order	to	achieve	 the	 objectives	 of	 BD	 and	 HD	 and	 the	 objectives	 of	 sustainable	development	 in	 practice.	 Suggestions	 for	 future	 legislative	 and	 institutional	development	are	shown	in	Table	1.	The	thesis	was	confirmed.		
	TABLE	1:	PROPOSAL	FOR	LEGISLATIVE	AND	INSTITUTIONAL	GUIDELINES	TO	IMPROVE	THE	GOVERNANCE	AND	MANAGEMENT	OF	THE	NATURA	2000	PROTECTED	AREAS	IN	SELECTED	COUNTRIES	OF	SOUTHEASTERN	EUROPE	TO	ACHIEVE	THE	OBJECTIVES	OF	SUSTAINABLE	DEVELOPMENT	
	
	The	 impact	 of	 Europeanisation	 in	 SEE	 countries	 reflects	 in	 pre-accession	 and	accession	processes	of	joining	the	EU.	Pre-accession	and	accession	processes	had	their	legal	and	institutional	form	in	these	countries.	Such	a	legal	and	institutional	form	incorporated	the	implementation	of	international	obligations	of	sustainable	development	into	the	national	legislation	in	the	course	of	implementation	N2000	(sub-thesis	1).	Apart	from	that,	there	were	changes	of	institutional	framework	in	the	system	of	nature	protection	(sub-thesis	2)	and	the	role	of	main	actors	in	the	system	 of	 nature	 protection	 (sub-thesis	 3).	 The	 establishment	 of	 N2000	contributed	to	the	development	of	this	legal	and	institutional	framework	(sub-thesis	 4),	 however,	 there	 are	 needs	 for	 further	 development	 of	 the	 legal	framework	(national	legislations,	especially	according	to	the	principles	of	AC	and	objectives	of	BD	and	HD)	and	institutional	framework	towards	democratisation	
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(national	 actors	 in	 nature	 protection)	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 objectives	 of	sustainable	development	in	practise	(sub-thesis	5).		
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VOTE	 ÉLECTRONIQUE	 IN	 SWITZERLAND:	
COMPARISON	OF	RELEVANT	PILOT	PROJECTS			
Markus	REINERS1	………………………………………………………………………….…………………………………		
Estonia	 is	 the	 trailblazer	 in	 e-voting,	 but	 Switzerland	 is	 actively	
pursuing	 the	 establishment	 of	 e-voting	 in	 its	 elections,	 too.	 The	
purpose	of	the	study	is	to	identify	the	factors	that	essentially	affected	
the	success	of	the	“vote	électronique”	in	the	pilot	projects	conducted	
in	the	cantons	of	Geneva,	Neuchâtel	and	Zürich.	It	becomes	evident	
that	state	change	 is	promoted	or	prevented	by	the	concurrence	of	
several	 factors.	Naturally,	 the	underlying	 institutional	 factors	and	
constellations	of	actors	play	a	substantial	role	and	the	context	of	the	
Swiss	system	is	of	importance	as	well.	Switzerland	is	using	two	of	the	
most	 progressive	 e-voting	 solutions	 in	 the	 cantons	 of	 Geneva	 and	
Neuchâtel	and,	hence,	can	be	a	role	model.	This	would	be	the	case	
simply	on	the	grounds	that	the	introduction	process	was	mastered	
despite	 strong	 federal	 structures	 and	 political	 complexities,	
although	such	determinants	are	generally	considered	to	be	resistant	
to	innovation	and	reforms.		
Key	 words:	 e-voting;	 vote	 électronique;	 digitalization;	digitization.	
	
	
	
1	RESEARCH	CONTEXT	AND	RELEVANCE	OF	THE	SUBJECT		 In	view	of	the	fact	that	digitalization	affects	all	areas	of	life,	it	suggests	itself	that	it	also	is	subject	to	increasingly	strong	dynamics.	Against	this	background,	the	scientific	 relevance	of	 the	 subject	 and	 the	 accompanying	 topic	 of	 e-voting	 are	coming	 to	 the	 fore	 rapidly.	 Undoubtedly,	 Estonia	 is	 a	 pioneer	 in	 this	 respect	(Drechsler	 2003;	Drechsler	 2006;	Maaten	2004,	 83–90;	 Charles	 2005;	Madise	and	 Martens	 2006,	 15–26;	 Estonian	 National	 Electoral	 Committee	 2007;	 Ray	2007;	 Trechsel	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Reiners	 2011),	 but	 Switzerland	 is	 following	 close	behind	(Reiners	2017,	40;	E-Vote-ID	2018).		E-voting	is	a	part	of	e-democracy,	which	refers	to	the	online	services	provided	by	e-government.	 It	 is	 an	 additional	way	 of	 voting	 electronically,	 in	 other	words	
 1	 Dr	 phil.	 habil.	Markus	 REINERS	 is	 an	 Associate	 Professor	 in	 Political	 Science	 at	 the	 Leibniz	University	 of	 Hanover,	 Institute	 of	 Political	 Science.	 Contact:	 markus.reiners@t-online.de	 or	m.reiners@ipw.uni-hannover.de.	
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irrespective	of	time	and	place,	in	public	elections	outside	of	a	voting	office	via	the	Internet	by	using	one's	own	private	 electronic	devices	 (Swiss	Federal	Council	2017,	1;	Buchstein	2004,	41;	Buchsbaum	2004,	31–42;	Palvia	and	Sharma	2007).		An	analysis	of	the	revolutionary	change	and	the	relevant	factors	supporting	or	blocking	 the	 Vote	 électronique	 project	 in	 Switzerland	 is	 needed	 because	 the	research	exhibits	extensive	deficits.	Up	until	now,	only	very	few	case	studies	and	even	 fewer	 comparative	 studies	 are	 available	 (Reiners	 2011;	 Reiners	 2017;	Braun	2004,	43–52).	Moreover,	only	rudimentary	research	findings	regarding	e-voting	in	the	pilot	cantons	of	Geneva,	Zürich	and	Neuchâtel	are	available	(Gerlach	and	Gasser	2009).	A	comparative	study	on	the	subject	has	been	compiled	but	not	published	 yet	 (Piwonski	 2018).	 Therefore,	 some	 of	 the	 empirical	 findings	concerning	 the	 three	 pilot	 cantons	 refer	 to	 this	 study.	 At	 the	 present	 time,	primarily	 only	 administrative	 assessments	 and	 reports	 drawn	up	by	 the	 pilot	cantons	can	be	found.	Thus,	this	gap	in	the	research	needs	to	be	filled.		The	joint	project	of	the	Confederation	and	cantons	is	intended	to	send	a	signal	in	support	 of	 political	 rights	 and	 democratic	 co-determination.	 In	 particular,	 it	would	accommodate	society's	increasing	desire	for	mobility	as	well	as	facilitate	participation	in	elections	and	votes	independent	of	time	and	place.	Moreover,	the	e-Government	Strategy	Roadmap	Vote	électronique,	passed	by	the	Swiss	Federal	Council	in	2007,	strives	to	simplify	government	services.	For	one,	the	project	is	the	logical	response	to	global	developments	in	communication	and	processes;	for	another,	 it	would	prevent	 invalid	votes	and	 facilitate	voting	 for	Swiss	 citizens	living	 abroad	 and	 persons	 with	 disabilities.	 Therefore,	 quality	 improvement	ostensibly	 is	 the	primary	goal	 (Swiss	Federal	Council	 2013a,	2;	 Swiss	Federal	Council	2017,	1).		The	 overall	 project	 Vote	 électronique	 has	 been	 driven	 by	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	Federal	Council,	the	parliament	and	the	cantons	since	2000.	Following	more	than	200	successful	cantonal	trials,	the	decision	to	roll	out	the	electronic	channel	on	a	wider	scope	was	taken	in	2018.	The	test	phase	lasted	for	about	15	years,	during	which	 the	 bottom-up	 project	 proved	 to	 be	 successful	 despite	 modest	expectations.	 Today,	 eight	 cantons	 have	 introduced	 e-voting.	 The	 first	 pilot	phase,	which	was	successful	in	all	three	pilot	cantons,	marks	the	starting	point.	However,	up	until	now	only	the	outcomes	in	the	cantons	of	Geneva	and	Neuchâtel	have	come	to	fruition.	By	contrast,	the	project	has	been	suspended	in	the	canton	of	Zürich	until	at	least	2022	despite	generally	positive	experiences.	Accordingly,	besides	 Estonia,	 the	 projects	 in	 the	 cantons	 of	 Geneva	 and	 Neuchâtel	 can	 be	counted	 among	 the	 most	 progressive	 e-voting	 projects	 (Swiss	 Federal	Chancellery	2018a;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2017,	1;	Reiners	2017,	48–50).		Following	the	initiation	of	the	project	in	2000,	the	Federal	Council's	first	report	on	the	feasibility	as	well	as	chances	and	risks	was	published	in	2002,	whereupon	the	pilot	projects	 followed	from	2004	to	2006.	Each	of	 the	three	pilot	cantons	used	 e-voting	 systems	 that	 they	 had	 developed	 themselves,	 and	 all	 of	 them	received	positive	assessments	by	the	Federal	Council.	At	the	beginning,	e-voting	was	limited	to	Swiss	nationals	living	in	the	country.	In	2006,	the	parliament	and	Federal	 Council	 decided	 to	 expand	 the	 channel	 successively	 and	 to	 make	 it	available	to	Swiss	nationals	(voters)	resident	abroad.	As	of	2008,	the	focus	was	expanded	 to	 include	 additional	 cantons,	 Swiss	 nationals	 living	 abroad	 and	persons	with	disabilities.	 In	addition,	more	 trials	were	conducted	 in	 the	 three	pilot	cantons	and	legislative	amendments	were	enacted	(Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	2;	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2004,	29;	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2018b).	
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The	establishment	of	the	Consortium	Vote	électronique	in	2009,	a	cross-cantonal	association	that	used	a	copy	of	the	e-voting	system	used	in	the	canton	of	Zürich,	and	further	expansion	of	the	system	used	in	the	canton	of	Geneva	marked	the	greatest	advances	made	by	 the	project.	As	a	result,	13	cantons	participated	 in	new	trials	in	2010.	In	2011,	the	Roadmap	Vote	électronique	was	expanded	so	that	half	of	Swiss	nationals	(voters)	resident	abroad	were	able	to	vote	electronically	in	federal	elections	in	2012.	Accordingly,	the	objectives	of	the	phase	from	2008	to	 2012	 were	 achieved.	 Following	 the	 introduction	 of	 additional	 legislative	amendments	from	2013	to	2016,	the	greatest	setback	occurred	when	the	largest	e-voting	 association,	 the	 Consortium	Vote	 électronique,	 fell	 apart	 because	 the	Federal	Council	withdrew	its	authorization	to	offer	e-voting	in	the	parliamentary	elections	in	2015	due	to	security	issues.	Consequently,	the	pilot	projects	in	the	cantons	 associated	 with	 the	 consortium,	 e.g.	 in	 Zürich	 amongst	 others,	 were	ended	or	suspended	because	of	financial	problems.	Nonetheless,	during	the	most	recent	phase	 from	2017	 to	2018,	 the	Swiss	Federal	Council	 announced	 that	 it	would	start	working	on	the	establishment	of	e-voting	(as	a	recognized	channel	for	 voting)	 and	 introduced	 a	 new	 planning	 tool	 for	 this	 purpose.	 In	 addition,	amendment	of	the	Federal	Act	on	Political	Rights	is	to	be	reviewed	(Statistical	Office	of	the	canton	of	Zürich	2018a,	3;	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2018a;	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2018b).		In	2018,	the	Swiss	Federal	Council	authorized	six	cantons	to	conduct	trials	during	national	 elections.	 Moreover,	 two	 systems	 comply	 with	 the	 federal	 legal	requirements:	the	system	used	in	the	canton	of	Geneva	and	that	of	Swiss	Post.	Currently,	eight	cantons	are	offering	e-voting	(Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2018c,	1).	Furthermore,	the	Swiss	Federal	Council	is	planning	to	introduce	an	electronic	identity	card,	a	measure	that	would	facilitate	the	process	(Neue	Zürcher	Zeitung	2017;	Reiners	2017,	48–50).		The	process	was	defined	by	intensive	negotiation	mechanisms,	whereby	this	is	inherent	in	the	country's	system	of	direct	representation.	The	seven	members	of	the	 Federal	 Council	 have	 equal	 power,	 discuss	 and	 act	 on	 the	 principle	 of	collective	responsibility,	negotiate	their	positions	and	take	decisions	jointly.	In	this	way	as	wide	a	range	of	political	views	as	possible	is	integrated	in	the	Swiss	Parliament.	Moreover,	 the	 government	 cannot	be	overthrown	by	 a	 vote	 of	 no	confidence.	Thus,	it	can	pursue	a	relatively	stable	political	agenda	independent	of	 parliamentary	 majorities;	 however,	 the	 government	 does	 not	 have	 a	 joint	government	program,	which	would	provide	 orientation	 to	 the	 actors.	 Yet,	 the	Road	 Map	 Vote	 électronique	 represents	 a	 standpoint.	 In	 view	 of	 the	 strong	federalism,	 the	 political	 interdependency	 resulting	 from	 the	 cantons'	 duty	 to	work	 together	 and	 the	 population's	 direct	 rights	 of	 participation,	 consensus	democracy	inevitably	evolved,	in	which,	as	a	rule,	power	is	exercised	not	on	the	basis	of	majorities	but	through	dialog	and	consensus	among	all	relevant	actors.	In	doing	so,	popular	 rights	exert	 strong	pressure	 to	achieve	concordance	and,	hence,	minimize	resistance	(Vatter	2006,	41,	57,	215,	236,	264).	Accordingly,	the	project	 could	 only	 be	 designed	 incrementally	 and	 bottom-up.	 It	 enjoyed	 the	widespread	 support	 of	 all	 relevant	 actors	 and	 the	 population	 in	 the	 pre-parliamentary	 phase;	 a	 circumstance	 that	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 continuous	negotiations	and	the	consensus	found	in	the	committees	set	up	by	the	Federal	Chancellery	 to	 work	 together	 with	 representatives	 of	 the	 Confederation	 and	cantons	 as	well	 as	 experts.	More	 than	 anything	 else,	 the	 permanent	 network	interaction	was	characterized	by	the	expectation	of	mutual	advantages	and	goals,	such	as	enhancing	the	legitimacy	of	the	democratic	system.		
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2	METHOD	AND	THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK		 The	 factors	 influencing	 the	 policy	 result	 are	 determined	 by	 means	 of	 a	qualitative-comparative	and	explorative,	empirical	(document-based)	analysis	of	the	period	from	2000	to	2018.	The	focus	is	on	the	national	and	cantonal	levels.	As	regards	the	method	of	comparison,	the	following	should	be	noted:	In	many	places	the	development	of	online	voting	projects	stopped	at	the	trial	stage,	and	only	rudimentary	data	are	available.	Therefore,	systematic	comparison	is	close	to	impossible.	For	this	reason,	the	context	of	the	analysis	is	limited	more	or	less	to	 a	 description	 of	 the	 status.	 It	 is	 almost	 inevitable	 that	 the	 focus	 becomes	explorative	and	only	implicitly	comparative.	The	conditions	in	the	three	cantons	will	 be	 explored	 based	 on	 the	 data	 available,	 albeit	 more	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	screening.	This	 is	 intended	to	be	 less	of	a	comparison,	even	 less	one	based	on	stringent	comparative	requirements,	than	an	appraisal	as	to	whether	the	correct	course	has	been	set	and	the	efforts	show	promise	(Hadenius	1992,	155;	Reiners	2017,	43).		The	 study	 extracts	 the	 institutional	 context,	 in	 other	words	 the	 promotive	 or	obstructive	 structural	 and	 legislative	 factors,	 in	 the	 three	 pilot	 cantons.	Furthermore,	the	focus	is	on	the	constellations	of	actors	and	the	forms	of	their	interaction	as	well	as	content-related	congruence	or	divergence	(Ostrom	2005,	819–848;	 Reiners	 2011,	 556–559).	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 study,	 therefore,	 is	 to	identify	 the	 factors	 that	 essentially	 affect	 the	 policy	 results.	 In	 the	 cantons	 of	Geneva	 and	 Neuchâtel,	 these	 factors	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 actor-centred	institutionalism	and	veto-player	theory;	this	would	also	be	true	for	the	factors	contributing	 to	 the	 failure	 in	 the	 canton	of	 Zürich	 (Mayntz	 and	Scharpf	1995;	Scharpf	2000;	Tesebelis	2002;	Yin	2003,	33;	 Sabatier	 and	Weible	2014;	Treib	2015,	277).		The	starting	point	as	 regards	actor-centred	 institutionalism	 is	 the	assumption	that	the	characteristics	of	actors	who	act	strategically,	 their	constellations	and	forms	of	interaction	as	well	as	influences	arising	from	the	institutional	context,	in	other	words	the	conditions	under	which	decisions	are	taken,	are	relevant	for	explaining	 policy	 decisions.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 context	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	exterior	framework	of	the	interaction,	which	defines	who	is	involved	in	decisions	and	which	rules	guide	a	decision.	Instead	it	can	be	assumed	that	institutions	also	influence	the	internal	organization,	capacity	to	act,	preferences	and	perception.	Consequently,	 policy	 results	 are	 not	 automatically	 the	 best	 possible	 solution;	rather	they	evolve	from	the	results	achieved	through	the	interaction	of	the	actors	involved,	all	of	whom	pursue	their	interests.	So,	although	state	structures	acting	in	 the	capacity	of	 institutions	affect	actors	and	 the	course	of	 their	 interaction,	they	don't	determine	the	policy	result,	they	merely	influence	it	indirectly.	All	in	all,	the	conditions	form	a	more	or	less	favourable	starting	point	for	change,	which,	as	it	were,	is	initiated	in	combination	with	other	mechanisms.	The	starting	point	impacts	 the	 objectives	 because	 of	 the	 path	 dependency	 of	 institutional	developments	(Scharpf	2000,	77,	82;	Treib	2015,	279–297).		The	concept	can	be	combined	with	the	veto	player's	theory,	which	analyses	so-called	veto	players,	i.e.	actors	who	are	set	in	their	position	based	on	their	inner	structure	and	behaviour.	Veto	players	are	individual	or	collective	actors	whose	agreement	is	needed	to	depart	from	the	status	quo	and,	thus,	initiate	change.	The	fact	 that	 laws	 passed	 by	 the	 Swiss	 parliament	 can	 be	 put	 to	 a	 popular	 vote	subsequently	because	of	a	defined	process	makes	the	people	a	veto	instance.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	policy	result	as	such	depends	on	whether	potential	
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veto	players	block	change	or	promote	it	constructively.	Achieving	change	is	even	more	difficult	whenever	a	system	comprises	a	large	number	of	institutional	veto	players.	However,	it	also	depends	on	the	congruence,	i.e.	the	degree	of	agreement	among	the	veto	players,	and	the	cohesion,	i.e.	the	degree	of	internal	unity	among	the	veto	players	(Tsebelis	2002,	2;	Benz	2003,	205–236;	Reiners	2011,	565–568).			
3	PILOT	PROJECT	GENEVA		The	trials	for	e-voting	in	Geneva	started	in	2004	using	a	system	developed	by	the	canton	 itself	 (CHVote)	and	were	rated	positively	by	 the	Federal	Council.	More	trials	that	focused	on	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad	and	persons	with	disabilities	were	conducted	 from	2008	to	2012.	 In	2009,	 the	central	Election	Council	was	established	 in	 the	 canton	 to	 enhance	 transparency.	The	Council	 had	 a	 control	function	 and	 included	 political	 representatives	 from	 the	 Grand	 Council	 and	experts	from	the	canton's	public	administration.	The	first	contracts	between	the	canton	of	Geneva	and	other	cantons	were	concluded	in	2011;	they	allowed	Swiss	expats	 to	 use	 CHVote.	 In	 2011,	 trials	 were	 conducted	 nationwide	 for	 the	parliamentary	 elections;	 in	 2012,	 the	 first	 trials	were	 authorized	 for	 cantonal	elections.	Since	2013,	all	 Swiss	voters	 resident	abroad	can	use	e-voting	 in	 the	canton	 of	 Geneva.	 The	 individual	 verifiability	 required	 by	 the	 Swiss	 Federal	Council	for	reasons	of	security	was	integrated	in	2015.	After	the	Consortium	Vote	électronique	was	discontinued,	new	trials	were	initiated	with	the	system	in	the	cantons	of	Aargau	and	St.	Gallen	(République	et	Canton	de	Genève/no	year;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	2–3,	31).		The	canton	of	Geneva	has	one	of	two	trailblazing	e-voting	systems	in	Switzerland.	The	CHVote	system	was	developed	completely	in	Geneva,	and	it	is	operated	and	controlled	 there	 by	 the	 canton's	 own	 IT	 division.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	canton	already	had	a	central	electoral	register	before	the	trials	were	started:	this	is	a	prerequisite	 for	ensuring	 the	unequivocal	 identification	of	every	user	and	preventing	double	votes.	Swiss	voters	living	in	Switzerland	have	to	register	to	be	able	 to	 use	 the	 e-voting	 system,	 Swiss	 voters	 resident	 abroad	 are	 registered	automatically	 (Gerlach	 and	 Gasser	 2009,	 6;	 Swiss	 Federal	 Council	 2013a,	 47,	109).		In	order	to	use	the	CHVote	platform,	eligible	voters	need	to	have	a	voting	card	(sent	to	them	by	post),	technical	equipment	and	Internet	access,	and	they	need	to	 state	 their	 date	 of	 birth.	 The	 voting	 card	 states	 individualized	 codes.	 The	system	is	accessed	by	means	of	the	voting	card	number;	subsequently,	the	voter	can	fill	out	a	ballot.	Confirmation	codes	are	generated	after	the	ballot	has	been	transmitted.	 The	 eligible	 voters	 need	 to	 compare	 the	 codes	 with	 the	individualized	codes	stated	on	their	voting	card	to	ensure	that	the	confidential	data	was	transmitted	correctly	and	securely	(individual	verifiability).	After	the	confirmation	 code	 stated	 on	 the	 voting	 card	 is	 entered	 in	 the	 system,	 the	electronic	ballot	will	be	transmitted.	In	the	final	step	of	the	process,	a	finalization	code	is	generated.	It	has	to	be	the	same	as	the	finalization	code	on	the	voting	card.	All	votes	are	collected	in	encrypted	form	and	decrypted	by	the	authorities	once	the	election	is	over	(République	et	Canton	de	Genève	2018a).	At	the	present	time,	the	 focus	 is	 on	 developing	 universal	 verifiability	 so	 as	 to	 prevent	 any	manipulation.	During	the	cantonal	elections	on	15	April	2018,	16.4%	of	eligible	voters	(particularly	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad)	chose	e-voting,	76.1%	chose	postal	 voting	 and	 only	 7.5%	 decided	 to	 vote	 in	 a	 polling	 station	 (Tribune	 de	Genève	2018).	
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An	analysis	of	the	institutional	context	also	proves	interesting	because	structural	and	 legislative	 factors	 can	 be	 subsumed	 under	 it	 (Reiners	 2011,	 556–559;	Reiners	2017,	40–43).	Some	demographic	characteristics	need	to	be	considered	in	 connection	 with	 structural	 factors.	 The	 canton	 is	 the	 smallest	 of	 the	 pilot	cantons:	its	area	is	282	km2,	the	population	is	498,000	and	population	density	is	2,028	 persons	 per	 km2,	 which	 is	 far	 above	 the	 Swiss	 average	 (204).	 In	 a	comparison	of	the	pilot	cantons,	it	takes	second	place	after	the	canton	of	Zürich	and	has	the	highest	population	density.	Moreover,	the	number	of	eligible	voters	came	to	233,000	 in	2018;	of	 these,	25,756	were	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad.	Therefore,	the	canton	has	the	largest	percentage	of	Swiss	residents	living	abroad	by	far,	i.e.	11.1%.	They	are	the	principal	target	group	for	e-voting,	but,	at	the	same	time,	 also	 the	 group	 that	 is	most	 difficult	 to	 integrate	 because	 their	 places	 of	residence	 are	 all	 around	 the	 world,	 they	 are	 registered	 in	 different	 polling	communes	 and,	 furthermore,	 are	 eligible	 to	 vote	 in	 their	 former	 place	 of	residence	and	commune	of	origin.	With	the	option	of	online	voting,	Swiss	voters	resident	 abroad	 can	 spare	 themselves	 long-distance	 travel	 to	 Swiss	representations	abroad,	and	other	bureaucratic	problems	are	minimized	as	well.	Consequently,	e-voting	makes	participation	 in	elections	more	comfortable	and	facilitates	administrative	services	(République	et	Canton	de	Genève	2018b,	1–2,	19;	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2018d).		A	fundamental,	though	not	unfavourable,	factor	is	the	widespread	affinity	to	the	Internet	prevalent	in	the	canton.	In	2015,	92%	of	all	households	in	the	region	of	the	Lake	of	Geneva	(cantons	of	Vaud,	Valais,	Geneva)	had	Internet	access.	In	these	areas,	72%	of	the	population	used	the	Internet	for	e-commerce	and	68%	for	e-banking	(Swiss	Federal	Statistical	Office	2018a;	Swiss	Federal	Statistical	Office	2018b).	In	addition,	about	223,000	tax	declarations	were	filed	in	2016,	15,428	(6.9%)	of	 them	electronically	 through	 the	GeTax	portal	 (Piwonski	 2018).	 The	diverse	utilization	of	online	applications	offered	by	private	and	public	providers	reflects	the	trust	placed	in	new	technologies.	All	in	all,	high	Internet	and	media	competence	can	be	assumed.		The	 political	 structures,	 which	 are	 founded	 on	 the	 federal	 structure	 of	Switzerland,	are	a	third,	substantial	factor.	Although	the	cantons	enjoy	extensive	autonomy	 from	 the	 confederation,	 they	 also	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 cooperate.	Pursuant	to	the	principles	of	federalism,	government	competence	and	political	rights	are	divided	between	the	federal,	cantonal	and	local	levels.	The	federal	level	controls	and	coordinates	the	project,	whereas	the	cantonal	level	is	responsible	for	 the	 introduction,	 organization	 and	 implementation.	 Furthermore,	 the	communes	 are	 not	 sovereign	 municipalities	 and,	 hence,	 subordinate	 to	 the	cantons.	Their	autonomy	is	subject	to	cantonal	law.	There	also	are	differences	in	the	degree	of	decentralization;	for	example,	the	degree	of	autonomy	decreases	steadily	from	east	to	west,	which	is	to	say	that	municipalities	located	in	cantons	in	the	western	part	of	Switzerland	have	less	autonomy	within	their	cantons	(with	the	exception	of	the	Valais).	This	is	particularly	true	for	the	canton	of	Geneva,	in	which	the	municipalities'	range	of	decision-making	authority	is	very	limited	and	they	primarily	are	considered	decentral	executive	bodies	(Vatter	2016,	443	and	456–457).		Accordingly,	 the	canton	of	Geneva	grants	 its	municipalities	 the	 least	degree	of	autonomy	 and	 decentralization	 or,	 to	 put	 it	 differently,	 it	 has	 effected	 strong	centralized	 autonomy	 towards	 the	 45	 municipalities.	 The	 French-speaking	cantons	of	Neuchâtel,	Vaud,	Fribourg	and	Geneva	have	adopted	these	structures;	however,	Geneva	takes	the	number	one	position	(Vatter	2016,	458).	Moreover,	
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the	 municipalities	 are	 responsible	 for	 setting	 up	 and	 managing	 the	 central	electoral	registers,	amongst	others	those	of	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad,	a	task	that	 cannot	 be	 completed	 without	 stipulating	 requirements.	 In	 view	 of	 the	centralized	structures,	electoral	registers	were	in	place	before	the	trials	started	and	facilitated	the	implementation	(Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2004,	24;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	44).		In	 addition,	 legislative	 factors	 (amendments	 to	 laws)	 were	 important	 in	connection	with	the	implementation.	On	the	one	hand,	the	cantonal	law	on	the	exercise	of	political	rights	already	was	adapted	in	1982	(Loi	sur	 l'exercice	des	droits	politiques/LEDP).	This	authorized	cantonal	governments,	in	cooperation	with	 the	municipalities,	 to	 test	newly	developed	methods	of	voting	and	ballot	counting.	This	reform	was	a	prerequisite	for	obtaining	approval	of	the	trials.	On	the	other	hand,	it	must	not	be	overlooked	that	postal	voting	was	introduced	at	the	cantonal	 level	 in	1994.	Comparative	statistics	on	voter	turnout	in	cantonal	parliamentary	elections	held	in	26	cantons	between	1972	and	2018	show	that	turnout	 before	 1994	 was	 negligible	 (Swiss	 Federal	 Council	 2006a,	 16;	 Swiss	Federal	Statistical	Office	2018c).	The	question	of	legitimization	always	comes	up	in	these	kinds	of	cases.	The	introduction	of	postal	voting	marked	a	turnaround	and	an	increase	in	voter	turnout	above	and	beyond	the	average	turnout	recorded	in	Switzerland	(Geser	2004,	77).	Both	postal	voting	and	e-voting	accommodate	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad	as	well	as	older	and	disabled	persons.	Both	cases	involved	similar	discussions	about	legitimization	and	the	danger	of	manipulation	of	democratic	processes.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	postal	voting	strengthened	the	trust	placed	in	the	integration	of	new	technologies,	so	that	95%	of	votes	in	the	2005	plebiscites	were	cast	by	postal	voting.	In	the	meantime,	about	80%	of	the	canton's	residents	are	using	this	venue	(Tribune	de	Genève	2018).	This	kind	of	trust	 is	essential	 for	 introducing	new	technologies	(Braun	2004,	43–52).	Therefore,	e-voting	was	promoted	by	 the	high	acceptance	of	postal	voting	and	 the	ensuing	increase	in	voter	turnout.	The	third	reform	concerned	the	adaptation	of	cantonal	law.	This	was	anchored	in	the	cantonal	constitution	in	2009	and	regulated	by	the	establishment	of	a	central	election	commission	(Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	31,	91;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013b).		The	most	important	actors	and	constellations	that	influence	the	project	are	the	Swiss	 Federal	 Council,	 Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery	 and	 the	 parliament	 at	 the	national	level,	the	Conseil	d'Etat	(Council	of	State)	and	Chancellerie	d'Etat	(State	Chancellery)	at	the	cantonal	level	as	well	as	various	political	and	operative	bodies	composed	of	federal	and	cantonal	representatives.	As	the	initiator	of	the	project,	the	 government,	 the	 Federal	 Council,	 plays	 a	 central	 part.	 It	 decided	 on	 the	legislative	process	and	put	the	project	on	the	agenda.	According	to	the	system	of	executive	 departments,	 the	 Political	 Rights	 Section	 of	 the	 Federal	 Council	 is	responsible	for	the	strategic	project	management.	The	team	is	responsible	for	the	coordination,	approval	and	control	of	the	trial	phase.	In	addition,	the	Chancellor	of	 Switzerland	 has	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 influence	 as	 a	member	 of	 the	 Federal	Chancellery.	 The	 objectives	 of	 the	 Confederation	 are	 to	 develop	 additional	venues	 of	 participation,	 to	 simplify	 the	 voting	 process	 for	 the	 competent	authorities	 and	 to	 stabilize	 or	 increase	 voter	 turnout	 by	 attracting	 young,	Internet	 savvy	 groups	 of	 the	 population.	 The	 parliament	 amended	 federal	legislation	 and	 decided	 concordantly	 with	 the	 Federal	 Council	 in	 favour	 of	successive	expansion	(Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	41).		At	the	cantonal	level,	the	Conseil	d'Etat,	Chancellerie	d'Etat	and	Chancelier	d'Etat	(State	Chancellor)	are	relevant	because	they	are	responsible	for	introducing	and	
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implementing	the	project.	Pursuant	to	LEDP,	the	Conseil	d'Etat	was	authorized	to	introduce	new	methods	of	voting	in	cooperation	with	the	municipalities.	The	implementation	of	the	trials	was	regulated	in	an	agreement	between	the	Federal	Chancellery	and	the	Conseil	d'Etat.	The	project	management	was	delegated	to	the	Chancellerie	d'Etat	responsible	for	the	organization	and	implementation	(Swiss	Federal	Council	2006a,	8;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	3).		Similar	goals	as	those	at	the	federal	level	become	evident	at	the	cantonal	level	as	well.	 In	 particular,	 the	 cantons	 hope	 to	 stabilize	 or	 increase	 voter	 turnout	 by	focusing	 on	 young,	 Internet	 savvy	 social	 stratums	 and	 to	 simplify	 the	 voting	procedure	for	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad	and	persons	with	disabilities	as	well	as	to	achieve	long-term	cost	reductions	(Hensler	2001,	14–15).	Other	secondary	objectives	 are	 the	 expansion	 of	 influence	 and	 recognition.	 Switzerland	 is	 a	modern	laboratory	of	direct	democracy,	in	which	the	cantons	are	considered	the	Confederation's	 field	 for	experimentation	(Vatter	2006,	35–36).	 In	view	of	 the	success	 of	 its	 pioneering	 work,	 Geneva	 stands	 a	 good	 chance	 of	 gaining	recognition.			
4	PILOT	PROJECT	NEUCHÂTEL		The	canton	started	the	project	in	2005	with	the	development	of	its	e-government	portal	“Guichet	Unique”.	Electronic	voting	is	only	one	of	many	services	offered	by	the	system.	From	2003	to	2005	a	central	electoral	register	was	developed	and	integrated	at	the	cantonal	level.	However,	in	contrast	to	the	canton	of	Geneva,	it	is	a	non-permanent	decentralized	solution,	which	means	that	the	register	is	set	up	before	every	vote/election	and	discontinued	afterwards.	The	first	trials	were	carried	out	 for	 the	 federal	 elections	 in	2005.	The	 second	phase,	 from	2008	 to	2012,	 enabled	 Swiss	 voters	 resident	 abroad	 to	 take	 part.	 In	 2015,	 individual	verifiability	was	integrated	in	the	e-voting	solution,	thereby	making	it	viable	for	the	process	at	the	federal	level.	A	productive	collaboration	with	Swiss	Post	was	initiated	in	2016,	and	as	of	2017	the	Post's	e-voting	system	was	offered.	Security	aspects	and	flexible	solutions	for	integrating	e-voting	in	the	e-government	portal	prompted	 the	 change	 (Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery	 2004,	 5,	 30;	 Swiss	 Federal	Chancellery	2018b;	Ne.ch	2018;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	2;	Die	Post	2015;	Die	Post	2018).		The	canton	uses	a	system	developed	by	their	own	IT	department	in	collaboration	with	the	Spanish	firm	SCYTL,	a	market	leader	in	voting	platforms.	A	prerequisite	for	casting	a	vote	is	that	the	voter	is	registered	in	the	system.	That	is	one	of	two	security	 stages.	 In	 a	 first	 step,	 eligible	 voters	 are	 identified	 by	 means	 of	 a	password	 and	 transaction	number	 stated	 on	 a	 card	 they	 receive	 by	post.	 The	second	step	is	integrated	in	the	e-voting	system;	it	is	similar	to	the	principle	used	in	e-banking	systems.	The	e-voting	solution	used	by	Swiss	Post	is	based	on	the	principle	of	Geneva's	CHVote	system	and	has	fulfilled	all	requirements	according	to	 Confederate	 law	 up	 until	 now.	 Currently,	 the	 canton	 and	 Swiss	 Post	 are	working	on	a	solution	for	universal	verifiability.	Contrary	to	the	CHVote	system,	development	work	is	being	carried	out	in	collaboration	with	private	companies.	At	the	present	time,	Swiss	Post	has	partnered	with	five	cantons,	three	of	which	are	planning	to	introduce	the	electronic	voting	channel	by	2020	(Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2004,	5;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	33;	Scytl/no	year;	Die	Post	2017;	Die	Post	2018).		Structural	factors	and	demographic	characteristics	are	of	interest	as	well	because	
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they	promoted	the	implementation.	The	canton	covers	an	area	of	802	km2;	thus,	it	is	the	second	largest	pilot	canton.	However,	its	population	of	178,567	is	lower	than	that	in	the	canton	of	Geneva.	The	population	density	is	249	residents	per	km2,	which	is	slightly	higher	than	the	Swiss	average	of	204	(Ne.ch	2017,	14,	50–51).	The	canton's	large	area	and	the	comparably	small	population	and	population	density	are	ideal	prerequisites	for	e-voting.	If	the	canton	does	not	have	to	ensure	canton-wide	availability	of	polling	stations,	costs	can	theoretically	be	saved	and,	moreover,	voters	can	be	spared	the	need	of	travelling	long	distances.	Moreover,	the	number	of	eligible	voters	was	136,281	in	2018,	of	which	684	(0.5%)	were	eligible	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad:	Neuchâtel	has	the	lowest	percentage	in	this	respect	compared	to	the	other	pilot	cantons	(Reiners	2011,	556;	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2018d).		Here,	as	in	other	cantons,	affinity	to	the	Internet	is	another	beneficial	factor.	In	2015,	90%	of	all	households	 in	the	region	Espace	Mittelland	(cantons	of	Bern,	Solothurn,	Fribourg,	Neuchâtel,	Jura)	had	Internet	access.	Seventy-eight	percent	of	the	population	used	the	Internet	for	e-commerce	and	72%	for	e-banking.	In	2018,	the	system	had	39,000	users	(Swiss	Federal	Statistical	Office	2018a;	Swiss	Federal	 Statistical	 Office	 2018b;	 Ne.ch	 2018).	 Furthermore,	 22.7%	 used	 the	portal	in	2017	to	submit	their	electronic	tax	declarations	(Piwonski	2018).	The	significant	 trust	 placed	 in	 new	 technologies	 such	 as	 the	 Internet	 and	 online	applications	is	reflected	by	the	many	different	ways	they	are	used	for	private	and	government	services,	even	more	than	in	the	canton	of	Geneva.		The	third	argument	concerns	the	political	structure.	The	degree	of	autonomy	of	the	municipalities	is	similar	to	that	in	the	canton	of	Geneva.	Consequently,	the	canton	has	 a	 strong	degree	of	 autonomy	as	 regards	 its	31	municipalities.	The	centralized	structure	of	the	canton	actually	promoted	the	introduction.	Besides,	a	central	electoral	register	was	integrated	in	the	system	at	the	beginning	of	the	trials	 in	 2005	 (Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery	 2004,	 30).	 Hence,	 the	 prerequisites	enabling	the	participation	of	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad	were	given.		In	addition,	 two	 legislative	 factors	were	of	 importance	 in	 connection	with	 the	implementation.	As	in	Geneva,	the	first	reform	was	the	introduction	of	the	postal	vote	in	1994.	The	canton	faced	low	voter	turnout,	e.g.	only	37.3%	for	the	cantonal	parliamentary	 elections	 in	 1993	 (Swiss	 Federal	 Statistical	 Office	 2018c),	 but	turnout	rose	after	the	introduction	of	postal	voting.	The	introduction	of	the	postal	vote,	thus,	paved	the	way	for	the	integration	of	new	technologies	(Swiss	Federal	Council	2006b).		A	 second	 factor	was	 that	 cantonal	 law	was	adapted	well	 in	advance.	To	begin	with,	the	regulation	was	adapted	in	2001	in	the	“Décret	sur	l'introduction	à	titre	expérimental	 des	 moyens	 électroniques	 facilitant	 l'exercice	 des	 droits	politiques”.	 This	 decree	 stipulates	 the	 experimental	 introduction	 of	 electronic	means,	in	other	words	the	possibility	of	e-voting	for	all	political	events	(elections,	votes,	referenda	and	initiatives),	and	has	been	effective	for	an	unlimited	period	up	to	now.	The	second	reform	was	enacted	with	the	amendment	of	cantonal	law	regarding	political	rights	(Loi	portant	révision	de	la	loi	sur	les	droit	politiques)	in	2002.	Accordingly,	the	preparation	of	the	voting	and	election	processes	as	well	as	the	establishment	of	the	central	electoral	register	required	for	online	voting	were	centralized	at	the	cantonal	level.	A	third	adaptation	was	the	launch	of	the	platform	 with	 e-voting	 integrated	 on	 it.	 This	 had	 been	 prepared	 in	 2004	 by	passing	the	relevant	law	and	implementation	regulations	regarding	the	system	(Loi	 sur	 le	 guichet	 sécurisé	unique	and	Règlement	d'exécution	de	 la	 loi	 sur	 le	
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guichet	sécurisé	unique)	(Swiss	Federal	Council	2006a,	21;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013a,	31;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2013b,	5).	The	process	was	accelerated	because	all	of	the	innovations	were	introduced	prior	to	the	first	phase.		The	same	institutions	and	actors	were	involved	at	the	federal	and	cantonal	levels	as	 those	 in	 the	 canton	 of	 Geneva.	 Private	 companies	 and	 Swiss	 Post	 were	involved,	too.	The	decisions	were	taken	by	the	Council	of	State.	It	was	responsible	for	 the	 organization,	 introduction	 and	 execution.	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	project	was	regulated	in	an	agreement	between	the	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	and	the	Council	of	State.	The	Chancellery	of	State	was	responsible	for	the	project	management.	 Here,	 too,	 the	 project	 was	 defined	 by	 dialog,	 cooperation	 and	finding	consensus.	The	interest	in	initiating	the	reform	was	characterized	by	the	possibilities	 offered	 by	 secure	 e-voting	 solutions	 and	 the	 uncomplicated	inclusion	of	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad	(Swiss	Federal	Council	2006a,	21).			
5	PILOT	PROJECT	ZÜRICH		The	first	phase	was	conducted	for	elections	in	three	municipalities	between	2005	and	 2007.	 The	 second	 phase,	 from	 2008	 to	 2011,	 focused	 on	 expanding	 the	system	 to	168	municipalities.	 In	 2009,	 the	 e-government	platform	ZHservices	was	 introduced	 (Canton	 of	 Zürich/no	 year;	 2018a).	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 seven	cantons	founded	the	Consortium	Vote	électronique,	which	–	analogously	to	the	e-voting	 system	of	 the	 canton	 of	 Zürich	 –	 introduced	 a	 channel	 for	 electronic	voting.	Therefore,	two	voting	systems	were	being	implemented	at	the	same	time	in	the	canton,	which	–	based	on	what	was	basically	a	competitive	situation	–	were	not	 developed	 further	 together.	 After	 the	 channel	was	 offered	 successfully	 to	Swiss	 voters	 resident	 abroad	 in	 2010,	 it	 was	 suspended	 in	 2011	 following	 a	decision	of	 the	canton's	Government	Council,	and	so	no	 trials	were	conducted	from	2011	to	2014.	The	step	was	justified	by	technical	problems	in	the	cantonal	election	 and	 voting	 software	 as	 well	 as	 increasingly	 uncertain	 security	requirements	 stipulated	 by	 the	 Federal	 Council,	 which	 led	 to	 planning	uncertainty	and	 refusal	of	new	 investments	 (Department	of	 Justice	and	Home	Affairs	 of	 the	 canton	 of	 Zürich	 2011,	 2;	 Statistical	 Office	 Zürich	 2011,	 13–14;	Statistical	Office	Zürich	2018a,	3).		Nevertheless,	the	canton	reviewed	the	introduction	of	a	new	platform	and,	hence,	in	2014,	the	basis	for	new,	more	efficient	trials	was	established	by	developing	a	central	electoral	register	for	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad.	In	addition,	the	canton	joined	the	Consortium	Vote	électronique	 in	2014.	This	had	the	advantage	that	investment	costs	were	shared	and	that	a	security	standard	enabling	individual	verifiability	 was	 brought	 about	 in	 2015.	 Accordingly,	 the	 first	 elections	 ran	smoothly	 in	 2015;	 however,	 the	 Federal	 Council	 did	 not	 authorize	 the	Consortium	 for	 federal	 elections	 because	 of	 security	 concerns	 and	 technical	measures	that	were	required	at	short	notice.	Subsequently,	 in	view	of	 the	 fact	that	new	investments	would	have	been	necessary,	the	Consortium	was	dissolved	for	financial	reasons.	The	costs	would	not	have	been	justifiable	given	the	loss	of	confidence	 in	 the	 new	 system,	 which	 actually	 had	 been	 used	 without	 any	incidents	 up	 to	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Federal	 Council.	 The	 consortium	 of	 nine	cantons	 was	 the	 largest	 e-voting	 network	 in	 Switzerland	 up	 until	 that	 time.	Following	the	decision,	it	ended	all	trials,	did	not	develop	its	system	further	and	announced	that	it	would	not	be	offering	e-voting	for	an	indefinite	period	of	time;	however,	 the	 prospect	 of	 relaunching	 trials	 as	 of	 2022	 at	 the	 earliest	 was	announced	 in	2018	 (Department	 of	 Justice	 and	Home	Affairs	 of	 the	 canton	of	
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Zürich	2013,	2,	2016,	2;	Swiss	Federal	Council	2015;	Canton	of	Zürich	2018b;	Neue	Züricher	Zeitung	2015).		The	e-voting	system	of	the	Consortium	Vote	électronique,	which	had	been	used	in	the	canton	up	to	2015,	was	based	on	the	same	principle	as	CHVote	and	the	system	of	Swiss	Post.	As	in	the	canton	of	Neuchâtel,	 it	was	developed	together	with	 Unisys,	 a	 private	 American	 IT	 company.	 Furthermore,	 during	 the	 initial	phase,	 the	 canton	 offered	 eligible	 voters	 an	 SMS	 option;	 this	 was	 terminated	again	 in	2008,	however.	 In	addition,	 the	 circumstance	 that	 the	canton	did	not	have	a	central	election	commission	tasked	with	controlling	the	e-voting	trials	had	detrimental	 effects	 (Statistical	Office	Zürich	2011,	3,	 24).	 Some	 structural	 and	demographic	factors	prove	quite	interesting.	In	a	comparison	of	the	three	pilot	cantons,	the	canton	is	the	largest	in	area	(1,729	km2)	as	well	as	the	most	populous	(1,482,003	people).	The	population	density	of	892	people	per	km2	is	far	above	the	Swiss	average.	The	total	number	of	eligible	voters	was	907,623	in	2015.	In	one	 of	 the	 last	 trials,	 which	was	 held	 on	 8	March	 2015,	 22,490	 Swiss	 voters	resident	abroad,	i.e.	2.5%,	were	allowed	to	vote	(Statistical	Office	Zürich	2018b,	18,	102,	190,	280;	Swiss	Federal	Chancellery	2015).	Thus,	the	canton	trails	after	the	canton	of	Geneva.	It	can	be	assumed	that	this	factor	did	not	promote	e-voting.	By	contrast,	the	second,	more	advantageous,	factor	is	the	overall	high	affinity	to	the	Internet.	The	figures	are	very	similar	to	those	in	the	canton	of	Neuchâtel.	In	2015,	91%	of	households	had	access	to	the	Internet,	77%	used	it	for	e-commerce	and	72%	for	e-banking.	 In	addition,	about	100,000	users	 (approx.	6.8%)	have	registered	 on	 the	 e-government	 platform.	 In	 2014,	 95,100	 of	 1,193,004	 tax	declarations	were	filed	electronically	on	the	Zhprivate	Tax	portal,	i.e.	8%	(Swiss	Federal	Statistical	Office	2018a;	Swiss	Federal	Statistical	Office	2018b;	Statistical	Office	of	the	canton	of	Zürich	2018b,	99;	Canton	of	Zürich	2018a;	Cantonal	Tax	Office	of	Zürich	2018;	Cantonal	Tax	Office	of	Zürich	2014;	Piwonski	2018).	All	in	all,	many	different	types	of	private	and	government	online	services	are	available.	The	 third	 argument	 concerns	 the	 political	 structure.	 The	 German-speaking	cantons	 of	 eastern	 Switzerland	 are	 characterized	 by	 decentralized	 structures	granting	the	municipalities	medium	autonomy.	Matters	are	complicated	further	by	the	large	number	of	municipalities	(168)	that	have	to	be	coordinated	for	the	electoral	 register;	 thus,	 a	 central	 electoral	 register	 for	 Swiss	 voters	 resident	abroad	was	introduced	comparably	late	in	2014	(Vatter	2016,	456)	It	can	be	said	that	the	structures	are	relatively	unfavourable	for	implementation.		Furthermore,	it	 is	worthwhile	to	look	at	two	legislative	factors.	Again,	the	first	factor	regards	the	introduction	of	the	postal	vote	at	the	cantonal	level	in	1994.	In	this	canton,	too,	voter	turnout	had	been	low	since	the	1990s.	As	discussed	above,	this	factor	tends	to	build	confidence.	A	second	factor	is	related	to	the	adaptation	of	 cantonal	 law.	 Starting	 in	 2003,	 this	 was	 regulated	 primarily	 by	 the	 Swiss	Federal	Law	and	Ordinance	on	Political	Rights,	whose	amendments	provide	that	political	rights	can	be	exercised	by	e-voting,	too.	In	addition,	it	was	decided	that	voter	 registration	 date	 would	 be	 retrieved	 and	 coordinated	 with	 the	municipalities.	The	legislative	basis	has	not	been	changed	up	to	now.	Therefore,	the	 e-option	 still	 exists	 (Swiss	 Federal	 Council	 2006b;	 Swiss	 Federal	 Council	2013a,	 31;	 Swiss	 Federal	 Council	 2013b,	 1;	 Swiss	 Federal	 Statistical	 Office	2018c).		The	development	process	was	arranged	by	the	same	institutions	and	actors	on	the	federal	and	cantonal	levels	as	in	the	other	two	cantons.	Another	potential	veto	actor	is	the	Consortium	Vote	électronique.	At	the	cantonal	 level	the	Governing	Council	 and	 State	 Chancellery	 launched	 the	 pilot	 trials.	 The	 introduction	
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primarily	 was	 designed	 to	 develop	 an	 electronic	 voting	 and	 balloting	 system	based	on	 the	electoral	 registers	of	 the	municipalities.	Another	 initial	objective	was	to	develop	diverse	input	media	for	the	same	e-voting	system	(Swiss	Federal	Council	 2006a,	 27).	 In	 this	 case	 too,	 the	 process	 evolved	 because	 of	 the	collaboration	 of	 several	 actors;	 however,	 they	 did	 not	 always	 share	 the	 same	perceptions	or	goals	with	regard	to	the	problems.	This	is	evident,	for	example,	in	connection	with	the	founding	of	the	Consortium	Vote	électronique	and	the	fact	that	 two	 e-voting	 systems	 were	 established	 at	 one	 and	 the	 same	 time.	 This	seriously	thwarted	all	efforts	at	constructive	dialog,	even	if	the	interaction	was	borne	by	mutual	objectives.			
6	SUMMARY		The	 process	 driving	 the	 establishment	 of	 e-voting	 is	 characterized	 by	negotiations	 between	 corporative	 actors	 with	 distinct	 autonomy.	 The	preferences	at	the	federal	and	cantonal	levels	are	defined	by	the	institutions'	own	interests,	 which	 overlap	 and	 flow	 into	 their	 mutual	 objective	 to	 increase	legitimacy.	The	interaction	assimilates	similar	perceptions	and	interpretations,	which	promotes	the	process	as	such.		A	somewhat	different	situation	presents	itself	in	the	canton	of	Zürich:	the	lack	of	a	central	election	commission	and	the	coexistence	of	two	e-voting	systems	have	had	 unfavourable	 effects	 here.	 The	 Consortium	 Vote	 électronique,	 being	 a	collective	actor,	was	highly	dependent	on	the	will	of	its	members	(the	cantons)	and	 dominated	 by	 institutional	 interests,	 a	 circumstance	 that	 facilitated	blockades.	 The	 discontinuance	 of	 the	 cantonal	 e-voting	 network	 decisively	affected	the	subsequent	dynamics	of	the	reform.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	Federal	Council	 blocked	 the	 project	 in	 2015	 and	 the	 cantonal	 government	 blocked	 it	several	 times	 (2011/2015).	A	high	 congruence	was	 evident	 among	 the	 actors	until	 2011;	 however,	 it	 declined	 successively	 and	 steadily.	 In	 particular,	 the	adverse	 decision	 of	 the	 Federal	 Council	 in	 2015	 was	 followed	 by	 substantial	content-related	 disagreement.	 To	 be	 sure,	 security	 concerns	 were	 merely	theoretical	in	this	case	because	there	had	never	been	any	technical	breakdowns	at	all.		The	 mutual	 objective	 and	 preferences	 of	 the	 actors	 are	 incentives	 for	cooperation,	since	all	parties	can	only	achieve	the	best	possible	result	by	finding	a	collegial	solution.	The	significance	of	cooperation	becomes	particularly	evident	in	the	cantons	of	Geneva	and	Neuchâtel	 in	the	context	of	negotiating	solutions	with	low	conflict	structure.	Moreover,	whereas	the	process	was	not	determined	by	 institutional	 influences,	 it	 was	 guided	 by	 them.	 The	 positive	 influence	 of	private	 companies	 in	 the	 canton	 of	 Neuchâtel	 should	 not	 be	 underestimated,	because	 they	 helped	 fulfil	 the	 political	 demands	 regarding	 security	 aspects.	Although	this	means	that	more	potential	veto	actors	were	active	here,	the	mutual	constructive	focus	precluded	any	adverse	consequences.		In	the	canton	of	Geneva,	the	federal	level	benefitted	from	the	fact	that	the	trial	was	limited	to	a	certain	region,	the	restriction	of	possible	negative	effects	as	well	as	Geneva's	role	as	a	pioneer,	whose	success	induced	other	cantons	to	adopt	e-voting.	The	canton	 itself	benefitted	 from	 the	 financial	 support	during	 the	 first	phase	 and	 from	 the	 expertise	 provided	 by	 the	 Federal	 Chancellery	 and	 joint	commissions	 during	 the	 implementation.	Moreover,	 Geneva	 has	 distinguished	itself	as	a	pioneer.	In	addition,	the	federal	and	cantonal	levels	profit	equally	from	
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the	enhanced	 legitimacy	of	 the	system.	All	 in	all,	a	cooperative	game	becomes	evident	 in	 the	 network,	 borne	 by	 a	 negotiation	mechanism	with	 low	 conflict	structures.		As	 a	 rule,	 the	 veto	 structure	 (in	 view	 of	 the	 federal	 character	 and	 sacrosanct	structure	 of	 Switzerland)	 tends	 to	 hinder	 innovations,	 so	 that	 they	 usually	proceed	 only	 incrementally	 and	 moderately.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 numerous	potential	veto	points,	such	as	the	Federal	Council,	bicameral	Federal	Assembly	(National	 Council	 and	 Council	 of	 States),	 Federal	 Supreme	 Court,	 will	 of	 the	people	and	veto	points	at	the	cantonal	level	(cantonal	government,	parliament)	etc.,	did	not	block	the	project	in	the	cantons	of	Geneva	and	Neuchâtel.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 they	promoted	 it	 constructively.	 Such	 institutional	mechanisms	 as,	 for	example,	 the	 establishment	 of	 commissions	 to	 promote	 cooperation	 and	 the	integration	of	groups	of	experts,	counteracted	blockades.	Thus,	a	high	content-related	 congruence	 and	 cohesion	 was	 achieved	 between	 the	 actors	 for	 the	(systemically	induced)	inevitably	incremental	process.		In	 summary	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 the	 institutional	 context	 influences	 reforms	everywhere.	The	early	codifications	and	confidence-building	measures	taken	in	the	 course	 of	 introducing	 the	 postal	 vote	 had	 a	 positive	 impact	 in	 all	 three	cantons.	Also,	 the	widespread	affinity	 to	 the	 Internet	everywhere	had	positive	ramifications.	Furthermore,	the	institutional	framework	data	promoted	the	plan	of	introducing	e-voting	in	the	canton	of	Geneva.	The	structural	factors	that	had	a	particularly	favourable	impact,	in	particular,	were	the	high	percentage	of	Swiss	voters	resident	abroad	and	the	centralized	political	structures.	In	the	canton	of	Neuchâtel,	the	large	area	together	with	a	low	population	number	and	population	density	as	well	as	the	relatively	centralized	structures	were	explicitly	conducive.	The	idea	was	not	supported	by	the	institutional	context	in	the	canton	of	Zürich.	The	factors	that	had	a	particularly	negative	effect	were	obstructive	cooperation	with	 the	municipalities	as	 regards	 the	electoral	 register	and	 the	decentralized	structure	of	the	canton	as	well	as	the	large	number	of	municipalities	that	had	to	be	coordinated.	Most	likely	the	simultaneous	use	of	two	e-voting	systems	and	the	ensuing	interruption	of	the	project	by	the	Governing	Council	and	Federal	Council	also	 blocked	 the	 project.	 One	must	wait	 and	 see	which	 steps	will	 be	 taken	 in	future.		It	becomes	evident	that	multiple	concurrent	factors	are	needed	to	facilitate,	or	not	facilitate,	change.	The	fundamental	institutional	factors	and	constellations	of	actors	play	an	important	role	that	should	not	be	underestimated	(Reiners	2011,	40–43).	Therefore,	the	findings	can	be	generalized	only	to	a	limited	extent,	even	if	 the	 specific	 context	 in	 each	 case	 always	 is	 of	 substantial	 importance,	 for	example	 the	 strong	 federal	 system	 or	 the	 degree	 of	 centralization	 and	decentralization	within	the	individual	cantons.		Switzerland	has	two	of	the	most	progressive	e-voting	solutions	in	the	world,	both	of	which	will	achieve	the	security	level	of	universal	verifiability	in	the	near	future	and	are	suitable	for	use	in	cantons	with	centralized	or	decentralized	structures.	All	cantons	in	Switzerland	will	eventually	benefit	 from	the	pioneering	work	of	the	 cantons	 examined	 in	 this	 analysis.	 This	 will	 take	 place	 in	 the	 course	 of	political	learning	(for	a	more	detailed	discussion	on	this,	e.g.	Bennett	and	Howlett	1992;	Hall	 1993;	Rose	2005;	Bandelow	2006;	 Freeman	2006;	Grin	 and	Löber	2007).	All	in	all,	very	positive	developments	in	the	field	of	digitalization	can	be	observed	in	Switzerland,	which	make	the	country	a	forerunner	and	role	model.	Special	recognition	needs	to	be	given	to	the	fact	that	the	process	was	mastered	
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despite	 strong	 federal	 structures	 and	 high	 political	 interdependence,	 because	these	determinants	in	particular	are	considered	to	be	conservative	with	regard	to	structure,	adverse	to	innovation	and	resistant	to	reform.			
REFERENCES	
	 Bandelow,	Nils	C.	2006.	"Advocacy	Coalitions,	Policy-Oriented	Learning	and	Long-Term	Change	in	Genetic	Engineering	Policy.	An	Interpretist	View."	German	Policy	Studies	3	(4):	587–594.	Bennett,	Colin	J.	and	Michael	Howlett.	1992.	"The	lessons	of	learning.	Reconciling	theories	of	policy	learning	and	policy	change."	Policy	Science	25	(3):	275–294.	Benz,	 Arthur.	 2003.	 Konstruktive	 Vetospieler	 im	 Mehrebenensystem.	 In	 Die	
Reformierbarkeit	der	Demokratie.	 Innovationen	und	Blockaden,	 eds.	Mayntz,	Renate	and	Wolfgang	Streek,	205–236.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Campus.	Braun,	Nadja.	 2004.	E-Voting.	 Switzerland’s	projects	 and	 their	 legal	 framework	–	 in	 a	European	context.	In	Electronic	Voting	in	Europe.	Technology,	Law,	Politics	and	Society,	eds.	 Prosser,	 Alexander	 and	 Robert	 Krimmer,	 43–52.	 Bonn:	 GI	 Gesellschaft	 für	Informatik.	Buchsbaum,	Thomas.	M.	2004.	E-voting.	International	developments	and	lessons	learnt.	In	 Electronic	 Voting	 in	 Europe.	 Technology,	 Law,	 Politics	 and	 Society,	 eds.	 Prosser,	Alexander	and	Robert	Krimmer,	31–42.	Bonn:	GI	Gesellschaft	für	Informatik.	Buchstein,	Hubertus.	2004.	Online	Democracy,	Is	it	Viable?	Is	it	Desirable?	Internet	Voting	and	 Normative	 Democratic	 Theory.	 In	 Electronic	 Voting	 and	 Democracy.	 A	
Comparative	 Analysis,	 eds.	 Kersting,	 Norbert	 and	 Harald	 Baldersheim,	 39–58.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Canton	of	Zürich.	2018a.	"Digitale	Verwaltung	und	E-Government."	Zhservices.	Available	at	https://e-gov.zh.ch/internet/staatskanzlei/egov/de/zhservices.html.	Canton	 of	 Zürich.	 2018b.	 "Wahlen	 &	 Abstimmungen.	 E-Voting."	 Ausarbeitung	 einer	
Vernehmlassungsvorlage	 zur	 Revision	 des	 Gesetzes	 über	 die	 politischen	 Rechte.	Available	 at	 https://wahlen-abstimmungen.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/wahlen-abstimmungen/de/evoting.html.		Canton	 of	 Zürich/no	 year.	 "Chronik."	 Available	 at	 https://wahlen-abstimmungen.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/wahlen-abstimmungen/de/evoting/chronik.html.	Cantonal	Tax	Office	of	Zürich.	2014.	"Ein	Drittel	mehr	Online-Steuererklärungen	als	im	Vorjahr."	 Medienmitteilung,	 16	 July	 2014.	 Available	 at	https://www.steueramt.zh.ch/internet/finanzdirektion/ksta/de/aktuell.newsextern.-internet-de-aktuell-news-medienmitteilungen-2014-online_steuererklaerungen.html.		Cantonal	Tax	Office	of	Zürich.	2018.	"Zahlen	&	Fakten.	Leistungskennzahlen	Steueramt."	
Kennzahlen	 aus	 den	 Geschäftsberichten.	 Available	 at	https://www.steueramt.zh.ch/internet/finanzdirektion/ksta/de/ueber_uns/zahlen_fakten.html.		Charles,	Alec.	2005.	 "E-society	and	E-democracy.	The	Example	of	Estonia."	ETHICOMP	
papers.	Available	at	http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar.		Department	 of	 Justice	 and	 Home	 Affairs	 of	 the	 canton	 of	 Zürich.	 2011.	"Regierungsratbeschluss	1391/2011."	Protokollauszug	Regierungsrat	Kanton	Zürich.	16	 November	 2011.	 Available	 at	https://www.zh.ch/bin/ktzh/rrb/beschluss.pdf?rrbNr=1391&name=1391&year=2011&_charset_=UTF-8.		Department	 of	 Justice	 and	 Home	 Affairs	 of	 the	 canton	 of	 Zürich.	 2013.	"Regierungsratbeschluss	 582/2013."	Protokollauszug	 Regierungsrat	 Kanton	 Zürich.	29	 May	 2013.	 Available	 at	 https://wahlen-abstimmungen.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/wahlen-abstimmungen/de/evoting/chronik/_jcr_content/contentPar/downloadlist/downloaditems/923_1467809256516.spooler.download.1467809228812.pdf/rrb_582_2013.pdf.		
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     72 
 
 
 
Department	 of	 Justice	 and	 Home	 Affairs	 of	 the	 canton	 of	 Zürich.	 2016.	"Regierungsratbeschluss	61/2016."	Protokollauszug	Regierungsrat	Kanton	Zürich.	27	January	 2016.	 Available	 at	https://www.zh.ch/bin/ktzh/rrb/beschluss.pdf?rrbNr=61&name=61&year=2016&_charset_=UTF-8.		Die	Post.	2015.	"Post	treibt	eVoting	voran."	Available	at	https://www.post.ch/de/ueber-uns/unternehmen/medien/medienmitteilungen/2015/post-treibt-evoting-voran.		Die	Post.	2017.	"Die	E-Voting-Lösung	der	Post:	Eckpunkte	des	Angebots	für	Kantone	und	Gemeinden."	 Available	 at	 https://www.post.ch/-/media/post/evoting/dokumente/factsheet-e-voting.pdf?la=de&vs=12.		Die	Post.	2018.	"Was	ist	E-Voting."	Available	at	https://www.evoting.ch/.		Drechsler,	 Wolfgang.	 2003.	 "The	 Estonian	 E-Voting	 Laws	 Discourse.	 Paradigmatic	Benchmarking	 for	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe."	 NISPAcee	 Occasional	 Papers.	Available	at	http://unpan1.un.org.		Drechsler,	 Wolfgang.	 2006.	 "Dispatch	 From	 The	 Future."	 The	 Washington	 Post,	 5	November	2006.	Available	at	http://www.washingtonpost.com.		Estonian	National	Electoral	Committee.	2007.	"Internet	voting	in	Estonia."	Available	at	http://www.vvk.ee.		E-VOTE-ID.	 2018.	 "The	 International	 Conference	 for	 Electronic	 Voting."	 Available	 at	https://www.e-vote-id.org.		Freeman,	 Richard.	 2006.	 Learning	 in	 Public	 Policy.	 In	The	 Oxford	 Handbook	 of	 Public	
Policy,	 eds.	 Moran,	 Michael,	 Martin	 Rein	 and	 Robert	 E.	 Goodin,	 367–388.	 Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Gerlach,	 Jan	 and	 Urs	 Gasser.	 2009.	 "Three	 case	 studies	 from	 Switzerland.	 E-Voting."	
Internet	&	Democracy	Case	Study	Series,	Berkman	Center	Research	Publication	3:	1–17.	Geser,	Hans.	2004.	Electronic	Voting	in	Switzerland.	In	Electronic	Voting	and	Democracy.	
A	 Comparative	 Analysis,	 eds.	 Kersting,	 Norbert	 and	 Harald	 Baldersheim,	 75–96.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Grin,	 John	 and	Anne	Löber.	 2007.	Theories	 of	Policy	Learning.	Agency,	 Structure,	 and	Chance.	 In	 Handbook	 of	 Public	 Policy	 Analysis.	 Theory,	 Politics,	 and	 Methods,	 eds.	Fischer,	 Frank,	 Gerald	 J.	 Miller	 and	 Mara	 S.	 Sidney,	 201–219.	 Boca	Raton/London/New	York:	CRC	Press.	Hadenius,	 Axel.	 1992.	Democracy	 and	Development.	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	Press.	Hall,	 Peter	 A.	 1993.	 "Policy	 Paradigms,	 Social	 Learning,	 and	 the	 State."	 Comparative	
Politics	25	(3):	275–296.	Hensler,	 Robert.	 2001.	 Cyberadministration.	 La	 vision	 du	 canton	 Genève.	 Genève:	Chancellerie	d´Etat.	Maaten,	Epp.	2004.	Towards	Remote	E-Voting.	Estonian	case.	 In	Electronic	Voting	and	
Democracy.	A	Comparative	Analysis,	eds.	Kersting,	Norbert	and	Harald	Baldersheim,	83–90.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	Madise,	 Ülle	 and	 Tarvi	Martens.	 2006.	 E-voting	 in	 Estonia	 2005.	 The	 first	 practice	 of	country-wide	 binding	 Internet	 voting	 in	 the	 world.	 In	 Electronic	 Voting	 2006,	 GI	
Lecture	Notes	 in	 Informatics,	ed.	Krimmer,	Robert,	15–26.	Bonn:	GI	Gesellschaft	 für	Informatik.	Mayntz,	 Renate	 and	 Fritz	 W.	 Scharpf.	 1995.	 Der	 Ansatz	 des	 akteurzentrierten	Institutionalismus.	 In	Gesellschaftliche	 Selbstregelung	und	politische	 Steuerung,	eds.	Mayntz,	Renate	and	Fritz	W.	Scharpf,	39–72.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Campus.	Ne.ch	 (République	 et	 canton	de	Neuchâtel).	 2017.	 "Annuaire	 statistique	du	 canton	de	Neuchâtel."	 Chapter	 1	 and	 2.	 Available	 at	https://www.ne.ch/autorites/DEAS/STAT/Pages/AnnuaireSTAT.aspx.		Ne.ch	(République	et	canton	de	Neuchâtel).	2018.	"Guichet	Unique:	Plus	de	confort	et	une	accessibilité	 pour	 toutes	 et	 tous."	 Available	 at	https://www.ne.ch/medias/Pages/20180502Guichetunique.aspx.		Neue	 Zürcher	 Zeitung.	 2015.	 "Der	 grösste	 E-Voting-verbund	 steht	 vor	 dem	 Aus."	 17	September	 2015.	 Available	 at	 https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/der-groesste-e-voting-verbund-steht-vor-dem-aus-1.18614374.		
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     73 
 
 
 
Neue	Zürcher	Zeitung.	2017.	"Der	Bundesrat	will	den	elektronischen	Ausweis	einführen."	15	November	 2017.	 Available	 at	 https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/der-bundesrat-will-den-elektronischen-ausweis-einfuehren-ld.1328907.		Ostrom,	 Elinor.	 2005.	 Doing	 institutional	 analysis.	 Digging	 deeper	 than	 markets	 and	hierarchies.	In	Handbook	of	new	institutional	economics,	eds.	Ménard,	Claude	and	Mary	M.	Shirley,	819–848.	Dordrecht:	Springer.	Palvia,	 Shailendra	 and	 Sushil	 Sharma.	 2007.	 "E-Government	 and	 E-Governance.	Definitions/Domain	 Framework	 and	 Status	 around	 the	World."	 ICEG.	 Available	 at	http://www.iceg.net.		Piwonski,	Sandra.	2018.	Vergleich	der	drei	Pilotprojekte	 in	Genf,	Neuenburg	und	Zürich	
zum	 Schweizer	 Vote	 électronique	 anhand	 des	 theoretischen	 Bezugsrahmens	 des	
Akteurzentrierten	 Institutionalismus	 Modells	 und	 der	 Vetoplayer	 Theorie.	Unveröffentlichte	Forschungsarbeit,	Hannover:	Univ.	Ray,	Julie.	2007.	"E-stonians	E-Vote.	But	only	3	in	10	confident	in	honesty	of	elections."	Available	at	http://www.gallup.com.		Reiners,	Markus.	2011.	"E-Revolution.	Actor-centered	and	structural	interdependencies	in	 the	 realization	 of	 Estonia’s	 democratic	 revolution."	 Zeitschrift	 für	
Politikwissenschaft	21	(4):	553–575.	Reiners,	 Markus.	 2017.	 "Electronic	 voting	 in	 comparative	 perspective.	 Status	 quo	 in	Estonia	and	trends	in	central	Europe."	Journal	of	Comparative	Politics	10	(1):	40–56.	République	 et	 Canton	 de	 Genève.	 2018a.	 "Vote	 Électronique."	 Available	 at	http://ge.ch/vote-electronique/votations-mode-demploi.		République	 et	 Canton	 de	 Genève.	 2018b.	 "Mémento	 statistique	 du	 canton	 de	 Genève	2018."	 Available	 at	https://www.ge.ch/statistique/tel/publications/2018/donnees_generales/memento/dg-ms-2018.pdf.		République	 et	 Canton	 de	 Genève/no	 year.	 "L’historique	 de	 CHVote."	 Available	 at	https://www.ge.ch/dossier/chvote-plateforme-vote-electronique-du-canton-geneve/historique-chvote.		Rose,	Richard.	2005.	Learning	from	Comparative	Public	Policy.	A	practical	guide.	London:	Routledge.	Sabatier,	 Paul	 A.	 and	 Christopher	Weible.	 2014.	Theories	 of	 the	 Policy	 Process,	 3rd	 ed.	Boulder:	Westview	Press.	Scharpf,	 Fritz	W.	 2000.	 Interaktionsformen.	 Akteurzentrierter	 Institutionalismus	 in	 der	
Politikforschung.	Opladen:	Leske	+	Budrich.	Scytl/no	year.	"Customers."	Available	at	https://www.scytl.com/en/customers.		Statistical	Office	of	 the	canton	of	Zürich.	2011.	 "Evaluation	der	E-Voting	Testphase	 im	Kanton	 Zürich	 2008–2011."	 RRB	 1770/2007.	 Available	 at	https://www.zh.ch/bin/ktzh/rrb/beschluss.pdf?rrbNr=1391&name=Evaluation_E-Voting_Z%C3%BCrich&year=2011&_charset_=UTF-8.		Statistical	Office	of	the	canton	of	Zürich.	2018a.	"Schlussbericht	zum	Vorprojekt	für	einen	flächendeckenden	Einsatz	von	E-Voting	im	Kanton	Zürich."	RRB	551/2016.	Available	at	 https://wahlen-abstimmungen.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/wahlen-abstimmungen/de/evoting/_jcr_content/contentPar/downloadlist/downloaditems/921_1467808957304.spooler.download.1522912314174.pdf/Schlussbericht+zum+Vorprojekt+f%C3%BCr+einen+fl%C3%A4chendeckenden+Einsatz+von+E-Voting+im+Kanton+Z%C3%BCrich+vom+21.+M%C3%A4rz+2018.pdf.		Statistical	 Office	 of	 the	 canton	 of	 Zürich.	 2018b.	 "Statistisches	 Jahrbuch	 des	 Kantons	Zürich	 2018."	 Available	 at	https://statistik.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/statistik/de/daten/jahrbuch/_jcr_content/contentPar/downloadlist_0/downloaditems/163_1522993002832.spooler.download.1522992903332.pdf/jb_18_total.pdf.		Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery.	 2004.	 "Der	 Vote	 électronique	 in	 der	 Pilotphase."	Zwischenbericht.	 Available	 at	 https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk-intra/de/dokumente/pore/der_vote_electroniqueinderpilotphase-zwischenberichtschweizeris.pdf.		Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery.	 2015.	 "Eckdaten	 zum	 Einsatz	 der	 elektronischen	Stimmabgabe	 am	 8.3.2018."	 Available	 at	https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/politische-rechte/e-voting/versuchsuebersicht.html.		
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     74 
 
 
 
Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery.	 2018a.	 "Vote	 électronique.	 E-Voting	 als	 ordentlicher	Stimmkanal.	 Bundesrat	 plant	 Vernehmlassung	 für	 Herbst	 2018."	 Available	 at	https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html.		Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery.	 2018b.	 "Chronik	 Vote	 électronique."	 Available	 at	https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/politische-rechte/e-voting/chronik.html.		Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery.	 2018c.	 "Faktenblatt	 –	 Vote	 électronique."	 Available	 at	https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk/de/dokumente/pore/Faktenblatt%20E-Voting.pdf.download.pdf/Faktenblatt_DE.pdf.		Swiss	 Federal	 Chancellery.	 2018d.	 "Eckdaten	 zum	 Einsatz	 der	 elektronischen	Stimmabgabe	 am	 4.3.2018."	 Available	 at	https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/politische-rechte/e-voting/versuchsuebersicht.html.		Swiss	Federal	Council.	2006a.	 "Bericht	über	die	Pilotprojekte	zum	Vote	électronique."	Available	 at	 https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk-intra/de/dokumente/pore/politische_rechte/bericht_ueber_diepilotprojektezumvoteelectroniqueschweizerische.pdf.		Swiss	 Federal	 Council.	 2006b.	 "Briefliche	 Stimmabgabe	 –	 Analyse	 der	 eidg.	Volksabstimmung	vom	27.11.2005."	Medienmitteilung,	31	March	2006.	Available	at	https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-4470.html.		Swiss	 Federal	 Council.	 2013a.	 "Bericht	 des	 Bundesrates	 zu	 Vote	 électronique:	Auswertung	der	Einführung	von	Vote	électronique	(2006–2012)	und	Grundlagen	zur	Weiterentwicklung."	 Available	 at	 https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk-intra/de/dokumente/pore/politische_rechte/bericht_des_bundesrateszuvoteelectronique-auswertungdereinfuehru.pdf.		Swiss	 Federal	 Council.	 2013b.	 "Ergänzende	 Dokumentation	 zum	 dritten	 Bericht	 des	Bundesrats	 zu	 Vote	 électronique."	 Anhang	 1.	 Available	 at	https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk-intra/de/dokumente/pore/politische_rechte/ergaenzende_dokumentation.1.pdf.		Swiss	Federal	Council.	2015.	"Nationalratswahlen	mit	dem	elektronischem	Stimmkanal.”	
Medienmitteilung,	 12	 August	 2015.	 Available	 at	https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id	58314.html.		Swiss	 Federal	 Council.	 2017.	 "Glossar	 zu	 Vote	 électronique."	 Available	 at	https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk/de/dokumente/pore/Glossar%20E-Voting.pdf.download.pdf/Glossar_DE.pdf.		Swiss	 Federal	 Statistical	 Office.	 2018a.	 "Internetzugang	 der	 Haushalte."	 Grafik	 6	Internetzugang	 der	 Haushalte,	 nach	 Großregion,	 2004–2014.	 Available	 at	https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/kultur-medien-informationsgesellschaft-sport/informationsgesellschaft/gesamtindikatoren/haushalte-bevoelkerung/internetzugang-haushalte.assetdetail.5306940.html.		Swiss	 Federal	 Statistical	 Office.	 2018b.	 "Online-Aktivitäten	 2017."	 Available	 at	https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/kataloge-datenbanken/tabellen.assetdetail.4262532.html.		Swiss	 Federal	 Statistical	 Office.	 2018c.	 "Kantonale	 Parlamentswahlen.	 Stärke	 der	Parteien	 und	 Wahlbeteiligung	 1972–2018.”	 Available	 at	https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfsstatic/dam/assets/5486673/master.		Trechsel,	Alexander	H.,	Guido	Schwerdt,	Fabian	Breuer,	Michael	Alvarez	and	Thad	Hall.	2007.	 "Report	 for	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe.	 Internet	 voting	 in	 the	 March	 2007	Parliamentary	Elections	in	Estonia."	Available	at	http://www.osce.org.		Treib,	Oliver.	2015.	Akteurzentrierter	Institutionalismus.	In	Handbuch	Policy-Forschung,	eds.	Wenzelburger,	Georg	and	Reimut	Zöhlnhöfer,	277–297.	Wiesbaden:	Springer.	Tribune	 de	 Genève.	 2018.	 "Le	 scrutin	 sur	 Internet	 s’est	 bien	 déroulé."	 Available	 at	https://www.tdg.ch/geneve/actu-genevoise/scrutin-internet-s-deroule/story/18787997.		Tsebelis,	George.	2002.	Veto	players.	How	Political	Institutions	Work.	New	York:	Russell	Sage	Foundation.	Vatter,	Adrian.	2016.	Das	politische	System	der	Schweiz.	Nomos:	Baden-Baden.	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     75 
 
 
 
Yin,	 Robert.	 2003.	 Case	 Study	 Research.	 Design	 and	 Methods.	 Sage:	 Thousand	 Oaks,	London	and	New	Delhi.			 			
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     76 
 
 
 
			
CHINA’S	 STRATEGY	 VIS-A-VIS	 TAIWAN’S	
DIPLOMATIC	 FRIENDS:	 IS	 BEIJING	 USING	
DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY?1			
Šárka	WAISOVÁ2	…………………………………………………………………….………………………………………		
The	article	 responds	 to	 the	argument	 that	Beijing	has	been	using	
economic	 incentives	 to	 cause	 recipient	 nations	 to	 switch	 their	
diplomatic	 allegiances,	 which	 ultimately	 means	 breaking	 off	 ties	
with	Taiwan	and	recognizing	the	PRC.	It	can	be	concluded	that	the	
empirical	data	confirm	China’s	use	of	dollar	diplomacy.	In	the	case	
of	most	of	the	analysed	countries	capital	flows	and	economic	benefits	
were	provided	shortly	before	diplomatic	ties	were	established.	For	
all	of	the	countries,	their	diplomatic	recognition	of	the	PRC	enabled	
rich	economic,	 trade,	and	development	 links	with	China.	However,	
the	 volumes	 of	 capital	 flows	 were	 unstable	 and	 the	 awarding	 of	
economic	advantages	was	not	automatic	and	even	in	states	which	
saw	 the	 biggest	 input	 of	 capital	 and	 the	most	 lucrative	 economic	
deals,	China’s	use	of	dollar	diplomacy	leaves	several	questions.	
	
Key	words:	China;	Taiwan;	dollar	diplomacy;	Taiwan’s	allies.		
	
	
1	INTRODUCTION	
	 Taiwan	 (the	 Republic	 of	 China/Taiwan)	 lost	 its	 status	 as	 an	 internationally	recognised	independent	country	at	the	beginning	of	the	1970s	when	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC)	joined	the	United	Nations	(UN).	Within	a	few	years,	most	UN	member	states	had	switched	their	diplomatic	recognition	to	the	PRC	based	on	 the	 ‘One-China’	 principle.3	 Beijing	 calls	 Taiwan	 a	 renegade	 province	 and	insists	that	it	is	inseparable	from	the	PRC.	Taiwan,	on	the	other	hand,	rejects	the	
 1	This	article	is	the	outcome	of	the	project	supported	by	Czech	Science	Foundation,	Grant	No.	19-09443S.	2	 Šárka	WAISOVÁ	is	associate	professor	in	the	Department	of	Politics	and	International	Relations	at	the	Faculty	of	Arts,	University	of	West	Bohemia	(Czech	Republic)	and	International	Chair	at	the	Faculty	of	International	and	European	Studies,	National	University	of	Public	Service	(Hungary).	Contact:	waisova@kap.zcu.cz.	3	Formulated	in	1979,	this	principle	states	that	there	is	only	one	China	that	Taiwan	is	an	inalienable	part	of	Chinese	territory,	and	that	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	 is	the	rightful	government	of	both	the	mainland	and	Taiwan.	This	position	was	later	reinforced	in	various	Chinese	government	statements	 and	 declarations.	 See,	 in	 particular,	 the	 white	 papers	 ‘The	 Taiwan	 Question	 and	Reunification	of	China’	(1993)	and	‘The	One-China	Principle	and	the	Taiwan	Issue’	(2000).	
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social	 and	 political	 organisation	 of	 mainland	 China	 and	 the	 narrative	 about	Taiwan’s	rebel	province	status.	Nevertheless,	world	political	developments	have	gradually	 marginalised	 Taiwan.	 The	 PRC	 is	 intent	 on	 minimising	 Taiwan’s	international	 presence	 and	 does	 not	 recognise	 activities	 or	 events	 that	might	imply	 Taiwanese	 sovereignty.	 From	 an	 international	 politics	 perspective,	Taiwan’s	situation	is	clearly	very	complicated.4	The	country	has	been	struggling	to	 maintain	 its	 ‘independent’	 position	 by	 any	 means	 possible,	 including	diplomatic	 relations	with	 other	 states.	 Even	 so,	 the	 number	 of	 countries	 that	diplomatically	 recognise	 Taiwan	 is	 declining.	 Between	 2016	 and	 2018	 alone,	Taiwan	lost	the	support	of	Burkina	Faso,	the	Dominican	Republic,	El	Salvador,	Panama,	the	Gambia,	and	Sao	Tomé.	In	December	2018,	Taiwan	had	diplomatic	relations	with	only	17	countries.		Every	 time	 Taiwan	 loses	 a	 diplomatic	 ally,	 there	 is	 talk	 of	 Chinese	 dollar	diplomacy	(Reuters	2018a;	The	Economist	2018).	The	idea	here	is	that	Beijing	is	using	economic	enticements	to	persuade	Taiwan’s	diplomatic	friends	to	abandon	the	island.	Both	the	behaviour	and	comments	of	several	of	Taipei’s	former	allies	suggest	that	there	might	be	good	reason	to	think	this	way.	In	an	interview	with	Bloomberg	in	2018,	the	then	Burkinabe	minister	of	foreign	affairs,	Alpha	Barry	mentioned	 that	 Beijing	 had	 offered	 his	 country	 500	million	 USD	 to	 establish	diplomatic	relations	with	China	the	previous	year	(Bloomberg	2018).	In	2018,	El	Salvador	 made	 no	 secret	 of	 its	 reasons	 for	 shifting	 its	 allegiance	 when	 it	announced	 that	 it	 had	 established	 diplomatic	 ties	 with	 the	 PRC	 after	 Taiwan	denied	its	financial	demands	(Renteria	2018).			Given	these	circumstances,	it	seems	quite	credible	that	China	is	using	economic	incentives	to	convince	Taiwan’s	allies	to	‘switch	teams’.	A	closer	look	at	Chinese	politics	and	the	politics	of	former	Taiwan	allies	however,	suggests	this	may	be	too	simplistic	an	explanation.	For	a	time,	preserving	diplomatic	ties	with	Taiwan	was	in	these	states’	economic	interests,	but	with	the	political	and	economic	rise	of	China	and	the	side-lining	of	Taiwan	in	world	politics,	 it	became	clear	that	a	partnership	with	Taipei	would	not	 suffice	 for	 countries	with	 regional	 or	 even	global	ambitions.	As	the	cases	of	Costa	Rica	and	Senegal	show,	China	also	became	a	political	sponsor	of	certain	countries.	Thanks	to	the	support	of	the	PRC,	Costa	Rica	was	granted	a	non-permanent	seat	on	the	UN	Security	Council	in	2007	and	Beijing	also	backed	its	APEC	membership	despite	a	moratorium	on	new	members	(Casas-Zamora	2009).	Similar	motives	may	be	ascribed	to	Senegal,	which	wished	to	represent	Africa	on	the	UNSC	in	2005	and	to	join	the	Group	of	33	in	the	WTO	(Gehrold	and	Tietze	2011;	Okumu	2005).			Additionally,	a	growing	number	of	studies	(e.g.	Corkin	2011;	Lee	and	Zou	2017)	show	that	Chinese	foreign	policy	is	quite	decentralised	and	that	the	Communist	Party	cannot	control	or	manage	foreign	policy	matters,	which	involve	more	and	more	 agents	 who	 do	 not	 communicate	 adequately	 with	 one	 another.	 The	situation	has	led	to	many	clashes	over	who	has	the	authority	to	set	foreign	policy,	with	 coordination	 sometimes	 so	 poor	 that	 different	 representatives	 present	opposing	positions	internationally.	In	fact,	some	studies	(Corkin	2011;	Lee	and	Zou	2017)	suggest	that	trade	and	investment	interests	are	the	true	forces	driving	political	goals	and	that	there	is	no	top-down	grand	geopolitical	strategy	in	many	foreign	policy	areas.	Concerning	the	approach	to	Taiwan,	things	are	even	more	
 4	Taiwan´s	vigilant	approach	to	Beijing	has	been	strengthened	also	by	events	in	Hong	Kong.	The	limited	 international	 reactions	 on	 Hong	 Kong´s	 demonstrations	 and	 China´s	 Hong	 Kong´s	activities	indicate	that	there	will	be	hardly	any	assistance	to	Taiwan	if	the	island	would	be	part	of	the	PRC	(more	see	Chan	Ka-Lok	2018).	
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complicated.	Taiwan-related	issues	are	seen	in	China	as	part	of	domestic	policy	and	several	Chinese	political	bodies	are	responsible	for	Taiwanese	relations	and	affairs.	At	the	same	time,	none	of	these	bodies	has	direct	links	to	foreign	policy	or	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	(MFA)	(Hsiao	2013;	Jakobson	and	Knox	2010).		All	 this	 raises	 the	 issue	of	whether	 there	 is	actually	any	 top-down	strategy	or	systematic	 policy	 on	 Chinese	 dollar	 diplomacy	 outside	 the	 general	 One-China	principle	 –	 or,	 to	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 whether	 Beijing	 is	 systematically	 using	economic	 incentives	 to	 change	 the	 recipient	 nations’	 positions	 and	 gain	diplomatic	 recognition.	 The	 current	 study	 aims	 to	 generate	 new	 evidence	 to	address	this	question	(among	previous	older	studies	see	for	example	Taylor	2002	or	Rich	2007).	To	this	end,	I	analyse	capital	 flows	and	economic	relationships,	offers,	 and	 incentives	 between	 China	 and	 countries	 that	 have	 broken	 off	diplomatic	ties	with	Taiwan.		To	establish	that	the	PRC	is	using	dollar	diplomacy	to	poach	Taiwan’s	diplomatic	friends,	 the	empirical	data	would	need	to	show	that	shortly	before	and	after	a	country	 changed	 diplomatic	 course,	 it	 received	 funds	 or	 other	 economic	incentives	 and	 offers	 from	 Beijing	 or	 that	 the	 PRC	 had	 taken	 steps	 to	 pledge	economic	benefits.		The	current	study	presents	my	research	in	three	stages.	The	first	part	defines	and	operationalizes	 the	 dollar	 diplomacy	 concept	 and	 explains	 the	 independent	variables	 selected	 as	 well	 as	 the	 methodology	 used	 to	 obtain	 data	 for	 each	variable.	 In	 the	 second	 part,	 I	 collate	 the	 information	 and	 results	 for	 these	independent	 variables	 in	 each	 country	 that	 severed	 ties	 with	 Taiwan	 and	switched	its	allegiance	to	the	PRC.	The	values	for	the	independent	variables	were	tracked	over	a	10-year	period	beginning	four	years	before	the	diplomatic	change	and	including	the	year	of	the	shift	and	the	next	five	years.	Finally	I	review	and	evaluate	 all	 of	 the	 collected	 data.	 The	 sample	 for	 my	 study	 consisted	 of	 all	countries	 that	 broke	 off	 diplomatic	 relations	 with	 Taiwan	 in	 favour	 of	 China	between	2000	and	2018	(Table	1).			TABLE	 1:	 COUNTRIES	 WHICH	 BROKE	 OFF	 RELATIONS	 WITH	 TAIWAN	 AND	RECOGNISED	THE	PRC,	2000–2018		
	Source:	 Information	 obtained	 by	 the	 author	 from	 the	 Chinese	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	confirmed	by	the	foreign	affairs	ministries	of	relevant	states.	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     79 
 
 
 
Observers	agree	that	the	year	2000	marked	a	foreign	policy	milestone	for	China	(Jakobson	and	Knox	2010;	Jakobson	and	Manuel	2016;	China	Daily	2018;	Zhang	and	 Smith	 2017).	 The	 country’s	 economic	 rise	 and	 growing	 political	 self-confidence	 led	 to	 the	 redefining	 of	 its	 international	 goals	 and	 actions.	 Beijing	approved	a	‘going	out’	strategy	that	combined	political	with	economic	expansion	and	resulted	in	new	policies	including	a	development	policy	and	new	bodies	such	as	 Leading	 Small	 Groups	 and	 China	 International	 Development	 Cooperation	Agency.	 In	 2000,	 the	 PRC	 also	 released	 a	 new	white	 paper	 on	 its	 position	 on	Taiwan.	The	 country’s	new	course	was	 confirmed	 in	2003	when	 the	 so-called	fourth	generation	of	leaders	took	office.			
2	 AN	 OPERATING	 DEFINITION	 OF	 DOLLAR	 DIPLOMACY	 AND	
INDEPENDENT	VARIABLES		The	 term	 ‘dollar	 diplomacy’	 was	 originally	 connected	 with	 US	 foreign	 policy	under	the	administration	of	W.H.	Taft.	The	goal	of	US	dollar	diplomacy	was	to	use	private	capital	 to	 improve	the	country’s	 financial	opportunities	and	further	 its	interests	 overseas,	 particularly	 in	 Central	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean	(Encyclopaedia	Britannica	 n.d.).	 Later,	 the	 term	was	 used	 to	 describe	 a	 set	 of	tactics	designed	to	achieve	political	objectives	by	economic	means.	The	current	study	uses	the	phrase	in	a	similar	way:	dollar	diplomacy	is	defined	as	the	capital	flows	and	other	economic	offers	and	incentives	(payments	or	pledges	of	profits)	which	one	state	provides	to	another	in	order	to	win	support	for	its	own	goals	and	visions.		Drawing	 on	 this	 definition	 and	 studies	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 political	 economy,	international	relations,	foreign	policy,	and	Chinese	studies,	I	take	the	following	independent	 variables	 (each	 variable	 and	 the	 reason	 why	 it	 was	 chosen	 is	explained	in	detail	below)	to	indicate	the	existence	of	Chinese	dollar	diplomacy	vis-á-vis	friends	of	Taiwan:	
§ a	rise	 in	 foreign	direct	 investment	 (FDI)	 flows	 from	China	 to	 the	recipient	country;	
§ a	 rise	 in	 Chinese	 financial	 investments	 and	 participation	 in	 construction	contracts	in	the	recipient	country;	
§ a	rise	in	Chinese	foreign	aid	(FA)	to	the	recipient	country;	
§ the	conclusion	of	a	bilateral	trade	or	any	other	agreement	aiming	to	improve	the	 recipient	 country’s	 economic	 situation	 (or	 the	 start	 of	 negotiations	 of	such	an	agreement);	
§ the	establishment	of	the	Confucius	Institute	(CI)	in	the	recipient	country	(or	the	start	of	relevant	negotiations);	
§ the	granting	of	Approved	Destination	Status	(ADS)	to	the	recipient	country	(or	the	start	of	relevant	negotiations);	and	
§ the	recipient	country’s	involvement	in	a	multilateral	institution	managed	and	funded	by	China.		To	 support	 the	 conclusion	 that	 China	 has	 used	 dollar	 diplomacy	 to	win	 over	Taiwan’s	diplomatic	friends,	the	results	for	these	independent	variables	would	need	to	show	that	shortly	before	and	after	the	other	country	changed	diplomatic	course,	 it	 received	 capital	 flows	 or	 pledges	 or	 other	 incentives	 related	 to	economic	 enrichment.	 In	 the	 sections	 that	 follow,	 I	 explain	 the	 independent	variables	 used	 in	 this	 study	 in	 detail,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 methodology	 and	 the	techniques	applied	to	collection	and	evaluation	of	the	data.	At	the	same	time,	I	highlight	key	limits	and	research	problems	associated	with	each	indicator.	
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At	the	outset,	it	must	be	said	that	the	biggest	limitation	and	problem	affecting	the	present	 research	 is	 the	 minimal	 transparency	 of	 the	 Chinese	 state	 and	 its	reluctance	 to	 share	 information	 and	 data.	 The	 Chinese	 authorities	 only	communicate	results	and	data	selectively;	key	data	for	particular	countries	and	periods	are	missing	and	this	is	also	true	of	the	total	values	of	certain	projects	(for	more	details	on	this	problem	see	e.g.	Dreher	et	al.	2017;	Grimm	et	al.	2011;	Kitano	2016).	 A	 second	 obstacle	 relates	 to	 the	 diverging	 definitions	 of	 different	indicators	and	 the	different	methodologies	used	 to	determine	results.	Chinese	foreign	 aid,	 for	 example,	 cannot	 be	 compared	 with	 the	 OECD’s	 Official	Development	Assistance	 (ODA).	 Similarly,	 China’s	methodology	 for	measuring	FDI	flows	differs	from	than	that	of	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	 (UNCTAD)	 and	 the	 World	 Bank	 (de	 Jong,	 Greeven	 and	 Ebbers	2017).This	 situation	means	 that	 up	 to	 now	 certain	 topics	 have	 been	 ignored.	Moreover,	 scholars	 have	 started	 to	 establish	 their	 own	 datasets	 concerning	Chinese	 economic	 activities	 and	 capital	 flows	 (e.g.	 China-Africa	 Research	Initiative	of	Johns	Hopkins	School	of	Advanced	International	Studies;	Dreher	et	al.	2017;	Wolf,	Wand	and	Warner	2013).	The	current	study	uses	information	and	statistics	 from	 China	 as	 well	 as	 data	 produced	 by	 third	 parties.	 Whenever	possible,	data	have	been	triangulated	and	cross-checked	based	on	information	from	Chinese	political	entities	and	media,	international	media,	and	the	political	institutions	 and	media	of	 relevant	 countries	 as	well	 as	 academic	 sources,	 and	reports	and	interviews	with	political	representatives.	In	several	cases,	Wikileaks	documents	were	also	used.		2.1	Foreign	Direct	Investment	Flows		Foreign	Direct	Investment	Flows	record	the	value	of	cross-border	transactions	related	to	direct	investment	over	a	given	period	of	time.	For	a	long	time,	these	flows	were	 thought	 to	have	a	purely	economic	and	developmental	 impact	but	over	the	last	decade,	a	number	of	studies	have	shown	that	FDI	may	be	a	tool	for	achieving	 political	 goals	 (see	 e.g.	 Biglaiser	 and	 Staats	 2010;	 Raess,	 Ren	 and	Wagner	2017;	Strűver	2016).			FDI	officially	became	part	of	China’s	national	economic	development	plan	in	the	1990s	when	Beijing	actively	encouraged	Chinese	companies	to	go	global.	At	the	same	time,	the	government	expanded	the	development	of	already	internationally	competitive	state-owned	enterprises	(SOEs)	(de	Jong	et	al.	2017).	While	scholars	disagree	about	the	extent	to	which	Chinese	companies	are	state-controlled,	they	agree	on	the	existence	of	Chinese	party-state	oversight	along	with	an	extremely	complex	regulatory	environment	particularly	for	SOEs.	SOEs	dominate	the	list	of	China’s	biggest	companies,	tend	to	have	preferential	access	to	credit	from	China’s	policy	 banks,	 and	 are	 frequently	 contracted	 to	work	 on	 aid	 and	 construction	projects,	 and	 Chinese	 state	 bodies	 assist	 SOEs	 to	 enter	 new	markets	 (Corkin	2011;	Jones	and	Zou	2017;	Lee	and	Yizheng	2017;	Scissors	2016;	Scissors	2018).	All	this	suggests	that	in	the	case	of	China,	FDI	flows	are	a	viable	tool	for	reaching	political	goals.		For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	the	total	volume	of	FDI	flows	is	not	important	but	trends	 (changes	 in	 volume)	 are	 tracked.	 Data	 on	 FDIs	 are	 sourced	 from	 the	
Statistical	Bulletin	of	China’s	Outward	Foreign	Direct	 Investment	 for	 the	period	1999–2017	(National	Bureau	of	Statistics	in	China	2017).5	It	must	be	noted	that	
 5At	the	time	of	writing,	data	on	FDIs	for	2018	were	still	not	available.	While	UNCTAD	offers	another	potential	data	source,	UNCTAD	data	on	bilateral	FDI	only	cover	the	period	between	2000	and	2012.	
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FDI	data	are	 far	 from	perfect.	Beijing	 transfers	 a	huge	volume	of	FDI	 through	offshore	financial	centres	such	as	Hong	Kong,	the	British	Virgin	Islands,	and	the	Cayman	 Islands	 (National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 in	 China	 2017)	 and	 the	 final	recipients	of	this	money	are	unknown.6		2.2	Chinese	Investments	and	Participation	in	Construction	Contracts			Investments	and	financial	contributions	to	construction	contracts	are	a	second	important	means	by	which	China	asserts	 its	 economic	presence	globally.	This	‘Chinese	 financial	participation’	 includes	 the	state	and	SOEs	as	well	as	private	investors.	While	private	investors’	share	of	investment	contracts	stood	at	about	30	per	cent	in	2017,	construction	contracts	remain	dominated	by	SOEs	and	the	state,	with	massive	aid	from	concessionary	financing	from	state-controlled	banks	(Mayers	 and	Gallagher	2018;	 Scissors	2018).	Though	 there	 is	 some	 crossover	between	investment	and	construction	contracts	(ICC)	and	FDI,	ICCs	also	include	loans	and	non-investment	 flows	such	as	professional	services,	know-how,	and	technology.	Since	my	 interest	here	 is	not	 in	total	amounts	but	 in	trends,	some	degree	of	overlapping	should	not	present	a	problem.			Data	about	the	volume	of	China’s	ICC	contributions	can	be	obtained	from	official	Chinese	Ministry	of	Commerce	(MOFCOM)	statistics,	particularly	the	Investment	Project	Database	(MOFCOM	n.d.).	These	statistics	do	not,	however,	reflect	flows	passing	 through	 Hong	 Kong,	 i.e.	 an	 estimated	 one-third	 of	 all	 flows	 (Scissors	2018),	and	they	do	not	extend	beyond	2012.	For	this	reason,	I	made	use	of	the	China	Global	Investment	Tracker	(CGIT).	The	CGIT	tracks	the	movement	of	funds	from	 China,	 including	 their	 transfer	 through	 Hong	 Kong	 to	 their	 final	destinations,	 and	 is	 thus	 a	 vastly	 superior	 tool	 for	measuring	 Chinese	 capital	flows.	The	CGIT	 includes	all	verified	 investment	and	construction	transactions	worth	100	million	USD	or	more	between	2005	and	2018.	Even	so,	 it	does	not	track	 loans,	 bonds	 or	 other	 foreign	 exchange	 applications	 that	 do	 not	 involve	property	or	services	 in	the	host	country	(Scissors	2018,	2).	Pre-2005	ICC	data	were	obtained	separately.	The	sources	consulted	were	(i)	international	and	local	news	 reports,	 (ii)	 Chinese	 embassies,	 companies,	 and	 news	 reports,	 and	 (iii)	political	representatives	and	state	institutions	in	the	recipient	country.			2.3	Foreign	Aid		Foreign	 aid	 (FA)	 is	 probably	 both	 the	most	 important	 and	most	 problematic	indicator	of	Chinese	dollar	diplomacy.	The	official	aim	of	Chinese	FA	is	to	‘provide	economic,	 technical,	material,	human	resources	and	administrative	 support	 to	recipient	countries’	(MOFCOM	2014,	article	2).	Scholars	suggest,	however,	that	this	 aid	 is	 driven	 by	 many	 other	 motives,	 some	 of	 which	 are	 political	 and	ideological	 (Lengauer	 2011;	 Lum	 et	 al.	 2009;	 Zhang	 and	 Smith	 2017).	 The	Chinese	 FA	 system	 took	 off	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 since	 then	 has	 seen	 significant	changes.	 Up	 to	 now,	 the	 system	 has	 been	 managed	 by	 MOFCOM,	 with	 other	participating	 bodies	 including	 the	 MFA,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 and	 two	financiers;	China	Export-Import	Bank	and	China	Development	Bank	(Zhang	and	Smith	2017).	In	2018,	Beijing	also	set	up	a	special	development	agency.	While	the	government	 (China	 Daily	 2018)	 has	 said	 this	 agency	 will	 mediate	 between	
 6	The	Hong	Kong	Census	and	Statistics	Department	lists	only	the	‘major	recipients’	of	Hong	Kong’s	outward	 direct	 investments.	 A	 total	 of	 10	 countries	 are	 listed	 including	mainland	 China,	 the	Cayman	Islands,	and	the	British	Virgin	Islands.	See	the	External	Direct	Investment	Statistics	of	Hong	 Kong	 dataset,	 available	 at	https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp260.jsp?productCode=B1040003.	
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ministries	and	other	state	bodies,	its	actual	function	is	still	not	clear.	Since	the	PRC	 favours	 a	 direct	 (bilateral)	 foreign	 aid	 system,	 the	 role	 of	 all	 these	 state	institutions	remains	immense.		As	 we	 have	 seen,	 Beijing	 does	 not	 use	 a	 concept	 of	 Official	 Development	Assistance	 like	 the	 one	 employed	 by	 the	 OECD	 (for	 details	 of	 the	 differences	between	 the	OECD’s	definition	and	 the	Chinese	understanding	of	 FA,	 see,	 e.g.,	Grimm	 2011;	 Lum	 et	 al.	 2009;	Wolf,	Wang,	 and	Warner	 2013).	 According	 to	Chinese	policy	documents,	FA	covers	three	types	of	funding:	grants	(gratis	aid),	interest-free	 loans,	and	concessional	 loans.	Grants	support	 the	construction	of	hospitals,	 schools,	 and	 other	 social	 welfare	 infrastructures,	 including	 both	technical	assistance	and	humanitarian	aid.	Interest-free	loans	are	meant	to	help	the	recipient	country	build	public	facilities	and	relate	to	projects	that	 improve	living	standards.	Lastly,	concessional	loans	are	provided	for	projects,	including	infrastructure,	which	have	both	economic	and	social	benefits	(Information	Office	of	the	State	Council	the	PRC	2011).	In	practice,	Chinese	FA	also	includes	aid	for	the	 military	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 sports	 facilities,	 both	 of	 which	 are	traditionally	excluded	from	ODA.	It	is,	however,	not	only	the	gap	between	Chinese	FA	and	the	OECD	development	assistance	that	presents	a	problem.	Chinese	FA	is	difficult	to	quantify.	Back	in	2009,	some	scholars	lamented	that	the	PRC	did	not	publicly	 release	 any	 foreign	 aid	 statistics	 (Lum	 et	 al.	 2009),	 and	 today	 the	situation	is	no	better.		Because	of	the	lack	of	systematic,	transparent,	and	representative	FA	data	from	the	PRC,	researchers	in	this	area	have	only	one	option,	i.e.	to	establish	their	own	dataset.	 I	used	FA	data	from	AidData	and	particularly	from	the	Global	Chinese	Official	Finance	Dataset.	The	dataset	 tracks	official	Chinese	overseas	 financing	between	2000	and	2014	and	is	seen	as	the	best	resource	to	date	in	an	otherwise	poorly	charted	area.	The	AidData	dataset	relies	on	an	open-source	data	collection	and	triangulation	methodology	(for	more	details	see	Dreher	et	al.	2017;	Strange	et	al.	2017).	This	tracks	Official	Development	Assistance-like	flows,	Other	Official	Flows	(OOF)	and	Vague	Official	Finance	(VOF).	ODA-like	flows	include	technical	assistance,	 scholarships,	 concessional	 loans,	 debt	 relief,	 and	 grants	 for	development.	 OOF	 covers	 non-concessional	 loans	 for	 development,	 export	credits,	commercial	loans,	grants	for	representatives’	events,	and	funds	for	the	Confucius	Institutes.	VOF	relates	to	flows	that	cannot	be	classified	as	ODA-like	or	OOF-like	because	of	a	lack	of	information	(Strange	et	al.	2017).	AidData	tracks	not	only	actual	 flows	but	also	pledges,	which	are	significant	for	researchers	of	dollar	diplomacy.		Unfortunately	the	AidData	dataset	does	not	cover	the	period	2015-2018	and	so	a	separate	 dataset	 had	 to	 be	 created	 for	 these	 years.	Working	with	 a	 group	 of	Master’s	students,	 I	used	Google	and	LexisNexis	 to	 track	Chinese	FA	 including	pledges.7	 Information	 about	 the	 scope	 of	 a	 country’s	 FA	 was	 retrieved	 from	Chinese	 sources	 (media,	 ministries,	 embassies,	 and	 political	 representatives)	along	with	 sources	 in	 recipient	 countries	 (local	media,	 government	ministries	and	 agencies,	 and	 political	 representatives).	 The	 findings	were	 cross-checked	against	international	media	and	academic	publications.	Details	of	loans	to	Latin	American	 countries	 were	 retrieved	 from	 the	 China-Latin	 America	 Finance	Database	(Gallagher	and	Myers	2017).	Where	different	values	were	identified	for	the	same	item,	the	lower	amount	was	listed.			
 7	Given	 the	 limited	scope	of	 this	article,	 these	data	are	not	presented	here.	Further	details	 can,	however,	be	provided	on	request.	Please	contact	waisova@kap.zcu.cz.	
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2.4	Bilateral	Trade	Agreements	and	Other	Treaties	on	Economic	Profit			The	 idea	 that	 bilateral	 trade	 agreements	 (BTAs)	 and	 other	 economic	 treaties	might	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 profits	 is	 well	 established	 among	 both	international	 trade	 scholars	 and	 practitioners.	 BTAs	 are	 believed	 to	 open	 up	opportunities	for	exporters	and	investors	to	expand	their	businesses.	They	can	also	 improve	 market	 access,	 stimulate	 competition	 among	 domestic	 players,	reduce	or	eliminate	tariffs	and	quotas,	and	encourage	investment,	productivity,	and	innovation	(Baggs	and	Brandner	2006;	Goyal	and	Joshi	2006).	Since	China	is	a	rapidly	growing	market,	gaining	privileged	access	to	it	is	seen	as	a	gateway	to	prosperity.	 My	 research	 thus,	 examined	 the	 existence	 of	 BTAs	 and	 other	economic	 and	 trade	 treaties	 between	 particular	 countries	 and	 China.	 For	 all	identified	treaties,	the	date	when	Beijing	or	the	recipient	country	announced	the	beginning	 of	 negotiations	 was	 recorded.	 The	 logic	 here	 was	 that	 the	 start	 of	negotiations	 reflected	 the	 promise	 of	 economic	 profit	 in	 the	 relatively	 near	future.	 Data	 on	 BTAs	 and	 other	 agreements	 were	 drawn	 from	 the	 UNCTAD	Investment	Policy	Hub’s	dataset	of	bilateral	and	multilateral	trade	and	economic	agreements,	the	WTO	Regional	Trade	Agreements	Information	System,	and	the	online	archives	of	the	ministries	of	commerce,	ministries	of	foreign	affairs,	and	embassies	 of	 China	 and	 the	 relevant	 countries.	 All	 findings	were	 triangulated	using	information	from	local	and	international	media.			2.5	Confucius	Institute		Like	other	countries,	China	seeks	to	enhance	its	international	reputation,	and	it	has	 created	a	 special	 body	 called	 the	Confucius	 Institute	 (CI)	with	 this	 aim	 in	mind.	Though	the	CI	began	as	a	non-profit	initiative,	the	Chinese	government	has	operated	these	organisations	since	2004,	and	at	the	end	of	2018,	there	were	525	CIs	in	142	countries	(Hanban	2018).	The	CI	is	a	Chinese	Ministry	of	Education	programme	financed	through	foreign	aid,	whose	official	mission	includes	sharing	information	‘about	Chinese	language	and	culture’	and	providing	‘[a]	platform	for	cultural	exchanges	between	China	and	 the	world	 […]	and	a	bridge	reinforcing	friendship	and	cooperation	between	China	and	the	rest	of	 the	world’	 (Hanban	2018).	 Hanban,	 a	 public	 institution	 affiliated	 with	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education,	administers	 CIs	 and	 the	 Chinese	 government	 provides	 an	 administrator,	teachers,	and	funding	through	this	agency.	Although	CIs	are	set	up	in	partnership	with	the	recipient	country,	the	Hanban-appointed	administrator	has	the	final	say	over	 their	operations	 and	activities,	 thus	 ensuring	 that	Beijing	 retains	 control	over	every	CI.		While	CIs	certainly	carry	out	educational	and	cultural	activities,	they	are	also	as	experts	 (Harting	 2015;	 Stambach	 2017;	 Starr	 2009)	 note,	 an	 important	diplomatic	and	 financial	 tool	 for	 the	Chinese	government,	which	uses	 them	to	channel	funds	and	communicate	specific	strategic	narratives	about	China	and	its	place	in	the	world.	Among	the	purposes	for	which	Beijing	use	CIs	are	to	attract	the	 interest	 of	 local	 populations;	 to	 sway	 public	 opinion	 in	 China’s	 favour;	 to	recruit	locals	for	projects;	to	manage	debates	on	sensitive	issues	like	Taiwan	and	Tibet;	 to	 advance	 foreign	 policy	 interests;	 to	 promote	 cooperation	 with	 local	businesses;	and	to	create	market	opportunities	(Custer	et	al.	2018;	Lien	and	Oh	2014;	 Lien	 et	 al.	 2012).	Many	 countries	 are	 interested	 in	working	with	CIs	 in	order	to	court	Chinese	investors.		Given	this	background,	the	presence	of	CIs	 in	countries	that	have	shifted	their	loyalties	from	Taiwan	to	China	is	highly	relevant.	Unfortunately,	there	has	long	
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been	 a	 lack	 of	 quantitative	 data	 concerning	 the	 resources	 being	 channelled	through	CIs.	We	can	however,	at	least	access	information	about	the	emergence	of	CIs	in	particular	countries.	The	establishment	of	a	CI	which	is	also	used	to	channel	funds	 would	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 Beijing	 is	 using	 dollar	 diplomacy	 and	expanding	its	influence	in	the	target	country.	Information	about	the	existence	of	CIs	was	retrieved	from	Hanban’s	website	and	confirmed	based	on	details	on	the	website	of	the	particular	CI	and	local	media	reports.			2.6	Approved	Destination	Status		China	introduced	an	Approved	Destination	Status	(ADS)	policy	in	the	early	1990s	to	 address	 the	 growing	 interest	 of	 Chinese	 citizens	 in	 foreign	 travel.	While	 in	1993	 3.74	 million	 Chinese	 citizens	 travelled	 overseas,	 in	 2014	 the	 number	exceeded	 100	 million	 (National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 in	 China	 2016).	 ADS	 is	granted	to	partner	countries	under	a	bilateral	governmental	agreement	which	allows	 those	 countries	 to	 receive	 tourist	 groups	 from	 China.	 As	 of	 2018,	 156	countries	had	been	given	this	status.	The	granting	of	ADS	is	understood	to	be	a	sign	of	China’s	support	(Chen	and	Duggan	2016;	Tse	2013).	While	in	1995,	the	average	 Chinese	 tourist	 spent	 approximately	 820	 USD	 per	 trip,	 in	 2014,	 this	figure	had	risen	to	about	1500	USD	(UNWTO	2017).	ADS	is,	thus,	clearly	a	source	of	 financial	 profit.	 ADS-related	 data	 were	 obtained	 from	 the	 website	 of	 the	Chinese	Ministry	of	Culture	and	Tourism.	These	findings	were	triangulated	using	data	from	official	tourism	and	foreign	affairs	bodies	in	recipient	countries	and	local	media	reports.			2.7	 Participation	 in	 a	 Multilateral	 Institution	 Managed	 and	 Funded	 by	China		The	economic	and	political	rise	of	China	has	led	to	a	widening	of	the	country’s	international	 engagement	 strategies.	 In	 particular,	 the	 PRC	 has	 established	several	cooperative	frameworks	that	should	pave	the	way	for	its	economic	and	political	 progress	 in	 different	 regions.	 These	 cooperative	 frameworks	 are	managed	 and	 funded	 by	 China,	 and	 they	 connect	 the	 PRC	 with	 potential	cooperating	 countries.	 These	 projects	 include	 the	 Forum	 on	 China-Africa	Cooperation	(FOCAC),	the	Forum	for	Economic	and	Trade	Co-operation	between	China	and	Portuguese-speaking	Countries	(Forum	Macau),	One	Belt,	One	Road	(OBOR)	 and	 the	 Forum	 of	 China	 and	 the	 Community	 of	 Latin	 American	 and	Caribbean	States	(China-CELAC	Forum).			The	FOCAC	was	established	in	2000	as	an	institutional	framework	for	political	dialogue	and	economic	cooperation	between	China	and	Africa.	The	framework	works	 mainly	 through	 a	 system	 of	 ministerial	 conferences	 that	 should	 bring	together	Chinese	and	African	 foreign	affairs	and	 finance	ministers	every	 three	years.	 The	FOCAC	 secretariat	 is	 located	 in	 the	Chinese	MFA,	which	 also	has	 a	coordinating	role.	Beijing	proposes	projects	and	funding	through	the	FOCAC	but	projects	are	usually	coordinated	through	separate	bilateral	arrangements	in	the	implementation	phase.	In	2006,	China	pledged	to	route	5	billion	USD	through	the	FOCAC.	In	2012,	this	pledge	increased	to	20	billion	USD,	and	at	the	2018	FOCAC	summit,	Beijing	promised	another	60	billion	USD	(FOCAC	n.d.).			Forum	Macau	was	launched	in	2003.	An	initiative	by	China’s	central	government,	the	 project	was	 established	 together	with	 Portuguese-speaking	 countries	 and	with	the	cooperation	of	the	Macao	Special	Administrative	Region.	Forum	Macao	is	 a	 system	 of	 multilateral	 intergovernmental	 cooperation	 that	 promotes	
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economic	 exchange	 and	 trade	 and	 uses	 Macao	 as	 a	 connecting	 hub	 among	participants.	In	2010,	Beijing	announced	an	initial	budget	of	1	billion	USD	for	the	forum	(Macauhub	2017b).		One	Belt,	One	Road	(OBOR)	was	established	in	2013	and	has	an	estimated	value	of	900	billion	USD	(Phillips	2017).	The	project	has	two	parts:	the	Economic	Land	Belt	 and	 the	 Maritime	 Silk	 Road.	 OBOR	 aims	 to	 offload	 China’s	 industrial	overcapacity	and	infrastructure	development	capital	and	improve	the	country’s	connectivity	 with	 the	 world.	 Beijing	 is	 currently	 planning	 or	 carrying	 out	construction	and	other	projects	 in	 countries	 along	 these	 routes.	At	 the	end	of	2018,	OBOR	included	72	countries.			The	 China-CELAC	 Forum	 is	 the	 cooperative	 framework	 between	 Beijing	 and	countries	from	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean.	Launched	in	2014,	the	forum	had	its	first	ministerial	level	meeting	in	2015.	This	arrangement	includes	several	thematic	sub-forums	such	as	the	China-LAC	Infrastructure	Cooperation	Forum	and	the	China-LAC	Business	Summit.	In	2014,	Beijing	announced	a	35-billion	USD	financing	facility	package	for	the	forum	(MFA	of	China	2016,	39).		Information	 about	 participation	 in	 particular	 bodies	 was	 retrieved	 from	 the	online	 archive	 of	 the	 Chinese	MFA	 as	well	 as	 the	 foreign	 affairs	ministries	 of	specific	 countries	 and	 the	 website	 of	 the	 given	 body.	 These	 sources	 were	triangulated	 using	 information	 from	 local	 and	 international	 media.	 The	usefulness	 of	 this	 indicator	 is,	 of	 course,	 limited	 because	 several	 of	 these	institutions	were	only	established	recently.				
3	CASE	STUDIES			The	 following	 section	 contains	 13	 country	 case	 studies	 which	 each	 present	empirical	data	about	all	of	the	independent	variables	considered	in	this	study	(for	a	summary	see	Table	2).	The	case	studies	are	listed	chronologically	based	on	the	date	 when	 the	 country	 established	 diplomatic	 ties	 with	 the	 PRC.	 Each	 study	includes	a	short	analysis	of	the	change	in	diplomatic	position	along	with	findings	for	the	independent	variables;	accompanying	graphs	depict	volumes	and	related	trends.	These	graphs	track	the	ten-year	period	beginning	four	years	before	the	diplomatic	shift	and	extending	through	the	year	of	that	change	and	the	next	five	years.																	
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TABLE	2:	SUMMARY	OF	INDEPENDENT	VARIABLES	
		
Liberia	Relations	 between	 China	 and	 Liberia	 have	 been	 broken	 and	 re-established	several	times	since	1977	when	the	two	states	first	formed	diplomatic	ties.	Liberia	severed	its	ties	with	Taiwan	for	the	last	time	in	October	2003	and	proceeded	to	re-establish	relations	with	the	PRC	(Embassy	of	the	PRC	in	Liberia	n.d).	China-Liberia	relations	reached	the	new	peak	in	2013.	Since	then,	newly	financed	by	China	and	by	Chinese	companies,	constructed	projects	included	the	setting	up	of	public	buildings,	 sports	stadium,	health	delivery	and	educational	 facilities	and	telecommunications	 sectors.	 During	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Ebola	 virus,	 China	responded	with	medical	aid	and	cash.	In	2011,	Beijing	sent	a	team	to	support	the	UN	peacekeeping	operation	and	it	also	undertook	millions	of	dollars'	worth	of	projects	 to	 support	 the	Liberian	army	and	 security	 apparatus	 (Gray	2018).	 In	2018	 both	 countries	 signed	 the	 new	 maritime	 deal	 which	 also	 means	 that	Liberian	flag	bearing	vessels	will	get	a	preferential	rate	for	tonnage	dues	when	visiting	Chinese	ports.		
	FIGURE	1:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	LIBERIA	
		Existence	of	bilateral	trade	or	other	economic	agreements:	Beijing	terminated	all	its	 projects	 and	 treaties	with	 Liberia	 in	 1989,	 not	 long	 after	 Liberia	 switched	allegiance	to	Taiwan.	Current	Chinese-Liberian	agreements	on	trade,	economic	
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cooperation,	and	development	were	all	negotiated	after	October	2003	(MFA	of	Liberia	n.d.).	Beijing	used	the	2006	FOCAC	summit	as	an	opportunity	to	negotiate	several	economic	cooperation	and	development	treaties	with	Liberia	(Moumouni	2014).		Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes,	since	2008.		Award	of	ADS:	None	at	the	end	of	2018.	Participation	in	a	multilateral	institution	managed	by	China:	FOCAC	membership	since	December	2003;	OBOR	membership	since	2018.		
Dominica	China	and	the	Commonwealth	of	Dominica	have	had	a	diplomatic	relationship	since	March	2004.	Since	then	China	has	provided	to	Dominica	assistance	in	areas	of	 infrastructure,	agriculture,	education	and	medical	 services	 In	October	2018	the	two	countries	signed	economic	and	technical	cooperation	agreement	worth	millions	of	dollars.	The	areas	in	which	agreements	are	expected	to	be	signed	in	2019	 include	 tourism,	 agriculture	 and	 free	 zones.	 While	 Dominican-Chinese	relations	prosper,	the	US	warned	Dominica	not	to	accept	more	financial	aid	from	Beijing	(Caribbean	Council	n.d.b).		
	FIGURE	2:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	DOMINICA	
		Existence	 of	 bilateral	 trade	 or	 other	 economic	 agreements:	 Several	 economic,	trade,	development,	and	military	aid	treaties	exist	between	Dominica	and	China.	All	were	signed	after	March	2004	(Dominica	News	Online	2017).			Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes,	since	2015.	The	CI	located	in	Barbados	is	shared	with	Dominica.	Award	of	ADS:	Awarded	in	the	summer	of	2004.	Participation	in	a	multilateral	institution	managed	by	China:	China-CELAC	Forum	member	since	2014;	OBOR	negotiations	started	in	2018.		
Senegal	Senegal	established	diplomatic	ties	with	the	PRC	in	1973.	This	relationship	lasted	until	1996	when	Senegal	resumed	relations	with	Taiwan.	PRC-Senegal	relations	were	restored	 in	October	2005	when	Senegal	cut	 ties	with	Taiwan.	Since	then	Beijing	 invested	 in	 construction	 and	 infrastructure	 projects.	 In	 2019	 Senegal	signed	cooperation	documents	with	China	under	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	and	Beijing	granted	Senegal	a	role	as	co-chair	of	FOCAC.	
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FIGURE	3:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	SENEGAL	
		Existence	 of	 bilateral	 trade	 or	 other	 economic	 agreements:	 Agreements	suspended	in	1996	were	restored	in	October	2005	when	new	trade	talks	began	between	the	two	countries	(State	Council	of	the	PRC	2005).	While	some	Chinese	companies	 stayed	 in	 Senegal	 after	 1996,	 this	 was	 on	 a	 strictly	 private	 basis	(Gehrold	 and	Tietze	2011).	New	 rounds	of	 economic,	 trade,	 and	development	treaty	negotiations	opened	up	in	2016	and	again	 in	2018	(Saudi	Press	Agency	2018).			Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes,	since	2012.		Award	of	ADS:	Awarded	in	2016.	Participation	 in	 a	 multilateral	 institution	managed	 by	 China:	 FOCAC	member	since	2006;	OBOR	negotiations	started	in	2018.	
	
Grenada	Grenada	 recognised	 Taiwan	 since	 1989	 but	 by	 January	 2005,	 it	 had	 resumed	diplomatic	 relations	 with	 Beijing.	 When	 negotiations	 with	 the	 PRC	 began,	Grenada	expressed	 its	hopes	of	obtaining	reconstruction	aid	 to	repair	damage	from	Hurricane	Ivan	(BBC	2005).	The	Taiwanese	media	reported	that	the	Chinese	Red	 Cross	 had	 provided	 50,000	 USD	 to	 Grenadine	 political	 representatives	(Taipei	Times	2005).	No	other	source	confirmed	this	report.		
	FIGURE	4:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	GRENADA	
		Existence	of	bilateral	trade	or	other	economic	agreements:	Agreements	between	the	PRC	and	Grenada	were	suspended	in	1989.	Since	January	2005,	new	treaties	have	been	negotiated	and	concluded.			
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Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	No	CI	has	been	established	but	a	Confucius	Classroom	has	been	in	place	since	2015.	Award	of	ADS:	Awarded	in	2006.	Participation	 in	 a	 multilateral	 institution	 managed	 by	 China:	 Member	 of	 the	China-CELAC	Forum	since	2014.	
	
Chad		China	 suspended	 its	 diplomatic	 ties	 with	 Chad	 in	 1997	 when	 the	 country	recognised	Taiwan.	In	August	2006,	Chad	and	the	PRC	resumed	their	relationship	after	Chad	accepted	Beijing’s	One-China	Policy.	Since	then	oil	investment	looks	set	to	play	a	key	part	in	China’s	continuing	engagement	with	the	country.	After	the	World	Bank	in	2018	withdrew	its	funding	for	the	Chadian	government	on	the	grounds	that	it	had	violated	their	bilateral	agreement,	Beijing	quickly	seized	the	opportunity	 to	 extend	 its	 engagement	 and	 offered	 to	 build	 roads,	 bridges,	hospitals,	schools	and	even	airports.	
	FIGURE	5:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	CHAD	
		Existence	 of	 bilateral	 trade	 or	 other	 economic	 agreements:	 Negotiations	 of	economic,	trade,	technical,	and	development	cooperation	have	been	under	way	since	August	2006.	Beijing	is	mainly	interested	in	Chadian	oil	(Dittgen	and	Large	2012).		Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	None.	Award	of	ADS:	None	at	the	end	of	2018.	Participation	 in	 a	 multilateral	 institution	managed	 by	 China:	 FOCAC	member	since	August	2006;	OBOR	negotiations	started	in	2017.		
Costa	Rica	Costa	 Rica	 and	 the	 PRC	 first	 held	 talks	 in	 the	 1990s	 to	 explore	 setting	 up	diplomatic	 relations.	 These	 efforts	 were	 thwarted,	 however	 (Casas-Zamora	2009),	and	the	two	states	did	not	establish	diplomatic	ties	until	June	2007.	Later,	it	 was	 revealed	 that	 the	 PRC	 had	 pledged	 foreign	 aid	 to	 Costa	 Rica	 under	 a	memorandum	on	setting	up	diplomatic	relations.	Under	this	deal,	Beijing	agreed	to	buy	300	million	USD	in	bonds	and	give	130	million	USD	in	aid	(Bowley	2008).	
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FIGURE	6:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	COSTA	RICA	
		Existence	 of	 bilateral	 trade	 or	 other	 economic	 agreements:	 All	 treaty	 and	agreement	negotiations	between	Costa	Rica	and	the	PRC	began	after	June	2007.	Free	 trade	agreement	 talks	were	announced	 in	2008	(Casas-Zamora	2009).	 In	2015,	the	two	countries	announced	a	strategic	trade	and	economic	cooperation	partnership.			Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes.	An	agreement	was	signed	in	2008.		Award	of	ADS:	Awarded	in	the	autumn	of	2007.	Participation	in	a	multilateral	institution	managed	by	China:	China-CELAC	Forum	member	since	2014;	OBOR	negotiations	started	in	2018.		
Malawi	Malawi	and	the	PRC	formed	diplomatic	ties	in	January	2008	though	Malawi	later	backdated	 the	commencement	 to	December	2007.	Taipei	has	claimed	that	 the	two	states	also	signed	a	secret	agreement	about	the	transfer	of	approximately	6-billion	 USD	 in	 aid	 to	 Malawi	 once	 diplomatic	 links	 had	 been	 established	(Wikileaks	2008).	No	other	party	has	confirmed	this	allegation.		
	FIGURE	7:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	MALAWI	
		Existence	 of	 bilateral	 trade	 or	 other	 economic	 agreements:	 In	 March	 2008,	Malawi	 and	 the	 PRC	 concluded	 their	 first	 bilateral	 agreement	 on	 trade,	investment,	 and	 technical	 cooperation.	 In	 May	 the	 same	 year,	 they	 signed	 a	memorandum	on	future	cooperation	(Chirombo	2017).		
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Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes.	A	cooperation	agreement	was	signed	in	2013.	Award	of	ADS:	None,	but	 in	2018	 the	Chinese	embassy	 in	Malawi	encouraged	Chinese	tourists	to	visit	the	country	(MW	Nation	2018).	Participation	 in	 a	 multilateral	 institution	managed	 by	 China:	 FOCAC	member	since	2008	(invited	to	participate	as	an	observer	in	2006)	(State	Council	of	the	PRC	2006).		
The	Gambia	The	Gambia	broke	off	ties	with	Taiwan	in	2013.	In	March	2016,	Beijing	and	the	Gambia	 normalised	 their	 diplomatic	 relations.	 In	 2017	 Beijing	 committed	 to	invest	75	million	USD	for	the	construction	of	roads	and	bridges	in	the	country.	In	June	 2019	 Gambia	 reaffirmed	 its	 commitment	 to	 the	 one-China	 policy,	consequently	Beijing	mentioned	it	would	promote	the	Gambia	as	a	destination	for	Chinese	tourists	(Office	of	the	President	2019).	
	FIGURE	8:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	THE	GAMBIA	
		Existence	of	bilateral	trade	or	other	economic	agreements:	In	2017,	the	PRC	and	the	Gambia	signed	a	memorandum	on	economic,	trade,	investment,	and	technical	cooperation.	The	two	states	launched	a	joint	committee	on	economics	and	trade.		Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Negotiations	started	in	2018.	Award	of	ADS:	None	at	the	end	of	2018.	Participation	 in	 a	 multilateral	 institution	managed	 by	 China:	 FOCAC	member	since	2017	(invited	to	take	part	as	an	observer	in	2006)	(State	Council	of	the	PRC	2006);	OBOR	negotiations	started	in	2018.		
Sao	Tomé	e	Príncipe	In	2013,	Sao	Tomé	announced	China’s	plans	to	open	a	trade	office	in	the	country.	Observers	noted	the	Chinese	interest	in	Sao	Tomé’s	oil	resources.	In	2016,	Sao	Tomé	revealed	it	had	cut	ties	with	Taiwan,	and	in	December	2016,	it	established	diplomatic	 relations	 with	 the	 PRC	 (Reuters	 2016).	 Taipei	 claims	 that	 before	shifting	its	loyalty	to	the	PRC,	Sao	Tomé	demanded	‘an	astronomical	amount	of	financial	 help’	 from	 Taipei	 (BBC	 2016).	 Information	 appeared	 that	 China	 has	pledged	to	provide	the	archipelago	with	millions	of	dollars	for	the	modernization	of	 its	 international	 airport	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 deep-sea	 container	 port	(Crabtree	2018).	
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FIGURE	9:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	SAO	TOME	
		Existence	 of	 bilateral	 trade	 or	 other	 economic	 agreements:	 The	 first	 treaties	between	Sao	Tomé	and	the	PRC	were	signed	in	April	2017	(Macau	2017).	Earlier,	in	October	2015,	Sao	Tomé	announced	it	had	agreed	to	build	a	deep	sea	port	in	partnership	with	China.			Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	An	agreement	to	set	up	a	CI	was	signed	in	2018.	Award	of	ADS:	In	2017,	Sao	Tomé’s	foreign	affairs	ministry	declared	the	start	of	ADS	negotiations	(Macauhub	2017a).		Participation	 in	 a	 multilateral	 institution	managed	 by	 China:	 FOCAC	member	since	September	2018	(invited	to	take	part	as	an	observer	in	2006)	(State	Council	of	the	PRC	2006);	Forum	Macao	member	since	2017;	OBOR	negotiations	started	in	2018.		
Panama	Between	2009	and	2010,	Panama	made	efforts	to	form	diplomatic	ties	with	the	PRC.	However,	Beijing	rejected	this	offer	because	of	concerns	about	jeopardising	its	 improving	 relationship	with	 Taiwan	 (Wikileaks	 2011).	 Instead,	 a	 Panama-China	 trade	 development	 office	 was	 opened	 in	 Panama.	 New	 negotiations	between	the	two	states	began	in	2017	leading	to	the	establishment	of	diplomatic	ties	in	June	of	that	year.	
	FIGURE	10:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	PANAMA	
		Existence	of	bilateral	trade	or	other	economic	agreements:	Since	the	summer	of	2017,	 Panama	 and	 the	 PRC	 have	 concluded	 more	 than	 28	 diplomatic	 and	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     93 
 
 
 
investment	agreements.	Panama	now	has	most	favoured	nation	trade	status,	and	in	July	2018,	negotiations	of	a	free	trade	agreement	began	(The	Guardian	2018a).		Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Negotiations	started	in	2016,	and	a	CI	has	existed	since	September	2017.	Award	of	ADS:	Awarded	in	2018.	Participation	in	a	multilateral	institution	managed	by	China:	China-CELAC	Forum	member	since	the	summer	of	2017;	OBOR	negotiations	started	in	2018.		
Burkina	Faso	Beijing	has	had	unofficial	contact	with	some	Burkinabe	politicians	since	2005.	Since	2011,	Sino-Burkinabe	Friendship	Forum,	a	private	organisation	in	Burkina	Faso,	 has	 been	 allowed	 to	 issue	 Chinese	 visas	 to	 Burkina	 Faso	 citizens	 and	residents	 (Cabestan	 2017).	 The	 two	 countries	 formed	 diplomatic	 ties	 in	May	2018.	 In	a	media	 interview	that	year,	Burkinabe	Foreign	Minister	Alpha	Barry	revealed	that	the	PRC	had	offered	Burkina	Faso	50	million	USD	in	2017	in	return	for	diplomatic	recognition	(Bloomberg	2018).	
	FIGURE	11:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	BURKINA	FASO	
		Existence	of	bilateral	trade	or	other	economic	agreements:	Negotiations	started	at	the	end	of	2018.	Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes,	since	May	2018.		Award	of	ADS:	None	at	the	end	of	2018.	Participation	 in	 a	 multilateral	 institution	managed	 by	 China:	 FOCAC	member	since	August	2018	(invited	to	take	part	as	an	observer	in	2006)	(State	Council	of	the	PRC	2006).		
The	Dominican	Republic	China	and	the	Dominican	Republic	first	held	talks	on	diplomatic	recognition	in	2004.	Those	negotiations	resulted	in	the	opening	of	Dominican	trade	offices	in	Hong	Kong	and	Beijing	(Wikileaks	2004).	Commercial	links	developed	over	the	next	 few	years,	with	particular	progress	between	2012	and	2014	when	China	approved	the	import	of	Dominican	cigars	(Xinhuanet	2018b).	In	November	2017,	talks	began	on	establishing	official	relations	and	those	relations	commenced	in	May	2018	(Dominica	Today	2017).		
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FIGURE	12:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	THE	DOMINICAN	REPUBLIC	
		Existence	 of	 bilateral	 trade	 or	 other	 economic	 agreements:	 BTA	 negotiations	started	in	May	2018	although	some	commercial	ties	existed	before	2018.	As	of	December	 2018,	 the	 PRC	 and	 the	 Dominican	 Republic	 had	 concluded	 18	agreements	(Caribbean	Council	n.d	a).			Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes,	since	the	autumn	of	2018.		Award	of	ADS:	Awarded	in	June	2018.	Participation	in	a	multilateral	institution	managed	by	China:	Participated	in	the	China-CELAC	Forum	for	the	first	time	in	January	2018.	
	
El	Salvador	El	 Salvador	 and	 the	 PRC	 formed	 diplomatic	 ties	 in	 August	 2018.	 Previously,	however,	the	leftist	party	Farabundo	Martí	National	Liberation	Front	maintained	relations	with	Beijing	(Wikileaks	2005).	Both	Taiwan	and	the	United	States	were	outraged	 by	 this	 connection	 and	 have	 accused	 El	 Salvador	 of	making	 various	financial	 demands.	 In	 particular,	 Taiwan	 claims	 that	 El	 Salvador	 asked	 it	 to	provide	an	‘astronomical	sum’	for	a	port	project	and	that	when	Taipei	responded	coldly,	El	Salvador	launched	talks	with	Beijing	(The	Guardian	2018b).	El	Salvador	has	denied	this	allegation.	Observers	say	it	is	unclear	whether	China	offered	any	specific	aid	or	economic	incentive	to	El	Salvador	(Reuters	2018b).	
	FIGURE	13:	CHINESE	DOLLAR	DIPLOMACY:	EL	SALVADOR	
		Existence	of	bilateral	trade	or	other	economic	agreements:	The	first	negotiations	started	in	the	autumn	of	2018	(Xinhuanet	2018a).	Presence	of	the	Confucius	Institute:	Yes,	since	May	2018.		
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Award	of	ADS:	None	at	the	end	of	2018.	Participation	in	a	multilateral	institution	managed	by	China:	China-CELAC	Forum	member	 since	August	 2018;	 negotiations	 about	OBOR	membership	 started	 in	2018.		
	
4	 CONCLUSION:	 YES,	 BEIJING	 IS	 USING	 DOLLAR	 DIPLOMACY,	
HOWEVER	 THE	 MOTIVATION	 OF	 THE	 RECIPIENT	 STATES	 IS	 NOT	
ALWAYS	 ECONOMICAL	 AND	 THE	 MOTIVATION	 OF	 BEIJING	 IS	 NOT	
ALWAYS	TO	ABANDON	TAIWAN		This	 article	 responds	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 Beijing	 has	 been	 using	 economic	incentives	to	cause	recipient	nations	to	switch	their	diplomatic	allegiances,	that	is,	 to	 break	 off	 ties	 with	 Taiwan	 and	 recognise	 the	 PRC.	 Based	 on	 the	 data	collected,	we	can	draw	a	number	of	conclusions	about	Chinese	dollar	diplomacy	and	 the	 causes	 and	 effects	 of	 the	 links	 between	 Beijing	 and	 Taiwan’s	 former	diplomatic	friends.		The	 empirical	 data	 shows	 that	 the	 PRC	 uses	 dollar	 diplomacy	 concerning	Taiwan’s	 diplomatic	 allies.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 eleven	 countries,	 capital	 flows	 or	economic	benefits	were	provided	before	diplomatic	ties	were	established	(Table	3).	The	new	diplomatic	 ties	between	 the	PRC	and	 individual	countries	 further	opened	the	door	to	the	flow	of	capital	and	economic	opportunities	and	relations.	These	 countries	 gained	 foreign	 aid,	 received	 approved	destination	 status,	 and	benefited	from	the	establishment	of	Confucius	Institutes.	Moreover	through	their	investments,	construction	contracts,	and	membership	of	multilateral	institutions	managed	by	China,	 they	were	able	 to	access	Chinese	 loans	and	other	 financial	resources.		However,	the	strategy	has	been	applied	to	various	recipient	countries	differently.	It	was	 clear	 from	 the	 same	data	 that	China	offered	virtually	none	of	Taiwan’s	friends	a	systematic	and	permanent	set	of	economic	incentives.	There	were	big	differences	 among	 the	 eleven	 countries	 where	 capital	 flows	 and	 economic	relations	were	identified	before	forming	diplomatic	ties.	The	data	did	not	point	to	any	pattern	of	flows,	or	incentives	and	offers	across	these	states.	The	graphs	in	 the	 case	 studies	 show	 that	 the	 volumes	 of	 capital	 flows	 like	 foreign	 direct	investment	and	foreign	aid	were	unstable	(only	in	the	case	of	Senegal	did	FDI	rise	for	four	successive	years)	and	even	after	diplomatic	ties	had	been	established,	the	conferral	of	economic	advantages	was	not	automatic.		Several	countries	did	not	receive	these	benefits	for	almost	a	decade.	Of	the	cases	examined	here,	there	were	two	countries,	Dominica	and	Grenada,	which	did	not	receive	any	significant	economic	profit	as	a	result	of	the	diplomatic	change	(for	more	information,	see	graphs	2	and	4	above).	While	the	reasons	for	this	warrant	more	exploration,	these	inquiries	exceed	the	scope	of	the	current	study.	And	in	states	like	Panama,	the	Dominican	Republic,	and	Sao	Tomé,	which	saw	the	biggest	input	of	capital	and	the	most	lucrative	economic	deals	including	the	setting	up	of	trade	and	economic	offices	and	contracts	China’s	use	of	dollar	diplomacy	leaves	several	unanswered	questions.	In	the	case	of	Panama,	Beijing	was	interested	in	making	use	of	 the	Panama	Canal	and	playing	a	part	 in	 its	 reconstruction	(The	Guardian	2018a).	Concerning	Sao	Tomé,	Beijing	was	keen	to	access	the	country’s	newly	discovered	offshore	oil	deposits	(Reuters	2013;	ABC	News	2016).	Finally,	the	Dominican	Republic	offered	tobacco,	rum,	minerals,	and	an	attractive	tourist	destination	in	response	to	the	growing	demands	of	the	Chinese	market	(Brito	and	
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Jianrong	2018).	In	the	cases	of	Panama	and	El	Salvador,	it	may	even	be	that,	as	several	observers	have	said	(Harris	2018;	Reuters	2018b;	Telesur	2018),	China’s	goal	is	not	to	suppress	Taiwan	but	to	undermine	the	US’s	power.	It	appears,	thus,	that	in	the	case	of	many	of	these	economic	alliances,	the	isolation	of	Taiwan	was	not	the	only	aim.	
	TABLE	3:	CAPITAL	FLOWS	AND	ECONOMIC	STIMULI	BEFORE	THE	DIPLOMATIC	SHIFT	
	*	For	acronyms	see	chart	2.	Source:	Author	based	on	empirical	data	from	case	studies.		The	experiences	of	Panama	and	the	Gambia	also	supported	the	view	that	China’s	actions	were	 not	 reckless	 or	 impetuous.	 During	 the	 administration	 of	 former	Taiwanese	president	Ma	(2008–2015)	at	 least,	cross-strait	relations	 improved	and	Beijing	was	hesitant	to	form	ties	with	Taiwan’s	diplomatic	allies.	The	fact	that	there	was	no	change	 in	 the	diplomatic	relations	with	Panama	and	the	Gambia	between	2007	and	2016	(Table	1),	even	as	both	these	states	expressed	interest	in	 joining	China’s	 side,	 suggests	 that	 the	PRC	adjusted	 its	 actions	and	policies	based	on	the	quality	of	its	relationship	with	Taiwan.	In	the	case	of	Panama,	the	lack	of	diplomatic	relations	may	even	be	seen	as	detrimental	to	Chinese	economic	interests	(Chinese	companies	were	excluded	from	construction	contract	bids	in	the	 country	 while	 Beijing	 faced	 the	 prospect	 of	 complicated	 international	transport	routes).	Even	so,	Beijing	postponed	establishing	diplomatic	ties.	
	TABLE	4:	CAPITAL	FLOWS	AND	ECONOMIC	STIMULI	AFTER	THE	DIPLOMATIC	SHIFT		
	*	Country	received	the	benefit	more	than	five	years	after	 the	diplomatic	switch.	Source:	Author	based	on	empirical	data	from	case	studies.		It	was	also	clear	that	recipient	countries	had	some	reservations	and	doubts	about	accepting	 Chinese	 money	 and	 offers	 and	 that	 Taiwan’s	 former	 (and	 current)	friends	recognised	potential	risks	as	well	as	benefits	arising	from	their	ties	with	
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the	PRC.	A	good	example	is	the	Malawi	government,	which	held	extended	debates	about	the	risks	of	entering	a	debt	trap	when	considering	Chinese	loans	(Ngozo	2011).	 In	 March	 2018,	 the	 Gambian	 parliament	 also	 rejected	 a	 framework	agreement	on	a	Chinese	concessional	loan	after	finding	out	that	the	agreement	was	not	transparent	enough	and	posed	several	risks	to	the	country	(Bah	2018).	Both	 these	 critical	 responses	 suggest	 that	 Beijing	 may	 need	 to	 revise	 and	transform	the	structure	and	tools	of	its	economic	diplomacy.		We	may	 conclude,	 then,	 that	 there	 is	 sufficiently	 conclusive	 empirical	 data	 to	confirm	China’s	use	of	dollar	diplomacy	vis-á-vis	Taiwan’s	diplomatic	allies.	For	most	of	these	countries,	their	diplomatic	recognition	of	the	PRC	has	enabled	rich	economic,	trade,	and	development	links	with	China	and	all	of	them	profited	from	the	 diplomatic	 change.	 However,	 there	 should	 be	 further	 discussions,	 if	 the	increase	in	capital	flows	and	economic	ties	were	only	motivated	by	the	interest	of	China	in	isolating	Taiwan.	
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ANALYTICAL	 IMAGES	 OF	 POLITICAL	 TRUST	 IN	
TIMES	 OF	 GLOBAL	 CHALLENGES.	 THE	 CASE	 OF	
SLOVENIA,	SPAIN	AND	SWITZERLAND			
Lluís	COROMINA	and	Simona	KUSTEC1	…………………………………………………………………….………………………………………		
The	main	aim	of	this	paper	 is	 to	disentangle	the	understanding	of	
political	 trust	by	analysing	 its	determinants	and	 trends	 in	 specific	
global	 crisis	 circumstances.	 Two	 fundamental	 perspectives	 of	
understandings	 of	 political	 trust	 as	 institutional	 and	 evaluation	
category	in	the	period	during	the	2002	to	2012	are	taken	into	focus,	
applying	 Switzerland,	 Spain	 and	 Slovenia	 as	 case	 study	 countries	
with	 different	 experiences	 of	 democratic	 development.	 The	aim	of	
the	study	is	to	see	whether,	and	how,	attitudes	towards	political	trust	
in	the	three	countries	potentially	changed	during	the	set	period	and	
according	 to	 the	 set	 institutional	 and	 evaluation	 perspectives	 of	
political	 trust.	 A	 multiple	 group	 confirmatory	 factor	 analysis	
(MGCFA)	 and	 posterior	 structural	 equation	 model	 (SEM)	 are	
specified,	applied	on	the	European	Social	Survey	(ESS)	dataset.	The	
study	confirms	that	the	perception	of	political	trust	is	significantly	
divided	 within	 various	 types	 of	 political	 institutions.	 Attitudes	 to	
political	 trust	 in	 various	 democracies	 differ	 within	 political	
institutions	 depending	 on	 whether	 they	 exist	 at	 a	 national	 or	
international	 level,	 or	whether	 they	 appear	 as	 individual	 political	
subject.	Attitudes	to	political	trust	are	also	affected	by	time	periods	
and	global	economic	challenges.	The	findings	point	to	the	need	for	
political	 institutions	 to	 perform	 in	 accordance	 with	 stable	
democratic	 patterns.	 Findings	 also	 point	 to	 the	 need	 for	 further	
research	 in	 order	 to	 track	 various	 prevailing	 characteristics	 of	
political	trust	in	variously	developed	democracies.	
	
Key	 words:	 political	 trust;	 political	 institutions;	 democracy;	multiple	group	confirmatory	factor	analysis;	posterior	structural	equation	model.	
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1	INTRODUCTION	
	 Trust	is	one	of	the	most	fundamental	research	areas	in	the	social	sciences.	Ever	popular,	but	at	the	same	time,	increasingly	complex,	ambiguous,	multi-layered,	and	elusive,	and	therefore,	a	highly	challenging	topic	of	research,	whether	taken	from	a	 conceptual	 or	 an	operational-measurement	perspective.	 It	 is	 therefore	unsurprising	 that	 the	 substantial	 body	 of	 ‘trust	 literature’	 has	 a	 considerable	number	of	studies	from	various	perspectives,	with	findings	that	are	frequently	contradictory	and	mutually	exclusive.		This	 paper	 focuses	 on	 the	 perceptions	 of	 political	 trust,	 and	 analyses	 two	fundamental	perspectives	of	its	understandings	-	the	institutional	and	evaluation	one.	 The	 focus	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 set	 in	 the	 period	 during	 the	 2002	 to	 2012,	considering	 economic	 crisis	 in	 that	 time	 in	 three	 European	 countries	 with	different	 rates	 of	 democratic	 development.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 study	 was	 to	 see	whether,	 and	 how,	 attitudes	 towards	 political	 trust	 in	 the	 three	 countries	potentially	changed	during	the	set	period	and	according	to	the	set	two	political	trust	perspectives.			Various	 typologies	 of	 political	 trust	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 referred	 literature,	addressing	various	perspectives.	For	the	purposes	of	the	paper	political	trust	is	set	into	its	institutional	and	evaluative	context.	The	institutional	perspective	of	political	trust	places	political	entities	at	the	heart	of	interest.	Here,	the	issue	of	political	trust	refers	to	trust	in	political	institutions,	which	are	either	understood	as	 one	 large	 complex	 entity,	 or	 as	 a	 set	 of	 individual,	 political	 institutional	constructs	with	 their	 own	 peculiarities	 and	 ‘modus	 of	 operandi’	 (Zmerli	 et	 al.	2007;	Hooghe	 2011).	 The	 individual	 political	 entities,	 or	 the	 ‘zipped’	 political	institution	 approach	 to	 measuring	 political	 trust	 is	 taken	 at	 the	 core	 of	 this	perspective	of	political	trust.		The	second	perspective	of	political	trust	addresses	its	evaluative	perspective.	It	focus	either	into	the	processes	and	structures	of	the	work	and	performance	of	political	institutions	(political	trust	as	a	so-called	specific	phenomenon),	or	into	general	 democratic	 processes	 and	 structures	 of	 a	 political	 regime	 and	 its	correspondence	 with	 political	 trust	 (political	 trust	 as	 a	 so-called	 diffuse	phenomenon)	 (Easton	1975;	Crozier,	Huntington	and	Watanuki	1975;	Kumlin	2002;	Newton	2006).	In	this	sense,	political	trust	can	be	understood	as	a	purely	political,	 or	 as	 a	 wider	 socio-cultural	 phenomenon	 (van	 Deth,	 Montero	 and	Westholm	 2007).	 It	 can	 ‘serve’	 to	 be	 either	 a	 dependent	 or	 independent	evaluation	 research	 variable.	 Among	 the	 so-called	 political	 factors,	 such	characteristics	 as	 satisfaction	 with	 democracy,	 patterns	 of	 political	 culture,	attitudes	 towards	 political	 participation,	 and	 political	 performance	 have	most	frequently	corresponded	to	political	trust	as	dependent	variable,	and	it	can	be	also	vice	versa	(Almond	and	Verba	1963;	Easton	1975;	March	and	Olsen	1984;	Mishler	 and	 Rose	 2001;	 Grönlund	 and	 Ferrera	 2007;	 Zmerli,	 Newton	 and	Montero	 2007;	 Marien	 and	 Hooghe	 2011).	 So-called	 ‘non-political	 factors’	primarily	focus	on	demographic,	economic,	educational	and	other	socio-cultural	attitudes	 towards	 political	 trust.	 For	 instance,	 it	 is	 predicted	 that	 the	 level	 of	education	or	gender	corresponds	to	 the	 level	of	political	 trust	detected	by	the	respondents	(Kaase	1999;	Letki	2004;	Mishler	and	Rose	2001;	Almond	and	Verba	1963;	Schiffman,	Thelen	and	Sherman	2010;	Zmerli	et	al.	2007).			In	this	paper,	both	of	the	exposed	approaches	to	political	trust	are	being	tested	in	 three	 European	 democracies	 with	 different	 experiences	 of	 democratic	
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development,2	 all	 of	 them	 having	 very	 specific	 political	 and	 economic	circumstances	 before	 and	 after	 the	 2009	 global	 economic	 crisis.	 When	considering	 the	 stated	 political	 trust	 perspectives,	 the	 study	 is	 expected	 to	provide	new	insights	into	the	following:		a) the	 complexity	 of	 general	 understanding	 of	 political	 trust	 as	 a	 unique	 or	construct-divided	institutional	phenomena,	with	a	special	focus	given	before	and	after	critical	crisis	circumstances	(‘institutional’	perspective).	b) the	role	of	political	and	non-political	 factors	 in	relation	to	the	 institutional	related	 perception	 of	 political	 trust	 before	 and	 after	 critical	 system-wide	circumstances	(‘evaluation’	perspective).			For	 analytical	 purposes,	 the	 dataset	 of	 the	 European	 Social	 Survey	 (ESS)	 is	obtained.	A	multiple	group	confirmatory	factor	analysis	(MGCFA)	and	posterior	structural	 equation	model	 (SEM)	are	 specified	 and	applied	 to	 three	European	countries	 in	 2004,	 before	 the	 2008	 global	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis,	immediately	after	the	crisis,	in	2010	and	later	in	2012.			
	
2	 POLITICAL	 TRUST	 AND	 THE	 INSTITUTIONAL	 STRUCTURE	 OF	
POLITICAL	ENTITIES		Political	trust	is	understood	first	and	foremost	as	an	institutional	phenomenon.	It	 is	most	often	approached	as	being	 either	 interpersonal	 (Almond	and	Verba	1963;	Putnam	1993;	Inglehart	1990)	or	system	(Easton	1975;	Mishler	and	Rose	2001;	Dalton	2000;	Levi	 and	Stoker	2000);	 and	either	 individual	 or	 collective	(Zmerli	et	al.	2007).			In	this	sense,	political	trust	is	most	often	considered	a	dependent	variable	with	special	relevance	in	the	relationships	between	citizens	and	political	authorities	or	 entities.	 These	 relationships	 can	 be	 understood	 on	 a	 single	 political	institutional	basis	or	on	an	individual	basis,	and	based	on	either	firmly,	formally	regulated	constitutional	and	legislative	norms	or	on	their	own	‘rules	of	the	game’	(Searing	1982).3			Many	authors	suggest	it	is	inappropriate	to	categorise	political	entities	as	single	political	 institutions.	 (Rohrschneider	 and	Whitefield	 2009;	 Zmerli	 et	 al.	 2007;	Marien	and	Hooghe	2011),	instead,	various	political	subjects	need	to	be	treated	as	a	set	of	 individual	entities	or	constructs	(Levi	and	Stoker	2000;	Pharr	et	al.	2000;	 Searing	 1982;	 Torney-Purta,	 Barber	 and	 Richardson	 2004).	 Results	confirm	the	argument	above	and	identified	differences	in	the	levels	of	political	trust	among	the	following	individual	groups	of	political	subjects	(Denters	et	al.	2007;	Hooghe	2011):	a)	individual	actors	(e.g.,	political	parties	and	politicians);	b)	regulating	institutions	(e.g.,	parliament,	government,	courts,	police,	army);	c)	
policy	 performance	 bodies	 (e.g.,	 economic,	 healthcare,	 education,	 and	 cultural	institutions;	 civil	 service,	 and	 so	 on);	 and	 d)	 international	 organisations	 (the	United	Nations).4		
 2	See	Table	5	in	Annex	for	the	key	descriptive	characteristics	of	the	democracies	of	the	countries	analysed:	Switzerland,	Spain	and	Slovenia.	3	In	real	life,	the	‘truth’	frequently	fell	somewhere	‘in-between’.	Politicians	do	not	implement	the	rules	 of	 the	 game	 as	 reliably	 as	 is	 implied	 by	 traditional	 constitutional	 rulings	 and	 modern	democratic	 theory.	 In	 practice,	 therefore,	 politicians'	 responses	 differ	 substantially	 from	 the	normative	expectations	of	the	political	institutions	(ibid).	4	Hooghe	(2011,	271)	fundamentally	defends	the	single-definition	of	political	institutions’	trust,	but	adds	“if	there	is	any	two-dimensionality	in	a	political	trust	scale,	it	would	be	between,	on	the	one	
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On	the	basis	of	the	institutional-related	understanding	of	political	trust	outlined	above,	the	first	leading	hypothesis	tests	the	potential	division	of	political	entities	and	perception	of	political	trust,	as	follows:	
	
H1:	The	structure	of	political	trust	is	more	than	a	one-dimensional	phenomena.		
	
3	EVALUATION	PERSPECTIVES	OF	POLITICAL	TRUST	AND	POLITICAL	
ENTITIES		Political	 trust	 can	 be	 conceptually	 and	 analytically	 treated	 as	 a	 two-fold	phenomenon.	It	can	be	used	as	one	(among	many	others)	of	the	determinants	for	the	assessment	of	the	success	of	one	political	system	or	its	democracy,	or	it	can	directly	reflects	the	cognitive	assessment	of	what	political	entities	do	with	regard	to	regime	performance	(Easton	1975;	Kumlin	2002,	109–111).	In	the	former	case	we	speak	about	a	diffuse	political	trust	phenomenon,	while	in	the	latter	about	a	specific	 phenomenon	 (Easton	 1975).	 In	 the	 diffuse	 phenomenon	 cases,	 it	 is	assumed	 that	 political	 trust	 is	 so	 closely	 related	 to	 democracy	 that	 it	 either	represents	its	constitutive	minimal	criteria,	which	is	a	trademark	of	success	or	failure	 (Zmerli	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Kumlin	 2002;	 Denters	 et	 al.	 2007).	 Political	institutions	undertake	a	central	role	when	political	trust	is	regarded	as	a	specific	phenomenon.	Political	trust	is	being	defined	through	the	evaluation	data	of	how	they	perform,	how	they	are	perceived	by	the	people,	and	what	results	they	are	achieving	(ibid).		By	the	mid	1970s,	Crozier,	Huntington	and	Watanuki	(1975)	had	already	closely	connected	lower	levels	of	political	trust	in	established	Western	democracies	to	the	 prevailing	 modes	 of	 state	 governability.	 According	 to	 the	 authors,	 lower	levels	of	political	 trust	 are	 related	 to	 a	broader	 range	of	 economic,	 social	 and	political	interventions	on	a	macro-level,	showing	that	in	the	longer	term,	various	general	 dysfunctions	 of	 democracy	 are	 the	 only	 evident	 explanation	 for	decreasing	trust	in	political	institutions	(ibid).	Inglehart	(1990),	also	on	a	longer-term	basis,	correlated	decreasing	levels	of	trust	with	the	rise	of	modernisation	and	identity	changes.	Within	a	similar	framework,	a	causality	between	general	satisfaction	with	 democracy	 and	 the	 performance	 of	 specific	 policies	 has	 also	been	 confirmed	 on	 various	 case	 studies,	 stating	 that	 where	 there	 is	 higher	welfare	 and	 economic	 policy	 performance,	 people	 have	 higher	 expectations	(Putnam	1993;	Vatter	and	Bernauer	2009).	This	is	particularly	true	for	economic	policy	 performance	 and	 trust	 in	 how	 governments	 work.	 It	 is	 believed	 that	national	 economic	 performance	 and	 citizens'	 evaluations	 of	 the	 economy	 are	correlated	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 negative	 perceptions	 of	 the	 economy	 promote	higher	political	distrust	(Citrin	1974;	Hetherington	1998).5		
 hand,	trust	in	representative	institutions	[…]	and	on	the	other	hand	trust	in	the	order	institutions	of	a	society”	and	“	if	the	purpose	was	to	show	political	trust	is	not	one-dimensional,	it	would	have	made	more	 sense	 to	 focus	on	 items	 that	 are	 less	 central	 to	 the	 scale,	 like	 […]	 trust	 in	United	Nations”.	5	Although	in	a	very	recent	case	Klingeman	(2018)	stated	that	the	2008	financial	crisis	in	Germany	had	 no	 direct	 impact	 on	 the	 strong	 and	 stable	 support	 for	 democracy	 within	 the	 country,	 a	number	of	studies	focusing	on	political	parties’	stability	 in	times	of	economic	crisis	show	that	people	in	Western	democracies	(especially	post-socialist)	are	significantly	more	likely	to	shift	to	another	party	in	response	to	an	economic	downturn.	This	leads	towards	the	destabilization	of	the	party	 systems,	 which	 is	 one	 of	 the	 building	 blocks	 of	 today's	 democratic	 systems,	 and	 also	political	trust	discourse	(Hernández	and	Kriesi	2016;	Dassonneville	and	Hooghe	2017).		
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Similar	general	trends	described	above	have	also	been	detected	in	the	cases	of	younger	democracies.	Although	countries	in	the	so	called	younger	democracies	have	 higher	 levels	 of	 mistrust	 in	 political	 institutions	 than	 those	 of	 older	democracies	(Bernhard,	Reenock	and	Nordstrom	2003;	Letki	2004;	Catterberg	2006;	 Dalton	 and	 Welzel	 2014),	 the	 patterns	 of	 relationships	 between	democracies,	 politicians’	 responsiveness	 and	 political	 trust	 show	 similarities	with	democracies	with	older	tradition	(Zmerli	et	al.	2007;	Denters	et	al.	2007).			In	 other	 words,	 scholars	 who	 have	 analysed	 the	 shorter-term	 impacts	 of	contemporary	 political	 and	 economic	 experiences	 and	 the	 changing	 levels	 of	political	 trust	recognise	mostly	conclude	 that	short-term	negative	experiences	have	a	greater	effect	on	the	decreasing	levels	of	political	trust,	regardless	of	the	level	of	their	democratic	traditions	(Mishler	and	Rose	2001;	Klingemann	2014).			Hence,	according	to	the	results	form	literature	review,	it	would	be	expected	that	the	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 related	 processes	 shaped	 attitudes	towards	political	trust	during	the	periods	under	study	(2004,	2010	and	2012).	Based	on	the	exposed	general	evaluative	perspective	of	political	trust	in	times	of	crisis,	the	following	hypothesis	is	established:	
	
H2:	The	 level	of	political	 trust	 constructs	 is	negatively	affected	over	 time	 (e.g.	 in	
times	of	financial	crisis).			Further	on,	a	set	of	the	so-called	diffuse	political	and	non-political	determinants	of	political	 trust	 in	various	political	entities	should	be	considered.	The	 leading	questions	in	these	cases	would	be	if	individual	satisfaction	with	government	or	with	 democracy	 (political	 determinants),	 or	 level	 of	 education,	 gender,	satisfaction	 with	 life	 (non-political	 determinants)	 are	 relevant	 as	 evaluation	categories	of	defining	political	trust	(Almond	and	Verba	1963;	Catterberg	2006;	Crozier	 et	 al.	 1975;	 van	Deth	 et	 al.	 2007;	Mishler	 and	Rose	2001;	Pharr	 et	 al.	2000).			The	literature	that	relate	to	the	political	determinants	of	the	concept	of	political	trust	 reveals	 that	 levels	 of	 political	 trust	 correspond	 to	 the	 performance	 of	political	 institutions	 in	 relations	 to	 democracy,	 political	 system	 and	 also	 in	 a	specific	 policy	 field	 as	 reflected	 through	 individuals’	 evaluation	 of	 their	satisfaction,	 responsiveness,	 participation,	 and	 choice	 of	 the	 stated	 political	factors	 (Zmerli	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Denters	 et	 al.	 2007).	 Besides	 the	 already	 stated	influence	 of	 economic	 circumstances,	many	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 political	trust	 in	 political	 institutions	 is	 likely	 to	 decline	 when	 material	 wellbeing	increases.	In	this	case,	greater	wealth	leads	to	a	decline	in	satisfaction	with	the	performance	of	welfare	policies,	as	the	public	begins	to	evaluate	its	leaders	and	institutions,	 demanding	 higher	 standards	 and	 with	 higher	 expectations.	(Inglehart	1990;	Catterberg	2006).			Further	 on,	 non-political	 determinants	 such	 as	 age,	 gender,	 education	 and	individuals´	 satisfaction	 with	 life	 are	 evidenced	 to	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	assessment	 of	 political	 trust,	 too	 (ibid).	 People's	 individual	 cultural	 and	normative	traits	and	beliefs,	or	their	social	backgrounds	are	assumed	to	correlate	with	 non-political	 determinants	 for	 political	 trust	 (Schoon	 and	 Cheng	 2011).	Some	studies	have	found	that	ability,	education	and	occupational	status	have	a	positive	association	with	political	trust	(Hibbing	and	Theiss-Morse	1995),	while	others	have	found	negative	or	non-significant	associations	(Döring	1992;	Hooghe	2011).	 Research	 on	 the	 potential	 impacts	 of	 non-political	 determinants	 (e.g.,	
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long-life	 learning)	 on	 political	 trust	 in	 younger,	 post-communist	 democracies	have	not	revealed	any	significant	differences	to	more	established	democracies	(Mishler	and	Rose	2001;	Catterberg	and	Moreno	2006).			Although	 the	 stated	 approaches	 and	 especially	 their	 findings	 have	 quite	frequently	 been	 marked	 as	 inconsistent	 (Schoon	 and	 Cheng	 2011),	 or	 even	conceptually	overstretched	(Fisher,	Van	Heerde	and	Tucker	2010;	Hooghe	2011),	the	 third	 and	 fourth	 hypothesis	 considering	 political	 and	 non-political	determinants	 of	 political	 trust	 are	 (in	 accordance	 with	 previous	 studies)	 as	follows:		
	
H3:	 Political	 determinants	 have	 a	 higher	 influence	 on	 political	 trust	 than	 non-
political	determinants.		
	
H4:	 Causal	 effects	 of	 non-political	 determinants	 on	 political	 trust	 constructs	 are	
significant	and	lower	than	causal	effects	on	political	determinants.		Table	1	shows	the	stated	hypotheses.		TABLE	1:	OUTLINE	OF	THE	HYPOTHESES	
	
	
	
4	DATA,	METHOD	AND	OPERATIONALIZATION	
	4.1	Data		Data	collected	on	a	random	sample	of	Swiss,	Spanish	and	Slovenian	citizens	were	provided	 by	 the	 European	 Social	 Survey	 (ESS)	 for	 the	 years	 2004,	 2010	 and	2012.6	The	sample	size	for	Spanish	citizens	was	4772	respondents	(1338	in	2004,	1683	in	2010,	and	1751	in	2012);	4459	were	Swiss	respondents	(1819	in	2004,	1295	in	2010,	and	1345	in	2012);	and	3335	were	Slovenian	respondents	(1091	in	2004,	1159	in	2010,	and	1085	in	2012).	Each	country	chosen	has	a	different	level	of	democratic	maturity,	and	all	three	offer	full	ESS	data	support	for	testing	the	 leading	 hypotheses.	 Switzerland	 was	 chosen	 for	 being	 one	 of	 the	 first	European	 democracies,	 Spain	 is	 representative	 of	 the	 early	 third	 wave	 of	European	democracies	in	the	late	1970s,	and	Slovenia	is	an	example	of	the	late	third	wave	of	post-communist	democracies,	 from	the	early	1990s.	Data	 for	all	three	countries	were	analysed	in	2004	(before	the	global	financial	crisis),	in	2010	and	2012	(two	and	four	years	after	the	2008	financial	crisis).	
	4.2	Operationalization		Political	 trust	 is	 described	 as	 a	 complex	 concept	 that	 cannot	 be	 properly	measured	by	answering	one	single	question.	Therefore,	a	combination	of	political	trust	indicators	were	used	in	order	to	obtain	a	more	reliable	result,	as	this	is	more	appropriate	for	measuring	complex	concepts	than	a	single	indicator	(Allum,	Read	and	Sturgis	2011;	Torney-Purta	et	al.	2004).	
 6	 The	 reason	 for	 using	 this	 particular	 sample	 of	 three	 countries	 is	 purely	 practical	 as	 all	 data	required	for	the	periods	analysed	were	fully	available	in	the	ESS	dataset	for	the	three	countries.	
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In	this	study,	political	trust	was	measured	using	seven	items	from	the	following	ESS	question:	“...	on	a	score	of	0-10	how	much	do	you	personally	trust	each	of	the	
institutions?	0	means	you	do	not	trust	an	institution	at	all,	and	10	means	you	have	
complete	 trust”.	The	 items	are:	 ‘[country’s]	parliament’,	 ‘the	 legal	 system’,	 ‘the	police’,	‘politicians’,	‘political	parties’,	the	‘European	Parliament’	and	the	‘United	Nations’.7	 These	 seven	 institutions	 were	 analysed	 for	 Switzerland,	 Spain	 and	Slovenia	in	the	years	2004,	2010	and	2012.		First,	 latent	 constructs	 on	 trust	 in	 political	 institutions	 was	 analysed,	 then	political	and	non-political	causal	relationships	between	the	constructs.	Political	factors	include	satisfaction	with	the	economic	situation,	government,	democracy,	health	and	education.	The	measurement	 for	 these	variables	 is	 the	same	for	all	time	periods,	and	is	obtained	from	ESS	on	a	scale	of	0	(completely	dissatisfied)	to	10	(completely	satisfied).	Satisfaction	with	the	economic	situation	is	measured	as	 follows:	 “On	 the	 whole,	 how	 satisfied	 are	 you	 with	 the	 present	 state	 of	 the	
economy	 in	 [country]?”.	 Satisfaction	 with	 government	 is	 measured	 by	 the	question	“Now	thinking	about	the	government	in	[country],	how	satisfied	are	you	
with	the	way	it	is	doing	its	job?”.	Satisfaction	with	democracy	is	evaluated	with	the	question	“On	the	whole,	how	satisfied	are	you	with	the	way	democracy	works	in	
[country]?”.	Satisfaction	with	education	is	evaluated	with	the	question	“Please	say	
what	you	think	overall	about	the	state	of	education	in	[country]	nowadays?”,	and	satisfaction	with	health	is	evaluated	with	the	question:	“Please	say	what	you	think	
overall	about	the	state	of	health	services	in	[country]	nowadays?”		Non-political	factors	used	are	gender,	age,	life	satisfaction	(measured	by	“On	the	
whole,	 how	 satisfied	 are	 you	 with	 life	 in	 general?”,	 measured	 on	 a	 scale	 of	 0,	completely	dissatisfied,	to	10,	completely	satisfied),	and	level	of	education	(using	four	categories:	“below	lower	secondary	education;	lower	secondary	education	completed;	 upper-	 and	 post-secondary	 education	 completed;	 and	 tertiary	education	completed”).	
	4.3	Method		Firstly,	Confirmatory	Factor	Analysis	-CFA-	(Brown	2006)	was	used	to	evaluate	political	trust	as	a	latent	construct.	As	three	countries	and	three	time	points	are	involved,	multiple	group	CFA	-MGCFA-	is	used	to	study	Hypotheses	1	and	2.	This	enables	us	to	evaluate	the	institutional	structure	and	trends	of	political	trust	over	different	years	for	the	three	countries.	Secondly,	the	effects	of	political	and	non-political	 indicators	 on	 political	 trust	 constructs	 are	 analysed	 using	 Structural	Equation	Modelling-	SEM	(Byrne	2012).	This	permits	not	only	accuracy	of	 the	results,	but	also	flexibility	in	estimating	models,	giving	more	accurate	estimates	of	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 theoretically	 related	 variables	 (political	 and	non-political	 indicators)	 and	 the	 latent	 construct	 of	 interest	 (political	 trust),	while	 measurement	 error	 is	 taken	 into	 account.	 Hypotheses	 3	 and	 4	 were	evaluated	using	SEM.	
	4.4	Results		The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 section	 shows	 the	 resulting	 institutional	 perspective	 of	political	trust.	The	focus	is	on	measuring	whether	political	trust	is	a	single	latent	
 7	The	following	set	of	institutions	was	selected	on	the	basis	of	the	classifications	available	and	the	labelling	of	institutions.	The	European	Parliament	was	added	as	another	potential,	very	specific	supra-national	representative	political	institution	(see	Denters	et.	al,	2007;	Hooghe	2011,	and	the	section	Political	trust	and	the	institutional	structure	of	political	entities	in	this	article).	
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construct	 formed	by	 seven	 indicators,	 or	 if	 it	 is	 represented	by	 several	 latent	variables.	The	institutional	perspective	of	political	trust	was	also	interpreted	for	each	country	and	time	period.	Table	2	shows	the	fit	indices	for	the	political	trust	model	 structures	 analysed.	 MGCFA	 with	 Maximum	 Likelihood	 Robust	 (MLR)	estimator	was	 used	 for	 each	 country.	 The	 following	 goodness-of-fit	measures	were	used	for	the	model	fit:	standardised	root	mean	square	residual	(SRMR),	and	root	mean	square	error	of	approximation	(RMSEA)	measures.	SRMR	values	of	0.09	or	lower	and	RMSEA	values	of	0.06	or	lower	indicate	acceptable	fit	(Hu	and	Bentler	 1999).	 The	 comparative	 fit	 index	 (CFI)	 and	 Tucker-Lewis	 index	 (TLI)	incremental	 fit	 indices	 were	 used	 to	 calculate	 improvements	 over	 competing	models.	 Values	 higher	 than	 0.90	 for	 these	 two	 indices	 are	 an	 indicator	 of	acceptable	model	fit	(Hu	and	Bentler	1999).		TABLE	2:	FIT	MEASURES	FOR	MEASUREMENT	OF	POLITICAL	TRUST	
*	National	institutions	and	political	subjects	(parliament,	legal	system,	police,	politicians,	political	parties);	Political	bodies	at	the	supranational	level	(European	Parliament,	United	Nations).	**	 Order	 institutions	 at	 the	 national	 level	 (parliament,	 legal	 system,	 police);	 Political	 subjects	(politicians,	 political	 parties);	 Political	 bodies	 at	 the	 supranational	 level	 (European	 Parliament,	United	Nations).		Table	2	shows	 the	model	 fit	 for	different	 institutional	perspectives	of	political	trust	using	MGCFA	in	the	three	time	periods.	Firstly,	a	single	latent	construct	with	the	 seven	 reflective	 indicators	 was	 evaluated.	 The	 fit	 for	 model	 (M1)	 is	 not	acceptable,	which	means	these	seven	items	are	not	correctly	specified	as	unique	latent	 variables.	 The	 second	 model	 (M2)	 considers	 one	 latent	 construct	represented	by	trust	in	‘parliament’,	‘legal	system’,	‘police’,	‘politicians’,	‘political	parties’,	 namely	 “National	 institutions	 and	 political	 subjects”,	 and	 a	 construct	representing	‘trust	in	the	European	Parliament’	and	‘trust	in	the	United	Nations’,	namely	“Political	bodies	at	an	international	level”.	This	model	fit	is	better	than	model	1,	but	it	is	still	not	acceptable.	The	third	model	(M3)	sees	political	trust	as	three	different	latent	constructs:	1)	“Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”8	made	up	 of	 ‘trust	 in	 parliament’,	 ‘legal	 system’	 and	 ‘police’;	 2)	 “Political	 subjects”	comprising	‘trust	in	politicians’	and	‘political	parties’;	and	3)	“Political	bodies	at	an	 international	 level”,	 a	 latent	 construct	 representing	 trust	 in	 'European	Parliament’	 and	 ‘United	 Nations’.	 The	 fit	 for	 M3	 is	 acceptable.	 The	 latent	component	structure	found	for	M3	is	invariant	(Milfont	and	Fischer	2010)	across	time	 (2004,	2010	and	2012)	 and	 countries	 (Switzerland,	 Spain	 and	Slovenia),	thus	allowing	comparisons	across	time	and	countries	to	be	interpreted	correctly.	The	representation	of	model	3	(M3)	can	be	seen	in	Figure	1.			
 8	Labelled	'order	institutions'	on	the	basis	of	established	typology	used	to	measure	political	trust	(Denters	et	al.	2007).	
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FIGURE	1:	CONFIRMATORY	FACTOR	ANALYSIS	WITH	3	LATENT	FACTORS	
	
		In	Figure	1,	squares	represent	indicators	and	circles	represent	constructs	(latent	variables),	ei	is	a	random	measurement	error	for	the	responses	and	κ	is	the	factor	mean	for	the	latent	variables.		Results	 from	Table	 2	 support	H1	 in	 that	 the	 institutional	 structure	with	 three	latent	variables	“Order	 institutions	at	a	national	 level”,	 “Political	subjects”	and	“Political	bodies	at	the	international	level”	is	the	same	for	all	three	countries.	This	structure	also	holds	for	the	three	time	periods:	2004,	2010	and	2012.	Parliament	and	national	governmental	institutions	are	regarded	as	public	order	institutions.	This	finding	is	important	in	itself,	as	parliament	is	regardless	of	the	fact	that	it	should	represent	the	central	arena	of	democracy	through	its	regulatory	powers	(functions,	jurisdictions).		Table	3	shows	the	levels	of	these	three	latent	constructs,	where	each	construct	is	measured	with	latent	means	(κ).		TABLE	3:	LATENT	FACTOR	MEANS	FOR	POLITICAL	TRUST	
		**p-value<0.01		Table	3	indicates	that	levels	of	trust	are	different	for	each	of	the	three	countries.	Switzerland	 has	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 trust	 for	 all	 constructs	 in	 2004	 (except	“Political	bodies	at	the	international	level”	in	Spain	in	2004).	Thus,	according	to	data	from	2010	and	2012,	Spain	follows	Switzerland.	The	country	with	the	lowest	level	 of	 trust	 for	 all	 constructs	 is	 Slovenia.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 maturity	 of	democracy	in	these	three	countries	(established	in	Switzerland	in	1848,	Spain	in	1977,	and	Slovenia	in	1991)	is	relevant	to	the	citizens’	level	of	trust;	Switzerland	thus	has	the	highest	levels	of	trust	for	the	various	dimensions	(order	institutions	at	a	national	level,	political	subjects	and	political	bodies	at	an	international	level).		Table	3	also	shows	the	trend	from	2004	to	2012	for	the	three	latent	constructs.	Switzerland	has	a	positive	trend,	which	means	that	for	“Order	institutions	at	a	national	 level”	and	“Political	 subjects”,	 the	 level	was	higher	 in	2010	and	2012	than	 in	 2004,	while	 for	 “Political	 bodies	 at	 an	 international	 level”	 there	 is	 no	
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difference	between	time	periods.	Spain	and	Slovenia	were	severely	affected	by	the	economic	and	financial	crisis,	and	have	a	lower	level	of	political	trust	for	all	the	 constructs	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Slovenia	 had	 a	 dramatic	 decrease	 for	“Order	institutions	at	the	national	level”	while	“Political	subjects”	also	decreased	significantly	after	the	crisis.			Results	partially	support	Hypothesis	2.	The	trend	for	the	level	of	political	trust	over	time	also	holds	as	the	trend	in	the	“Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”,	“Political	subjects”	and	“Political	bodies	at	an	international	level”	was	negative	over	time	for	Spain	and	Slovenia.	However,	the	constructs	“Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”	and	“Political	subjects”	increased	in	Switzerland,	which	had	the	same	level	of	trust	for	“Political	bodies	at	the	international	level”.		
	
5	CAUSAL	RELATIONSHIPS	FOR	POLITICAL	TRUST		The	next	step	is	to	relate	the	three	latent	constructs	found	in	the	analysis	(M3	in	Table	 2)	 with	 their	 political	 and	 non-political	 predictors.	 A	 SEM	model,	 with	Maximum	 Likelihood	 Robust	 (MLR)	 estimator,	 was	 used	 to	 identify	 the	significant	causal	factors	for	political	trust	over	time.	The	political	factors	used	are	 the	 level	 of	 satisfaction	with	 the	 following	 situations:	 country’s	 economy,	government,	democracy,	education	and	health	system.	The	non-political	factors	used	are	the	level	of	satisfaction	with	life,	gender,	age	and	education.	Tables	4a,	4b	and	4c	 show	 the	political	 and	non-political	 effects	on	 the	 latent	 constructs	“Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”,	“Political	subjects”	and	“Political	bodies	at	an	 international	 level”	 in	 Switzerland,	 Spain	 and	 Slovenia,	 respectively.	Unstandardized	 estimates	 are	 used	 (Byrne	 2012)	 to	 compare	 the	 results	 in	Tables	4a,	4b	and	4c.		TABLE	4A:	ESTIMATES	FOR	POLITICAL	TRUST	IN	SWITZERLAND	
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TABLE	4B:	ESTIMATES	FOR	POLITICAL	TRUST	IN	SPAIN	
		TABLE	4C:	ESTIMATES	FOR	POLITICAL	TRUST	IN	SLOVENIA	
		The	 results	 for	 Switzerland	 in	 Table	 4a	 show	 that	 political	 variables	 are	predictors	of	political	 trust.	These	variables	are	 satisfaction	with	government,	democracy,	 health,	 and	 education.	 “Order	 institutions	 at	 a	 national	 level”	was	particularly	affected	by	both	political	and	non-political	variables	in	2004,	except	for	the	variable	'satisfaction	with	the	economy'.	The	“Political	subjects	construct”	is	affected	by	political	variables	only,	while	“Political	bodies	at	an	international	level”	is	affected	by	satisfaction	with	government,	democracy,	education;	and	the	non-political	variables,	age	and	education.	
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In	2010,	the	“Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”	construct	is	affected	by	the	same	 variables,	 except	 gender	 and	 age,	which	 are	 not	 statistically	 significant.	“Political	 subjects”	 and	 “Political	 bodies	 at	 an	 international	 level”	 have	 more	differences	 between	 time	 periods;	 this	 means	 that	 order	 institutions	 in	Switzerland	are	more	stable	over	time.	In	2012,	satisfaction	with	the	economy	was	a	predictive	variable	for	“Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”	and	“Political	bodies	at	an	international	level”,	the	remaining	political	variables	and	most	non-political	variables	are	significant.		Table	4b	shows	that	for	Spain	in	2004,	all	political	and	non-political	variables	are	relevant	for	“Order	institutions	at	the	national	level”	except	gender.	For	“Political	subjects”,	all	variables	are	relevant,	except	satisfaction	with	life	and	education.	The	“Political	bodies	at	an	international	level”	is	affected	by	all	political	variables,	gender	and	education.	Concerning	2010	and	2012,	political	variables	affected	the	three	 latent	 constructs,	 except	 satisfaction	with	 health	 on	 “Political	 subjects”,	showing	clear	confirmation	of	stability	in	those	variables.	Education	is	the	most	relevant	non-political	variable,	however	it	is	non-significant	for	“Political	bodies	at	the	international	level”	after	the	economic	and	financial	crisis.		Results	for	Slovenia	(Table	4c)	in	2004	reveal	a	pattern	of	effects	of	determinants	on	constructs	 that	 is	 less	 clear.	Education	and	political	variables	affect	 “Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”,	and	“Political	subjects”	is	affected	by	satisfaction	with	 democracy,	 government,	 health;	 and	 the	 non-political	 variables,	 age	 and	education.	 “Political	 bodies	 at	 an	 international	 level”	 in	 Slovenia	 differ	 in	structure	 from	 Spain	 or	 Switzerland,	 as	 non-political	 variables	 (except	satisfaction	with	health)	are	significant.	The	trend	in	Slovenia	from	2004	to	2010,	and	 in	 2012,	 suggests	 that	 non-political	 variables	 become	 non-significant.	Education	and	gender	(except	in	2010)	are	significant	for	all	constructs.	Political	variables	are	stable	over	time,	and	satisfaction	with	the	economy	is	significant	in	2012	for	“Order	institutions	at	the	national	level”	and	“Political	subjects”.		Generally,	 political	 variables	 highly	 influence	 “Order	 institutions	 at	 a	 national	level”,	 “Political	 subjects”,	and	“Political	bodies	at	an	 international	 level”	 in	all	countries	and	all	time	periods.	In	2004,	non-political	variables	in	Switzerland	and	Spain	affect	“Order	institutions	at	the	national	level”,	while	for	Slovenia	they	are	more	closely	related	to	“Political	bodies	at	an	international	level”.	However,	from	2004	to	2010	and	in	2012,	the	trend	for	these	variables	differs	in	countries	with	different	 levels	 of	 democratic	 maturity.	 Results	 show	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	Switzerland,	 non-political	 variables	 are	 less	 important	 for	 predicting	 order	institutions	at	a	national	 level,	but	more	 important	 for	 “Political	subjects”	and	“Political	bodies	at	an	international	level”.	In	the	case	of	Spain,	the	effect	of	non-political	variables	has	not	changed	significantly.	For	Slovenia,	satisfaction	with	government	and	democracy	remain	stable,	and	satisfaction	with	economy	gains	importance	in	the	short-term	(2012)	after	the	2008	financial	crisis.		These	results	confirm	the	proposed	hypotheses.	 In	relation	 to	political	 factors	and	the	constructs	"Order	institutions	at	the	national	level”,	“Political	subjects”,	and	“Political	bodies	at	the	international	level”,	hypothesis	3	is	partly	supported.	Political	 variables	 are	 significant	 predictors	 of	 the	 various	 constructs.	 For	instance,	 satisfaction	 with	 the	 government	 is	 generally	 higher,	 but	 not	satisfaction	with	economy	or	democracy.		Additionally,	 political	 determinants	 on	 political	 trust	 over	 time	 show	 that	 the	effects	of	political	determinants	on	"Order	institutions	at	a	national	level”	after	
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the	financial	crisis	(2010	and	2012)	are	greater	than,	or	equal	to	those	in	2004.	Satisfaction	with	 the	 economy	 is	 increasingly	 important	 in	 2012,	 at	mid-term	after	 the	 financial	crisis,	and	even	more	relevant	 in	Spain	and	Slovenia,	which	were	 most	 affected	 by	 the	 crisis.	 Regarding	 the	 effects	 of	 non-political	determinants	on	the	latent	constructs,	hypothesis	4	is	also	partly	supported.	Non-political	 variables	 influence	 different	 years	 for	 the	 different	 countries,	particularly	education.	
	
	
6	CONCLUSIONS		The	 debate	 surrounding	 political	 trust	 has	 a	 long	 history,	 and	 still	 remains	popular	 today,	particularly	when	new	political	 and	 socio-economic	 challenges	appear	 in	a	system,	such	as	 the	2008	global	economic	crisis.	Previous	studies,	using	 a	 range	 of	 applying	 various	 normative	 and	 analytical	 approaches,	 have	revealed	many	interesting	findings,	but	also	contradictions.	The	results	pose	a	challenge	 for	 both	 further	 academic	 research,	 and	 also	 for	 the	 contemporary	‘state	of	affairs’	in	the	specific	countries	analysed,	be	it	from	institutional	or	wider	democratic	system	perspective.			The	main	aim	of	this	paper	was	to	disentangle	the	structure	and	map	the	trends	of	political	trust	before,	during	and	after	particular	global	crisis	periods.	This	was	carried	out	by	analysing	political	trust	as	a	bundle	of	constructs	of	various	types	of	 political	 institutions	 over	 time	 and	 according	 to	 political	 and	 non-political	determinants.		Testing	 the	 proposed	model	 revealed	 a	 convincing	 interrelation	 between	 the	countries	and	a	higher	general	level	of	political	trust	(see	Table	5	in	the	Annex).	It	 seems	 that	 citizens’	 understanding	 of	 political	 trust	 has	 a	 more	 complex	structure	than	appears	at	first	glance.			Hypotheses	 1	 and	 2	 confirm	 connections	 between	 an	 institutionally-divided	understanding	of	political	trust	according	to:	a)	order	institutions	at	a	national	level	(with	parliaments	in	all	countries	being	perceived	as	an	order	institution	similar	 to	national	 governmental	 institutions);	 b)	 individual	 political	 subjects;	and	c)	political	bodies	at	an	international	level.			The	 results	 confirm	 that	 these	 constructs	 are	 stable	 over	 time,	 and	 that	 the	periods	before	(2004)	and	after	(2010	and	2012)	the	global	financial	crisis	play	an	important	role.	If	we	compare	the	levels	of	political	trust	before	(2004)	and	after	the	financial	crisis	(2010	and	2012),	it	decreases	in	Spain	and	Slovenia,	but	not	in	Switzerland,	partially	confirming	hypothesis	2.			Regarding	hypotheses	3	and	4,	which	relate	to	the	casual	relationships	of	political	and	non-political	determinants	on	political	trust	constructs,	findings	reveal	that	political	determinants	have	predictive	effects	on	the	components	of	political	trust	in	the	different	countries.	For	non-political	determinants,	education	is	the	most	important	variable	that	influences	political	trust.	These	findings	point	to	the	need	for	 political	 institutions	 to	 perform	 in	 accordance	 with	 stable	 democratic	patterns.	 This	 is	 especially	 important	 for	 the	 set	 of	 representatives	 of	 the	 so-called	individual	political	subject	group	of	political	entities	that	face	the	lowest	levels	of	 trust	among	 the	whole	 “family”	of	political	 institutions.	Results	show	that	 highest	 political	 trust	 is	 placed	 in	 the	 regulatory	 (i.e.	 order)	 political	institutions,	followed	by	trust	in	political	bodies	at	an	international	level.		
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All	in	all,	the	results	of	the	analysis	reflect	the	need	to	conceptually	understand	political	trust	as	an	important	systemic	(i.e.	diffuse)	democratic	characteristic,	as	well	 as	 a	 specific	 construct	 of	 evaluation	 performance	 of	 different	 groups	 of	political	 entities.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 a	 convincing	 difference	 is	 found	 between	political	 institutions	 at	 both	 national	 and	 international	 levels,	 and	 the	phenomena	 of	 political	 entities	 as	 individual	 actors’	 is	 firmly	 evidenced.	Politically	relevant	determinants	play	an	especially	important	role,	and	should	therefore	assist	in	the	attempt	to	understand	and	explain	the	patterns	of	political	trust	in	individual	groups	of	political	entities,	and	their	further	potential	impact	on	the	wider,	so-called	diffuse	perception	of	variously	developed	democracies.	Special	attention	should	be	given	to	issues	regarding	various	types	of	satisfaction,	which	vary	from	each	other	surprisingly,	despite	their	similarities	‘on	paper’	(e.g.	government,	democracy,	economy).			Finally,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 add	 that	 the	 results	 of	 the	 study	 point	 to	 new	insights	 into	trends	 in	political	 trust	 in	 three	countries	with	different	 levels	of	democratic	development.	A	 limitation	of	 the	study	 is	 the	size	of	 the	sample	of	countries	selected,	which	restricts	generalization	of	the	findings.	However,	the	methodology	 and	 results	 can	 contribute	 to	 further	 research	 in	 that	 other	countries	and/or	other	time	periods	could	be	chosen	in	relation	to	the	political	system	selected.			
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APPENDIX		TABLE	5:	KEY	CHARACTERISTICS	BY	COUNTRIES	
	Sources:		*	van	Deth	et	al.	(2007,	20–22,	43–44);	**	World	bank	dataset	(The	World	DataBank)	(http://databank.worldbank.org/);		***	ECPR	Political	Data	Yearbook	(http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/);		****	United	Nations	(http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/);	*****	World	Trade	Organisation	(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm);		Results	without	stars	are	from	authors’	analyses.						
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